MIGRATION

The first tribes to invade and settle in Greece were the Achaeans and Hellenes, who settled on the northern part of the Corinthian Gulf; the tribe later claimed to be autochthonous, but in reality the tribe had moved down into Greece from the Sercheus river. Attica was the first settlement of the Ionian migration,¹ after which the same tribes spread into the Aegean

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¹ Herodotus: V.6.2, 69.1.
and Asia Minor.\(^2\) The Ionian tribal settlement in Attica took place ca. 1050 B.C.; settlement in the Aegean islands burgeoned from the earlier settlements in Attica.\(^3\) The Ionians had migrated into Attica and from thence to the Aegean islands because the Achaians had been displaced from settlement in Lakonia, Argos, and Messenia, when the Dorian tribe invaded the Peloponessus.\(^4\) The Ionian settlement in Attica and the Aegean provided the Ionian tribe with the strongest exposure to the Mycenaean civilization, perhaps accounting for why the highest Greek civilization took place in the Aegean and Attica.\(^5\) The Dori ans, having been last to settle in Greece, were less exposed to Mycenaean civilization, and, as exemplified by Sparta, were characteristically the most conservative, and as occasion bid, the most regressive part of Greek civilization.

The earliest settlement of Attica was unique. There was an absence of war in the earliest archaic period due to low population density. Non-agricultural economy limits migratory tribes to small populations and the post-mycenaean sedentary inhabitants had undergone a population collapse. Thus the invading Ionian tribes did not need to fight the remaining population of the Mycenean population.\(^6\) In oriental society, settlement had ensued by

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3 The Ionian race, then, must have existed before about 1050 B.C., even if we have to wait till Solon for a clear expression of Athenian feeling about it. It seems now to be agreed that the settlements made by the migrants in the east Aegean were new ventures; even. Cf. Andrews, A.; *The Growth of the Athenian State*, in *The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C.*, edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.361.

4 The cause of the Ionians’ flight to Athens was reputedly the dislodgment of the Achaians from their former homes in Lakonia and the Argolid regions that, along with Messenia, were captured by marauders from central Greece known as the Dori ans, led by descendants of Herakles. Cf. Hall, Jonathan F.; “Polis, Community, and Ethnic Identity,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece*, Ed. Shapiro, H.A., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 52.

5 Three dialects sharply distinguished, and probably correspond to three successive waves of conquerors. The oldest of these is the Arcadian and Aeolian-Achaean; the Ionian comes next; and the Dorian is probably the third and last. Thus the Ionians cut in like a wedge between the other two groups, and their chief center was not in Greece but in the islands and Asia Minor. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Michael; *A History of the Ancient World*, Volume I, p.182.
displacement or extermination of the prior inhabitants; at least superficially, the same had been the case of the Dorian tribes, in particular of the Laconians. The Greek, and especially the Ionian, tribes were always a small number among the aboriginal inhabitants, but, mysteriously, this majority adopted the Greek language. At the collapse of Mycenaean civilization no famine intervened, although food production did collapse, because of concurrent depopulation.\(^7\) In consequence the majority of Greeks derived from the non-Greek, aboriginal inhabitants.\(^8\) This is very peculiar because genetically organized tribes usually suffer horror at the liability of contamination by an alien genetic group. It seems that the tribe reconstituted its genetic order inclusive of the Mycenaean post-population. The Hellenic tribes that descended into Greece mixed with the prior inhabitants without enslaving them; usually a primitive tribe enslaves or exterminates an indigenous group in order to prevent contamination.\(^9\) The Mycenaean civilization collapsed ca. 1200, following which the population fell to 25% of what it had been; settlements not only diminished in population, but decreased from 320 at the end of the 13th century to roughly 40 in the 11th; this of course eliminated need for war, instead accommodating peaceful cohabitation with the Ionian tribes.\(^10\) The prior non-Greeks were allowed to become indiscriminately Greek. Centuries later the Greek colonists similarly

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6 The absence of warfare is indicative of a reduced population, limited resources, and a small amount of personal and community wealth, all in keeping with the archaeological record. Cf. Tandy, David W.; *Warriors into Traders*, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 35.

7 Reduced food production coincided with the collapse of the centralized economies and a decrease in population density (the result of emigration or death). The extensive and intensive farming of the Mycenaean Age folded back on itself: fewer people required less food. Cf. Tandy, David W.; *Warriors into Traders*, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 35.

8 In some countries, as seemingly in Attica, a small number of Greek strangers leavened the whole population and spread the Greek tongue; thus Attica became Greek, but the greater part of its inhabitants were sprung, not from Greeks, but from the old people who lived there before the Greeks came. In other countries the invaders came in larger numbers, and the inhabitants were forced to make way for them. Cf. Bury, J.B., *A History of Greece*, London, 1906, p. 42.

9 The folks who lived there before the Greeks came received Greek settlers in their midst, and gradually became Greeks themselves. And in many other lands, though greater changes befell than in Attica and Arcadia, the elder inhabitants probably remained as numerous as the newcomers. Cf. Bury, J.B., *A History of Greece*, London, 1906, p. 40
mixed with the natives instead of subjugating them. The Greek tribes had entered Greece over a period of centuries in sporadic tribes whose size did not upset the sedentary population of the indigenes.\(^\text{11}\)

The earliest social development of Greece differed from that of the Orient first, because the Greeks were not Semitic; they descended from Celtic Europe although racially related to the Persians, and secondly because Greek geography was different from that of the Orient; Greek settlements were enclosed by mountains but were communicable by sea. Settlements did not amalgamate into larger polities, and the most highly developed communities were on the sea coast, not inland.\(^\text{12}\) The atomistic pattern of settlement perhaps had more to do with geography than racial origin, considering that the Mycenaean civilization, composed of a different racial stock, had also consisted of disassociated city-states. The Ionian, Achaean, and Doric tribes that moved into the Peloponnesus should not be imagined to have conquered Greece. Rather, they mixed quite painlessly with the prior inhabitants, although in the later stage of polis-formation, the separate communities became jealously exclusive. The population

\(^{10}\) Following the collapse to the Mycenaean economic centers, which began about 1200, the population of Greece appears to have been reduced by perhaps as much as 75% over the course of the next 200 years. The size of settlements was much smaller than before, and the actual number of settlements was reduced by perhaps seven-eighths (from about 320 in the late thirteenth century to about 130 in the twelfth to about 40 in the eleventh). Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 20.

\(^{11}\) The first important thing to grasp about the coming of the Greeks into Greece is that it was not a single coming, but a series of successive comings. There is every reason to believe that this process of infiltration extended over centuries: each shock that they sustained from their northern neighbors caused a new movement southward. They did not sweep down in a great invading host; they crept in, tribe by tribe, seeking not political conquest but new lands and homesteads. Cf. Bury, J.B., A History of Greece, London, 1906, p. 41.

\(^{12}\) The political organization of Greece was dictated by the geographical and economic conditions. Nature had divided her into small economic units, and she was incapable of creating large political systems. So it had been during the prevalence of the Aegean culture, and so it still remained. Each was self-centered, and its inhabitants jealously guarded their pasture and arable land. The best parts of the country, especially its rich valleys, are open to the sea and shut in by land – separated from the central high valleys and plateau by formidable barriers. They are more in touch with those neighbors from whom the sea divides them than with those whom the land brings near them. It was easier for them to exchange goods and ideas by sea than by land. Hence civilization develops quickly on the coast but slowly in the center of the country. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Michael; A History of the Ancient World, Volume I, p. 181.
of classical Greece was not purely Greek, that is, from one of the three invading tribes; each of these tribal waves made up only a small minority of the subsequent population.

Attica was unique; no other Greek polis had peacefully amalgamated an extensive area; the geographic barriers suggest that a division of Attica into three poleis would have been more probable. The Boeotians, Arcadians, and Thessalians, who were homogenous races and had fewer geographic barriers than Attica, did not achieve extensive amalgamations. Athens had a basileus, which may account for influence that Athens exerted throughout Attica, as intimated by the legend of Theseus.¹³

In the ensuing centuries the Greeks did not make wars of annihilation, contrary to the impression of the Trojan War; something seems to have instilled a racial consciousness that intervened against the internecine self-destruction of the Greek race. Even though the parts of Greece were settled by different tribes, and the Greek of each of these tribes was considerably different from that of the others, the Greeks managed to discern a fundamental racial unity among these tribes that categorically distinguished them from non-Greeks. This resilient racial consciousness originated from tribal, not civic organization. The motivational power in tribalism accounts for why the Greeks maintained a very strong distinction between Greek and barbarian, a racial distinction, but completely failed to inaugurate national organization, dependent as it was upon civic identity, much weaker than tribal identity. Long after the poleis had converted from tribal to civic society, the tribal consciousness reasserted itself in opportune moments, in which poleis, conventionally alien or hostile to each other due to a primary loyalty to the polis, aligned themselves in tribal order. All of the Doric poleis,

¹³ A unitary state the size of Attica is not normal in the pattern of Greek settlement, even where there was no division of race: Boeotians, Arcadians and Thessalians were conscious enough of racial unity, but did not unite in the Attic manner. The three plains of Attica are separate barriers, easily surmounted but more marked than any in the Boeotian plain or the plain of eastern Arcadia, and they could well have supported three or more independent states, in a loose union or none at all. The king of Athens would normally have been the most influential ruler in Attica, as Thucydides presupposes, and that will have been especially true for a period when so much of the population huddled around his Acropolis. Cf. Andrews, A.; The Growth of the Athenian State, in The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C., edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.362.
regardless of divergent constitutions, came into alliance during the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars. In face of the Persian threat, Sparta urged that all the Aegean poleis, which happened to be Ionic, be abandoned, whereas Athens, the greatest Ionic polis, went to their defense. In the Peloponnesian War (431-04 BC), the fact that the Dorian poleis united in alliance, without need for a second thought, to fight all of the Attic and Aegean poleis, who similarly bonded from their common derivation from the Ionian tribe, manifests the latent strength of tribalism through the whole of Greek history.\(^{14}\) Conflict between kinship and citizenship pervaded every episode of Greek history.

Although national government was never achieved, religion, without centralized priesthood, but with nonaligned temples and oracles, performed some functions of a federal government.\(^{15}\) Although oracles were notoriously ambiguous, there is no record of suspicion that an oracle presented a misleading statement in order to mislead one polis in favor of another. The neutrality of the oracles was carefully preserved; they were not made the property of any nascent polis. Neutrality or indifference enabled religion to regulate between rivalrous ethne or poleis. The arbitration had been invented from the aboriginal commitment of the religious temples to the race. In contrast, the war of oriental societies typically prioritized annihilation, in which all humans of the opponent would be slaughtered; such practices

\(^{14}\) But even more importantly, although it was normally the polis that had first claim on a citizen’s loyalty, the memory of a primordial integrity is supposed to have endowed the members of dispersed ethne with an ethnic consciousness that could be invoked in circumstances that extended beyond the confines of the polis. Thus, in the course of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta appealed to a Dorian heritage shared by many of its allies—especially Syracuse—whereas Athens sought to justify its hegemony over the member states of the Delian League by emphasizing a common Ionian patrimony. Cf. Hall, Jonathan F.; “Polis, Community, and Ethnic Identity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, Ed. Shapiro, H.A., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 53.

\(^{15}\) The opposite of war-to-the-finish was the practice of arbitration between states. Its origins are not clear, but in the archaic age it was not uncommon for two parties in a conflict to invoke the mediation of a third, often sponsored, so to speak, by the oracle at Delphi. The role of Delphi in this can hardly surprise, given its function as an interstate oracular centre that was in the seventh and sixth centuries increasingly consulted for a variety of topics, from colonization enterprises to constitutional reforms. Arbitration sanctioned by the god also presupposed a certain awareness of community between the various poleis. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 588.
were based upon beliefs in gods. The Greeks characteristically did not annihilate the enemy; victories were highly restrained.\textsuperscript{16} Possibly the imagination of an implacable god instilled in the agent an absolute duty submerging any conventional limit of humanity; the Greeks, whose gods appeared in human proportions, might not have been capable of categorical extermination. It is quizzical that the Greeks conducted war within moral limits. They relented in war according to the \textit{Amphiktyonikon nomoi}, “laws of the Amphiictyons,” by which forbearance from extermination of the enemy polis was enjoined by religion, an element universal to all Greek communities.\textsuperscript{17} The injunctions furthermore prohibited reducing the polis by starvation, cutting off water supply, or surprise attack.\textsuperscript{18} These prima facie laudable restraints call for explanation of how they entered the Greek conscience; obviously release from such restraints would improve chances of victory, but the archaic Greeks largely contained themselves in these rules. Without variation they revered \textit{métis}, deception in war, but observed moral scruples against extermination. When an incident of similar proportions did occur, they regretted it and expected future vengeance from the \textit{furies}. They regarded it as dishonorable to enter battle with an army much larger than that of the opponent; as Thucydides constantly reminds us, honor, or rank, seems to have motivated war more than material gain. One must inquire why honor could appear more rational to the Greeks than wealth and power.

\textsuperscript{16} It may not be out of place to signal the absence in Greek history of any idea of a “holy war,” of warfare bent on the utter destruction of the opposing side at the command of, or in devotion to, a god. Such notions were known to peoples in the Near East and to Germanic tribes. Conceivably, their absence in Greece facilitated the emergence of norms and practices that served to mitigate to some extent the realities of war. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in \textit{A Companion to Archaic Greece}, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 595.

\textsuperscript{17} A set of conventions did indeed develop in the archaic age, which, although not often violated, nevertheless influenced Greek warfare to a considerable extent. The most important of these conventions were: to allow the defeated party to bury its dead under truce; to release prisoners of war against a ransom; to refrain from sacking town completely; and finally, not to attack by surprise. Later tradition called these rules specifically \textit{Amphiktyonikos nomoi}, “laws of the Amphiictyons,” i.e. the twelve statutes might well be the fruit of Delphic propaganda. In the fourth century Aeschines mentioned “the oath of the Amphiictyons” by which they swore not to destroy each other’s cities, nor to try to reduce them by starvation or deprive them of their water supply. P. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in \textit{A Companion to Archaic Greece}, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 597.

\textsuperscript{18} Aeschylus: 2.115, cf. 3.09-10.
RELIGION

The theocentric framework engendered civil society in Greece as elsewhere. Religion matured centuries earlier than the financing of religion by the polis. In forming religion to the consolidation of the polis, it gave religion its rationalistic-ethical element. The prior religion had been irrational, was cultivated within the family, not the polis, and remained dissociated from civic culture.19 Prior to Draco, murder for example was not an affair of civic society; the relative or member of the victim's clan had the religious responsibility to establish arbitration between families or to take revenge. In the emergent polis society, the kinship practice became inadequate. Conurbation in the polis entailed higher intensities of interdependence, so that elimination of an individual would extend harm to many people dependent on him. In the previous social order, the uniformity of labor meant that the disappearance of one person would not affect the labor or production of others. The transition to polis society entailed repeal of the traditional customs of remedy; the story of Kleon and Antigone exemplifies how kinship could conflict with polis. The family- or clan-member was no longer allowed to revenge himself on the perpetrator; he was required to bring the complaint to public agency.20

The gods of Greek mythology are notoriously amoral because their gestation preceded the polis by centuries, and therefore did not propagate from the interdependence ingredient to civic society. Religion remained steadfastly centered in civic society in the oriental societies, whereas in archaic Greek social evolution civil society was disengaged from religion; early religion tended to defend the priority of the family against the polis. Neither Samos, nor any polis thereafter, had ever been governed by a priesthood.21 The emphasis on religion

19 In this way our two strands of explanation complement each other. One represented the partial disengagement of legal process and public order from its original theocentric framework, the other a greater involvement of the state in the direction and financing of cult and ritual. Both combined to tip the balance of power between religion and state further in favor of the latter, and thereby to make the latter increasingly the main framework of religious activity and to intensify the difficulties and fragmentation of fifth-century theodicies. Cf. Davies, J. K.; “Religion and the State,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, second edition, volume IV: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C., EDS, Boatman, John, Hammond, N.G.I., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.388.
in classical Athens was perhaps an attempt to suppress the old folk religion with a revision oriented to Athenian patriotism. The stimulus, given from contact with Asia Minor, was intensified by an increase of population. The oikos mentality discouraged commerce, but since there was no priestly class to monitor portrayal of the gods, the new mythology, not created by priests, helped to surpass reservations against trade. Religion had lost its dominance within civil society much earlier than had been the case of the oriental societies. The gods were the very first symbols to regulate Greek social behavior, but these religious paradigms were engendered from the ancient tribal environment, concerned with survival, whereas the moral element introduced for social cooperation was a promotion of the conditions that made life in the polis possible. The apparent amorality of the gods reflects the instinctual, personal dedication ensconced in the archaic theology.

The gods were the very first symbols of social behavior, despite the immediate inconsistency. Oriental gods symbolized the unity of the entire society; mountains and valleys made Greek polytheism far stronger than its oriental counterpart, explaining the greater strength of Greek polytheism over its oriental counterpart, and thus much of the divergence

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20 It is very unlikely that Draco was the author of a comprehensive codification of existing law. Rather, his regulations seem to have covered only kinds of homicide in which conventional forms of arbitration no longer functioned and immediate self-help in the form of retaliation threatened to cause an escalating cycle of vengeance. That they were made effective retroactively confirms their urgency. Draco’s homicide law was recorded anew on stone in 409/8 in the context of a revision of all Athenian laws; an extant section concerns murder without premeditation and, despite possible modifications, certainly preserves the authentic core of Draco’s statute. First, specific relatives or members of the victim’s phratry had to bring public accusation against the murderer. The claim to blood relatives hereby announced was limited by the subsequent intervention of polis institutions. Cf. Stahl, Michael, and Walter, Uwe; “Athens,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 141.


of Greek from oriental civilization. Monotheism would have been a natural progression in the plains of oriental society, where society expanded, but Greek society coalesced. The origination of Greek gods from the family rather than civic organization allowed each individual to claim lineage from a particular god. But, the family organization of the gods, and the descent of individual humans from this divine family structure compelled the Greeks to improvise how the many gods could be brought into association with each other in order to make the various settlements coalesce. Greek religion thus served to generate the solidarity of previously atomized settlements. The plurality of the Greek gods thus served to unify Greek society.\textsuperscript{23}

Amalgamation of dispersed settlements into a polis was accomplished within polytheism, but polytheism had not evolved for the purpose of centralization, nor had religion functioned in tandem with government as well as it did in oriental society. The construction of gods as patrons of poleis fit awkwardly with the irremediably personal character of Greek religion. The personal religion was older, the state religion was separate, and state religion did not ritualize personal events. State religion had been instituted to promote solidarity of the people belonging to the polis, concentrating on the patron deity of the polis, war, and collective entity. The older religion was devoted to ancestors, family deities, birth, death, marriage, and other personal concerns. Engulfment of the primitive into the modern religion was unsuccessful; religious ceremonies pertinent to the polis were staged in the polis, and smallholders could not bear the expense of traveling in and out of the polis. This was one factor of the perennial conflict between state and religion.\textsuperscript{24}

Emphasis of the municipal nature of the gods involved negligence of religious cult on the familial level, for the authentic familial nature of religion undermined the polis.

\textsuperscript{23} That is, like all societies of archaic Greece their society is embedded in religion: at some level of consciousness, actions which express or reflect the solidarity of the community are transformed into ‘religious’ terms. A family is defined by its cults: Cf. Davies, J. K.; “Religion and the State,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, second edition, volume IV: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C., EDS. Boatman, John, Hammond, N.G.I., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.369.
Religion coincided perfectly with the genos- and phratry- organization of kinship, embracing expanding circles of votaries. However, the polis had originated in conflict with the antecedent kinship structure, which in consequence grew largely by displacing rather than amplifying religion. The member of a genos was ipso facto aristocratic, well born; the member of a genos was qualified to be a priest or priestess in one of the civic cults. It is probable that the migratory tribe had phratries and gene that divided according to blood lines, but that the polis regime adopted the prestige already embedded in the names of the blood-lines to form non-consanguineous groups; the military phratry, the military "brothers," were not blood-relatives by the later phase of the archaic period, although they remained so in Sparta and the ethne. This misleading eponymy was typical of the mentality of concealing replacement of old with new practices by using the same names; the idea of redistribution to and from the basileus to the people was an adaptation of the distribution within the family oikos between the patriarch and the members.25 Differing from oriental society, religion did not constitute the framework of political life.26

But the original polis did not form in oppositional separation from religion. The coalescence into a polis made use of the idea of divine lineage to explain their unification into a community; the members claimed that their common blood lineage derived from a

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24 Most of the famous state cults and festivals were celebrated only at the urban center; if residents of distant demes wanted to participate they had to travel. Distance may be seen as either a factor in consolidation (demsemen are integrated because forced to come to Athens) or in fragmentation (demsemen are excluded because they cannot come to Athens). Certain celebrations, however, notably those concerned with women and families, such as the Dionysian festivals, were recapitulated in city and countryside. This reduplication is difficult to understand as anything but a concession to the limits of the social solidarity of the rural population of the State. Furthermore a host of peculiar divinities were worshiped in the countryside, but not in the city. Cf. Hedrick, Jr., Charles W.; “Religion and Society in Classical Greece,” p. 293, in Ogden, Daniel; A Companion to Greek Religion, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007.

25 Gene, by contrast, did not include all Athenians, and by the classical period and doubtless before membership in a genos was synonymous with being “well born.” Many, if not all, gene had the prerogative of furnishing religious leadership to certain city cults: a given genos typically provided the priest or priestess of a civic cult out of its membership. Cf. Hedrick, Jr., Charles W.; “Religion and Society in Classical Greece,” p. 294, in Ogden, Daniel; A Companion to Greek Religion, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007.
The original polis-government was composed of aristocrats, because within the kinship hierarchy they were the most prestigious. The primitive army was composed of phratries i.e. groups of genetic linkage. The phratries were cult-groups composed of the same membership as the military group, giving each member a personal identity by virtue of his descent from a god celebrated in the cult. The early polis regularly adopted a god to be its patron. The choice was based upon the claimed lineage of a god; it consolidated the community in a way that disrespected economic distinction in favor of sanguinary identity, and the unified lineage from the god helped to minimize alienation due to economic distinction, thus forestalling stasis. Ultimately the organization of political groups by kinship was not harmonious; kinship promoted aristocracy in political organization, whereas the polis progressed through repudiations of its various gentilian premises. At the first formation of the polis, aristocrats, who were the creditors, occupied the political core while the debtors were deprived of power. The polis rather constantly developed apart from the tribal religious framework, although religion might possibly have fastened control over government, in the direction of an oriental prototype with a ruling priesthood. Uniquely, the Greek poleis instead adopted a secular

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26 ‘The gods became one with the state. Religion became a dependent appendage of national sentiment, and individual piety received an out and out deathblow. These are over-simplifications. Even in the fifth century the field of attraction of many institutions were important components of Greek religious life did not coincide with polis-type boundaries. Much cult, and perhaps that which was most important in terms of everyday piety, was carried on in local groups or communities- phratry, genos, village or locality- and was not necessarily, or not easily integrated into the cult life of the polis: the relative autonomy of gene at Athens until the mid-fifth century or of phratries at Delphi as late as 400-390, is clear from surviving documents. Again, many religious customs had little or nothing intrinsically to do with political life. Cf. Davies, J. K.; “Religion and the State,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, second edition, volume IV: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C., EDS. Boatman, John, Hammond, N.G.I., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 370.


28 First and foremost is the role which came to be given to some gods as the protector or ‘patron saint’ of this or that city. Cf. Davies, J. K.; “Religion and the State,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, second edition, volume IV: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C., EDS. Boatman, John, Hammond, N.G.I., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 377.
ARCHAIC GREECE

government. Why?

POLYTHEISM

Why did Greek society deviate so much from the oriental theocracies, despite similar preconditions? The peasantry of the oriental theocratic states complacently tolerated their enslavement in the state; in their fundamental conception, man existed to serve the gods. Greece had also been saturated with religion, but the belief that human existence was to the purpose of serving god never took hold. Why?

Mesopotamian city-states located their temples at the border of the polity; irrigation etc. required cooperative communication between neighboring city-states. The temple functioned to negotiate with the neighboring city, or to arbitrate disagreements between the two polities. The Greek poleis established the temples closely outside the polis, as far as possible from the border, and the city built up near the temple. The larger temples were neither located in the polis, nor were they border-stations. Although most temples were located outside the polis, Athens uniquely possessed her major sanctuary to Athena in the center of the polis. This

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29 Equally, however, the relationship was not one between separate entities such as ‘church’ and ‘state’ or whatever. Rather, it turned on the different social purposes which might be served by the same group, custom, or institution. A tribe, for example, could be an army regiment, or a constituency for the selection of political office-holders, while also being a descent-group, defined by linkage with god or hero, and a cult-group with its own precincts (temene) and rituals. Cf. Davies, J. K.; “Religion and the State,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, second edition, volume IV: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C., EDS. Boatman, John, Hammond, N.G.I., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 370.

30 The polis came into existence when a newly institutionalized political and economic center undertook to exclude the peripheral members of the community from the economic mainstream. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 5.

31 It was because we can detect a double movement: first, a gradual and partial emancipation of ‘the state’ from the rhythms and institutions in ways more convenient for civic organization. These movements were not foregone conclusions. Polis did not have to prevail over shrine, and Greece could have become a culture of temple-states and priestly leaderships analogous to some New Eastern societies. We shall therefore have to identify some of the reasons by the direction of change was towards secularization. Cf. Davies, J. K.; “Religion and the State,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, second edition, volume IV: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C., EDS. Boatman, John, Hammond, N.G.I., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 371.
discrepancy was associated with another unique feature of Athens: synoekismos. Whenever a village or polis was annexed to another polis, the village or polis that had been engulfed had to adulate the same divinity as that of the larger polis. Since Athens had used synoekismos to amalgamate the whole of Attica into Athens, it might have been beneficial to locate Athena in the center of Athens to underscore the sovereignty of Athens. Otherwise Greek poleis, separated by mountains and averse to commerce, did not need intensive communication.

Failure to conceive human existence as servitude to God was the fundamental flaw that eventually engendered democracy. The Greek peasants were far more refractory than orientals concerning their social benefits. The archaic Greek conception of law was custom (themis), ultimately from God, but the peculiarly Greek concept of God comprised the orderliness of the world. The laws of oriental society were also from god, but instead of themis, the legitimacy of the laws derived from numinous pronunciation of the priests. In both cases, Law derived

32 This was the synoecism, the process whereby the towns of Attica were made into a single political unit under the control of Athens. By the time our sources begin Athens was a centrally administered “monocentric” city, the main urban sanctuary of which was the home of the principle cult of the whole polis, a situation neatly expressed by Pausanias: “Both the city and the whole of the land are alike sacred to Athens for even those who in their parishes (demes) have an established worship of other gods nevertheless hold Athena in honor” (1.26.6). This made Athens unusual in the Greek world. Most cities were “bipolar,” with their major sanctuary located beyond the urban center. Argos’ principal cult site for example, the Argive Heraion, was situated around 8 kilometers from the city, and the major sanctuary of Sparta, that of Apollo Hyakinthos, was at Amykai about 5 kilometers away. But Athena’s cult was situated at the heart of the city. Argive Hera and Spartan Apollo both protected their cities, but Athena’s cult had a visibility and accessibility lacking to any other major polis cult. Cf. Deacy, Susan; “Famous Athens, Divine Polis”: The Religious System at Athens, p. 224 in Ogden, Daniel; A Companion to Greek Religion, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007.

33 Centralization was also encouraged by vertical linkages along the rivers. The inner core of the floodplain began to fill up, and village or kin groups began to rub up against one another. They required relatively fixed, regulated relationships. Authority, long present within the lineage group and the village, was required also in intervillage relations. This resulted in a second tier of larger quasi-political entities. In Sumer, a particular type of ceremonial center, the temple, seems to have been associated with this process, often as arbitrator between villages. The importance of the temple was fairly general among the earliest civilizations. Steward [1963 p. 201-2] notes that extensive social cooperation in irrigation agriculture was virtually everywhere associated with a strong priesthood in the New World cases as well as the Old World ones. He argues that a relatively egalitarian group engaged in cooperation had unusually strong needs for normative solidarity. Cf. Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social Power, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.85
from theology; how did the Greek trajectory diverge so widely from the oriental theocracies? The precept, that man existed to serve god, emerged in a society in which god was used to found society, so that the injunction to serve god conveniently translated into an injunction to serve the State.

The amorality of the Greek gods and the whimsicality of their theistic mythology suggests, deceptively, that Greek culture was highly secular. On the contrary, the Greeks were as deeply embedded in their religious representation as oriental cultures. Oriental gods, as symbols of the State, are usually august, and their enormous power is highlighted by their being non-human. Their inhumanity suggests mercilessness against any deviation from divine command. Such gods portended a nascent nation-state; the solemnity of the god was requisite to project the authority of a remote and centralized government. In contrast, considering that human life and society were unstable in the extreme, it is difficult to understand how a primitive culture such as that of Greece could so flippantly play with abstract entities whose confusion could disastrously disrupt a very fragile society. The adultery, deception, theft, murder, incest, intrigue, conspiracy, etc. pose the Greek gods as thoroughly amoral; how could the Greeks use such material to cultivate religious awe for the gods or conformity to society? Religion coalesces from practices that constitute the solidarity of the society; the cults of primitive religion function as templates for ordinary social behavior. It would seem impossible for a constructive code of social behavior to have emerged from Greek mythology. The behavior of the Greek gods encourages subjective caprice. Possibly the inconsistency between divine nature and its moral function was due to the caesura between polis and religion. The oriental gods were ingredient in the earliest formation of oriental society. The Greek polis originated in the 7th century B.C., many centuries after the development of Greek mythology;
the invention of gods had no association with the foundation of a polity.

Political society of Egypt and Mesopotamia having been engendered from religion, sacred authority could always intervene or supplant commercial or military reasoning. Greek religion however was centuries prior to political formation; the polity was not engendered from religion, whose matrix had been the family rather than any properly social organization. The eventual reform of religion to support the conditions of the polis was too different from the primordial religion to continue the same force as the primordial religion. As revised religion was made to fit the polis, the *eupatridae*, who had been the first aristocrats and the early priest class, gave up their priestly pretensions in favor of the advantages of aristocracy and great land holding. The function of religion, as the guardian of the secular forces, had shriveled.\(^3^7\)

In oriental society, God created the laws; they were inalterable because they were divine. In Greece, on the contrary, law was conceived as having been created by man, and was therefore easily susceptible to alteration by the same authority, if law proved inadequate to the purposes for which it was explicitly conceived.\(^3^8\) In this the Greeks had a conception of law mid-way between the orientals and the Hebrews. Unlike the Hebrews, the Greeks did not suppose that God had handed down the laws, but similarly to the Hebrews, the Greeks supposed divine action within natural and man-made events. They acknowledged divine agency, but never in separation from human or natural agency. Hector killed Patroclus, manifestly, but Ares empowered Hector to kill Patroclus, etc. Manifestly it was an earthquake that destroyed a village, but it was Poseidon's displeasure that caused the earthquake to take

\[\text{36} \quad \text{That is, like all societies of archaic Greece their society is embedded in religion: at some level of consciousness, actions which express or reflect the solidarity of the community are transformed into 'religious' terms. A family is defined by its cults. Cf. Davies, J.K; Religion And The State, in Persia, Greece And The Western Mediterranean C.525 To 479 B.C., The Cambridge Ancient History, Second Edition, Volume IV; Eds. Boardman, John, Hammond, N.G.L, Lewis, D.M., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.369.}\]

\[\text{37} \quad \text{Ideological movements argue that human problems can be overcome with the aid of transcendent sacred authority, authority that cuts through and across the “secular” reach of economic, military, and political power institutions. Ideological power converts into a distinctive form of social organization, pursuing a diversity of ends, “secular” and “material” (i.e., the legitimation of particular forms of authority) as well as those conventionally considered a religious ideal (i.e. the search for meaning). Cf. Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social Power, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.22.}\]
place. This enabled the concept that man, alone and by himself, created his laws, but that
disaster would follow if the law did not fit God's wishes. Except for Judaism, this margin, that
if disaster occurred, the gods were punishing man for having instituted a false law, priority,
etc., did not exist in the oriental concept of law. The Greek conception of law facilitated the
shift of power from basileus down to the demos

**FIDELITY**

Starting from the premise of conflict between archaic and polis religion, something
must explain why religion diffused into partially opposing traditional streams. Possibly
polytheism had resulted from the atomization of the community or polis, each one formidably
divided from the others by mountains. The local gods were the aegis of each separate
community; adoration of different gods probably amplified mutual repulsion among the
poleis. The structure of kinship facilitated organization of army and government, and religion
maintained the coherence of lineage. Thus a god or a mythical hero, serving as the patron
saint of a community, constituted the unifying identity of the community. However, exactly
because a patron god unified a group, the god also separated the group from others. Any
communicative relationship beyond the polis entailed that the local gods cohere with the
local gods of neighboring communities; such would entail graduation to major gods, not
directly representative of the local community, symbolizing the whole tribe or race. The idea
of procreation seems to have provided this coherence between the gods of each polis; by
conceiving the gods genealogically, the plurality of gods could be elaborated as a hierarchical

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38 As in the East, law is the means by which notions of right and justice are conveyed to the populace; but there is a difference. In the East, law is a divine revelation vouchsafed to the king himself, unalterable and binding on every man because it is the god’s command. But in Greece, though the law enjoys divine protection, it is not a divine revelation nor an unalterable rule of behavior laid down once for all. In Greece laws are made by men. If a law offends the conscience of the majority, it can and must be changed; but while it is in force, all are obliged to obey it because there is something divine in it and in the very idea of law. To break its injunctions entails punishment not only from men, the guardians of law, but also from gods. This rule of law in the city- of law created by the whole body of citizens- is one of the most characteristic features in the public life of Greece. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Michael; *A History of the Ancient World*, Volume I, p. 206.
family structure. In both Hesiod and the Presocratic philosophers the idea prevails that plurality proceeded from unity; human reproduction accounted both for proliferation and agreement of the many gods.\(^{39}\)

As communication commenced between initially hostile ethne or poleis, a basis of trust could not be peculiar to either of the communicants, nor could a common basis of trust be one governed by the law that either one of the communicants had developed. Such an adequate common basis of trust were the gods, who were supposed as guarantors to any mutual commitment. This use of the god as guarantor is universal in the emergence of primitive society, but it seems inconsistent with the treachery of Greek gods.\(^{40}\) The difficulty of forming covenants with an alien ethne may have imported the polytheism of Greek mythology. Both Hesiod and the presocratic Greeks had conceived of a unitary origin of all things, but one origin did not account for relations between things. The idea of human reproduction is very salient in Greek religion; if a pair produced progeny, which further produced progeny, then there would be a pattern for a simple origin accounting for an interrelated multiplicity. The Greeks, supposing family relations between gods, could thereby conceive of mutual relations between poleis, even if each polis had a different patron god.\(^{41}\)

One of the major purposes in the need for a god is to solidify a concept of fidelity. Poleis that established relationships with each other used the gods to assure fidelity to the agreements. Such a god that could guarantee fidelity had to be an inclusive god, one that each polis revered. The proprietary gods of a polis therefore could not discharge the pact of fidelity. How

\(^{39}\) It was above all a predisposition of the idea of one single origin that appeared to unite Hesiod with many of the presocratics that ‘origin’ had somehow emitted a pair, the model of human reproduction could be used to account for further proliferation, as it explicitly is in the Theogony. Cf. Kirk, G.S.; \textit{The Development of Ideas, 750 to 500 B.C.}, in Persia, Greece And The Western Mediterranean C.525 To 479 B.C., The Cambridge Ancient History, Second Edition, Volume IV; Eds. Boardman, John, Hammond, N.G.L, Lewis, D.M., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.400.

was it possible, then, that Greek mythology could be so whimsical if Greeks were materially dependent on their religion? Despite the patent amorality of the Greek gods, they regulated and guaranteed social relationships much as the oriental gods did. How could Greek gods serve to guarantee social relationships when their own behavior was so perpicious? This may be divisible into two explanations; (1) first, how could humans be influenced by Greek gods, and (2) how could the Greek gods expound a specifically moral direction in behavior? Thirdly, how is it possible that (1) and (2) did not defeat each other?

In regard to the second proposition, it is plausible that the primitive gods, Zeus, Poseidon, etc. appeared precisely as authorities first in association with proxenos, which signified the conventions of guest-friendship and gift-giving; possibly the connotation of the gods as guarantors developed from the obligation of the guest-friendship role. Any contract between individuals or poleis would have to be quite serious; one might hypothesize that it was the seriousness of the trust relationship which lent seriousness to the gods, rather than vice versa. The development of the gods as guarantors may have developed before, or after, the flowering of mythology. If the mythological stories accrued after the guarantor-function, how could the comical-derogatory attitude of this mythology have been attached to figures that had originally been solemn and august? Conversely, if Greek mythology had ripened before the guarantor function, how could these risible creatures have been made sufficiently solemn to secure a relationship based on trust? The oriental gods enforced good behavior on their acolytes by means of fear; they were lacking in charm, but engaged the acolyte’s respect by threatening to eat him in the case of disobedience. A scary god could infuse desirable behavior patterns

41 It was above all a predisposition of the idea of one single origin that appeared to unite Hesiod with many of the presocratics that ‘origin’ had somehow emitted a pair, the model of human reproduction could be used to account for further proliferation, as it explicitly is in the Theogony. Cf. Kirk, G.S.; “The Development of Ideas, 750 to 500 BC,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, second edition, volume IV: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C., EDS. Boatman, John, Hammond, N.G.L, and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.400
in the acolyte, but could exercise this effect only for as long as the acolyte remained in literal, not analogical, dread of the god. How could the Greeks have formed their gods sufficiently awesome to command long-term adherence to a moral code, in whom at the same time they enshrined all of the absurdities of human existence?

In regard to (1), uniquely to Greek theology, the gods present paradigms of human behavior, whereas the Orientals had universally deployed mortal fear to enforce devotion; the priests could kill or maim their victim and, by attributing the act to God, absolve themselves of blame while at the same time enforcing dread of the given imperative. In contrast, the Greeks achieved piety by making their gods eminently normative and personal. Accessibility to the gods was possible because the anthropomorphic stories of divine behavior evinced the same behavior as the acolytes. In the Iliad, for instance, when Achilles is in a rage he is described as “possessed” by a certain god; the description of specific psychological complexes as possession by certain gods conveys that the individual’s behavior is an embodiment of the god.43 The underlying conception that human behaviors can be living embodiments of gods may account for the marvelous elaboration of Greek mythology, and the paradigmatic structure of divine behavior may explain how the Greeks could be pious without the usual accompaniment of mortal dread.

What is lacking to the above hypothesis is solemnity. The oriental portrayal of the grandeur of God rested upon the god’s imperturbability and inhumanity. Oriental religion preceded the State, informing its gods with pre-rational mortal terror that would induce the

43 What matters in a polytheistic system is not the individual ego so much as the interlocking structure, and that was specific to Greece. It was a loose-knit structure, reflecting the interplay of the Dark and Archaic periods between local multi-functional deities on the one hand and on the other the greater theological tidiness diffused through the panhellenic shrines and the literary tradition, but precisely for that reason it managed to accommodate the attachments of deities to specific Greek localities within a framework which defined the relationship of the major deities to each other. This framework, inevitably genealogical with gods so anthropomorphic as the Greek, not only unified into a divine family the powers of the natural and psychological worlds which the gods were imputed to command, but also (and thereby) integrated with the divine order all the social groups and civilities which the gods collectively or individually could be invoked to protect. Cf. Davies, J.K., Greece after the Persian Wars, in The Fifth Century B.C., The Cambridge Ancient History, The Cambridge Ancient History, eds. Lewis, D.M., Boardman, John, Davies, J.K., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.18.
acolytes to conform to the polity. There is very little in Greek mythology that could serve as a paradigm for the origin of the polis and its authorities of civil procedure, exactly because the thoughts and emotions of the gods were too transparent and manipulable. Greek mythology seems confined to a nomadic-sphere in which interdependence is not yet pronounced. Possibly Zeus never came to resemble Amon-Ra because religion and state were not coordinated; Zeus was not the original force for obedience to a polity.

Integration of society into the tighter form of the polis called for a more august god; both Plato and Aristotle, at the end of the classical age, portrayed a highly abstract god. The effort of the polis to invest religion with solemnity oddly resulted in establishing the priority of the polis over religion, the reverse of their relation in the oriental societies. Whereas the oriental gods had penetrated social life because they had been ingredient in the formation of the state, the primordial Greek gods, having suffused oikos life long before the foundation of the polis, had been able to penetrate social life because human nature had been projected into the gods. The gods could give a paradigm for human life because one could identify with the all-too-human predicaments of the gods.

However, this does not explain why the Greeks were able to project human nature into their gods, whereas the Orientals dissociated divine from human nature. The Greek gods were not suited to buttressing the solemnity of the Greek polis. The mythology of the gods catered to the individual; attributes of the gods, such as sophrosyne, eros, drunkenness, etc. were individual attributes in abstraction from civic life, leading in in Plato and Aristotle to a conception of virtue ethics, whereas the god in which the polis needed to anchor its social commitments called for references of an impersonal nature. In oriental religion, plenary

44 In this way our two strands of explanation complement each other. One represented the partial disengagement of legal process and public order from its original theocentric framework, the other a greater involvement of the state in the direction and financing of cult and ritual. Both combined to tip the balance of power between religion and state further in favor of the latter, and thereby to make the latter increasingly the main framework of religious activity and to intensify the difficulties and fragmentation of fifth-century theodicies. Cf. Davies, J.K; Religion And The State, in Persia, Greece And The Western Mediterranean C.525 To 479 B.C., The Cambridge Ancient History, Second Edition, Volume IV; Eds. Boardman, John, Hammond, N.G.L, Lewis, D.M., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.388.
connection between human and divine was embedded in civic life. Usually the dichotomy of church and state is preceded by a prior religious inclusiveness; civil government is an excrescence of religion for the preservation of its clerical hierarchy, with the consequence that the structure of polity retains residual dependence on the religion. Writing, and written law, had grown from within oriental religion, and account for the durability of oriental religion. In Greek monarchic kinship society, the rules of social life transpired through oral mythology. The theology of the polis was a civic religion, which adopted the same personage as the primitive familial religion, but altered it to serve the needs of the polis.\textsuperscript{45} The conflict between familial and civic religion persisted through the archaic and classical periods, of which the family cults represented the authentic religion given from kinship, and the civic religion largely edited or falsified the archaic religion to facilitate the precedence of civic society.\textsuperscript{46} Stratification, in which different sectors of society have different access to resources, initiates a transition from kinship to civil society. Instead of the previous informal equality, law empowers office-holding to control differential access to resources according to social sector. Authority has begun to originate from an officeholder rather than from social pressure.\textsuperscript{47} The delayed appearance of writing instead undermined the state religion. The oriental pattern could not have exfoliated in Greece because its mythology, inept as it was for a State religion, was centuries too deeply rooted in the Greek mentality. The introduction of writing subverted the

\textsuperscript{45} Cf. Plato, \textit{Laws} 909d-910e; Let nobody possess shrines in private houses; whenever anyone is disposed to sacrifice let him go to the public shrines.

\textsuperscript{46} The most elementary and persistent group within society is the family. Since at least the time of Aristotle the family has been seen as the foundation of human community; but as has likewise been noted since at least the time of Aeschylus, family allegiance is an ever-present danger to the solidarity of the larger political order. Moral and religious obligations to the family may conflict with duty to the state. In the \textit{Laws}, Plato notoriously argued that family cults be entirely subordinated to those of the state. Typically family religious rites were observed for example, at childbirth and marriage, or in connection with farming. The most prominent and socially explosive religious duty of families, however, was their responsibility to the dead. Sophocles in his \textit{Antigone} has left the most famous statement: there the eponymous character is faced with the dilemma of her duty to obey state decree and leave her traitorous brothers to lie dead on the field of battle as carion for dogs and birds, or obey her familial duty and give them burial. The state attempted to regulate mourning; female lamentation was considered especially dangerous. Cf. Hedrick, Jr., Charles W.; “Religion and Society in Classical Greece,” p. 294; in Ogden, Daniel; \textit{A Companion to Greek Religion}, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007.
contrived, civic religion, but left its primitive roots intact.

**IRRIGATION**

The apparent quest for higher civilization is perhaps a side-effect of what humans seek primarily: equilibrium. Despite *ethnos*, which itself is an elaborated level of equilibrium, desire for equilibrium harbors revulsion at the greater constraint resulting from integration into larger social entities. Social organization advances only reactively, in face of a threatening alien group or outcome. People may for instance undergo constraint for the sake of nutrition; farmers cooperate under the restraints necessitated by irrigation. The Egyptian-Mesopotamian dependence on irrigation formed the subjection of the individual to the community and engendered the consequent hegemony of religion and priesthood. The Greek priesthood did not come to social ascendancy because irrigation or a like material force did not necessitate immediate and constant union into and between *poleis*.48

An analogon of oriental cosmology did not unfold in Greece because the unusual dispersal of Greek settlement obstructed consolidation of a priest-class.49 Domination by the oriental priests derived from their management of the irrigation network. Finances had grown out of religion in the oriental societies; the first organizations to provide banking services had been the temples. The ground for the religious-financial union had been irrigation. Near Eastern land depended on canals, irrigation, and flood control, for which the associated projects

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47 In its efforts to establish institutions and agencies as maintainers of an order of stratification, the state – pristine or secondary - concentrates on four basic foci of organization: hierarchy, differential degrees of access to basic resources, obedience to officials, and defense of the area. Note especially the second of these, for “the central question is one of the alienation of rights of access from portions of the social community, and one aspect of such alienation is the private transacting of critical economic activities. Law, generated and enforced by the state, replaces social pressure as the guide for appropriate behavior. Commands must be obeyed, because a commander has power by virtue of the institutionalized position he occupies. In Weberian terms, leadership has become “legal.” Cf. Tandy, David W.; *Warriors into Traders*, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 93. 48 There was an irreversible character to this development, and with it went subjection of the individual to the community. Hence the dominance of religious tradition in Near Eastern society and the political power of the priesthood. Cf. Weber, Max; *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, Verso, London, 1988, p.157.
required centralized authority. In Mesopotamia irrigation was ubiquitously necessary for any agricultural development; in Egypt the flooding of the Nile entailed incessant regulation. Because irrigation was dependent on the irrigation of upstream neighboring communities, more comprehensive political forms grew with agricultural expansion. Consolidation of communities on the same irrigation network was a natural consequence of the interdependence of the canal networks, which entailed the interdependence of the priests, who thus unified into a social class. The centralizing tendencies of irrigation matured into a priesthood.

Oriental temples had been built on the frontiers of a community so that the temple could mediate conflicting claims of neighboring communities. The Greek temples were close to the urban centers. The great oracles were not located in any polis, but they were also not affiliated with any polis. What the Greeks had, in the place of irrigation, conflicting claims, canals, and temples, were mountains. The Greek polis was insulated from neighboring poleis; if a person crossed the mountains to the neighboring polis, he would find it spoke a different dialect. Independence from irrigation impeded centralized government. While irrigation forced compatibility between oriental settlements, the mountainous division of the poleis compelled indifference.

The Sumerians and Egyptians started with no concept of personal property; in Egypt the farmland was regularly submerged under the Nile flood, so that the land had to be resurveyed and redistributed twice a year. Consciousness of oneself as a tribe, or as a clan, preceded

49 Equally, however, the relationship was not one between separate entities such as ‘church’ and ‘state’ or whatever. Rather, it turned on the different social purposes which might be served by the same group, custom, or institution. A tribe, for example, could be an army regiment, or a constituency for the selection of political office-holders, while also being a descent-group, defined by linkage with god or hero, and a cult-group with its own precincts (temene) and rituals. Cf. Davies, J.K; *Religion And The State*, in Persia, Greece And The Western Mediterranean C.525 To 479 B.C., The Cambridge Ancient History, Second Edition, Volume IV; Eds. Boardman, John, Hammond, N.G.L, Lewis, D.M., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.370.

50 Each little plain, rigidly sealed within its mountain barriers and with its population concentrated upon its small portion of good soil, seems formed to be a complete world of its own. Make your way up the pastureland, over the pass and down on to the fields and orchards on the other side, and you’ll find new traditions and customs, new laws and new gods, and probably a new dialect. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; *The Greek Commonwealth*; The Modern Library, New York, p.59.
individual self-consciousness; collective consciousness metamorphosed in continuity in Egypt, where all inhabitants consequently thought of themselves and their property as belonging to the Pharaoh. Private property functions to segregate population into groups having different privileges; in Egypt property was distributed to the different classes in order to stabilize the early class distinctions; it was not property defining class membership, but class membership defining what property the individual held. In essence, no member of society ever escaped from being the disposable property of God and the Pharaoh; despite the manifest differences in property and privilege, all members were equal in being entirely the property of the Pharaoh.51 This lack of ultimate social distinction may derive from the Nile floods, which regularly erased land measurements, therefore required a strong collective supervision of land, discouraging formation of self-identity based upon private property. The constant intervention of government surveyors generated credibility in the supposition that the land belonged to the pharaoh, or to the gods. The oriental temple was the greatest landholder because of dependence on higher-order regulation for irrigation. Irrigation necessitated government centralization directly proportional to the extent of agricultural development. Government was posterior to religion.

Characteristics of the Greek archaic period formed from overpopulation, land scarcity driven by partible inheritance, and food shortage.52 Irrigation had propelled popular religious

51 The institution of private property securely held is effective in dividing the population into different classes enjoying different rights. In Egypt all men are equal before the king and the god, all alike serve them. It is true that there is inequality in a social and economic sense: there are separate groups, one of priests, another of royal officials higher and lower, another of peasants and artisans; but there is no sharp division between these groups— it is possible to pass from one to another; and they are all alike in one main point— that no member of any group has full ownership in his property, especially landed property. There are only two proprietors— the god and the king; and they surrender a larger or smaller share of their property for the use of members of their family, their friends, officials, and servants. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Michael; Political History of Mesopotamia, in A History of the Ancient World, Volume 1, ch. 1. P. 45.

52 This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that all or some of the general crisis factors that affected the archaic period— population growth, fragmentation of landownership through division by inheritance, and general shortage of agricultural resources— were also operative in Corinth, Samos, and Megara and that they contributed to destabilizing conditions there as they did elsewhere. Cf. Stein-Höleskamp, Elke; “The Tyrants,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 112.
subjection in the orient, but had no application in Greece.\(^5^3\) The archaic Greeks, having been migratory, also lacked a concept of personal property, but on a different vector. The Greek concept of property diverged from the oriental because habitation did not presuppose irrigation projects. The archaic Greek smallholder could neither employ day labor, nor manage more farmland than what he already had.\(^5^4\) The concept of real property having been uncompelled by floods, the concept of (collective) clan ownership took a unique twist. The owner in oriental societies was conceived as merely the trustee of the family or clan; initially the same representation had also prevailed in Greek kinship society. Irrigation forced oriental society into tighter organization, but without the same coercion, the Greek idea of property became more atomistic. Possession perched upon a utility theory of ownership. Earliest archaic society did not allow a land market; land was transferred on the authority only of the clan, not of the private owner, and the only principle of transfer was an evaluation by the clan that another cultivator would produce a larger harvest. Although a holding was privately owned, the ownership was allotted purely according to the communal advantage of the community.\(^5^5\) An individual had a right in his ownership of something because he used it, and this right of possession was contingent on his ability to use the item better than others could; the story of

\(^{53}\) There was an irreversible character to this development, and with it went subjection of the individual to the community. Hence the dominance of religious tradition in Near Eastern society and the political power of the priesthood. Cf. Weber, Max; *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, Verso, London, 1988, p.157.

\(^{54}\) At this primary level the Greek world showed much uniformity but little interaction. Its uniformity derived in part from its ecological and climatic limits, in that Greeks had not penetrated as agricultural settlers either beyond the northern limit of olive cultivation or beyond dry-farming zones into areas of very low rainfall which required large-scale irrigation. In part it derived from the overwhelming primacy of the widely distributed private beneficial ownerships of land. Though there were free landless men, and owners of broad acres, social and military pressure had so far worked effectively against the polarization of society between such extremes and in favor of the largely autarkic peasant, each working his own kleros (inherited lot) and entitled to status within the community, or obliged to provide services to it, in proportion to the size of that kleros. True, some land was owned by deities, by cult-groups, or collectively and was rented out to individual tenants, but such assignments never made Greek deities and temples into the preponderant landholders and economic powers which they became in Egypt, the East Mediterranean seaboard, or Babylonia. Cf. Davies, J.K., *Greece after the Persian Wars*, in *The Fifth Century B.C.*, The Cambridge Ancient History, The Cambridge Ancient History, eds. Lewis, D.M., Boardman, John, Davies, J.K., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.19.
the bow of Odysseus was paradigmatic. From this ancient premise, Aristotle had theorized in favor of private property; use of a commons was pernicious because users are not mindful of what is not their own property: “the tragedy of the commons.” Common benefit is greater from private property than communal property.

OIKOS

The Greek ideal of economy in the archaic period was self-sufficiency. Between the 13th and 8th centuries, prior to the population surge, the Greeks neither conducted commerce nor impinged on the oriental consciousness. What very little commerce there was had been performed by occasional oriental merchants who came to Greek communities.\textsuperscript{56} It is difficult to divine why self-sufficiency should have become a central value. In oriental societies, especially in Egypt, an individual was registered with a personal address, and he was automatically an outlaw if he was not to be found there. Why did archaic Greek society not have a similarly totalitarian conception? The oriental analogue of \textit{polis} controlled the analogue of \textit{oikos}, whereas in Greece the oikos formed first, was relatively independent of the \textit{polis}, and took precedence. Why? Not the polis, but the \textit{oikos} engendered the original emotional life of the Athenians. Religious cults prior to the public religion had been practiced in the oikos; these religious rites were the most ancient component of Greek religion.\textsuperscript{57} Marriage and funeral

\textsuperscript{55} In egalitarian and rank societies, and within reciprocal and redistributive economic formations, land transfers are infrequent, always the result of “social” and not “economic” forces, land use being dictated by the community at large and under temporary or more permanent leadership. Transfers are possible in principle but rare in reality. In a self-regarding market system, land alienations occur regularly and, of course, for purely economic reasons. By the feedback mechanism built into the self-regulating market system, land is ideally alienated from the economically less efficient party to the more efficient. The party that takes over the land then becomes the proprietor of it and maintains ownership by overseeing the production more efficiently than his predecessor. Although the alienated party may continue to perform the actual tasks on the holding, he no longer “owns” it. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece}, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 127.

\textsuperscript{56} The Greeks of the Dark Age appear to have kept to themselves and to have attracted little attention. The little trade that did go on was apparently passive, performed by outsiders entering the Greek communities. Not until the eve of the population increase do we perceive Greeks engaged in active trade abroad in any significant way. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece}, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 59
ceremonies were privately located in the oikos, not the polis, and were not conducted by polis priests.

Possibly the social degradation assigned to dependent labor solidified the oikos mentality; in a context in which employment, i.e. working for another person, was conceived as nothing other than slavery, "freedom" was synonymous with "independence". Ancient economy was almost totally agricultural; the Greek economy was especially "cellular" in the sense that it was an ideal to confine production within as small a unit as possible; self-sufficiency, so cherished by the Greeks, connoted flight from dependence on anything external to themselves. Non-agricultural production was disfavored ab ovo because such products, dependent on agricultural produce, automatically entailed higher organizations of dependence. The family, conceived as the smallest possible independent unit, manifested its freedom and independence in the form of self-sufficiency.

Oikos agriculture differed greatly from the agriculture of the oriental societies. People conducting primitive agriculture do not produce as much food as they possibly can; they balance labor against food. In order to minimize the disutility of labor, they work only as much as will suffice, without working to produce a surplus. Since an oikos economy does not produce for the sake of commerce, no more than what the members of the oikos need is produced. Agriculture increases only if the members of the oikos increase, but no surplus for trade or storage emerges. The oriental societies in contrast produced for communal consumption. Since agriculture was controlled by government, and produce was tailored to the whole population rather than the family, farmers were compelled to produce surplus. This is why commerce developed early in oriental society, but late in Greek society.

Agricultural intensification in Greek society proceeded from two conditions: 1) the number of members of the oikos increased, whereas population size of the community

58 The new orthodoxy [Jones, Finley] stresses the cellular self-sufficiency of the ancient economy; each farm, each district, each region grew and made nearly all that it needed. The main basis of wealth was agriculture. The vast majority of the population in most areas of the ancient world was primarily occupied with growing food. Cf. Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 4
remained irrelevant; 2) land available for agriculture was limited. The need to intensify agriculture for greater production eventually instigated the process of synoekismos. The oikos produced all of its food, clothing, and otherwise; the oikos was an ideal construction because it was the smallest possible instance of self-sufficient society. Self-sufficiency implies distrust of otherness. Why should this distrust of the Other have arisen prominently in the Greek mentality, more than in any other racial stream? Possibly the idealization of self-sufficiency arose from the almost thorough insulation of every polis from every other. The orientation of the concept of the oikos was to delay further social elaboration; if consumption remained sufficiently primitive that the oikos could produce all of its needs, social organization beyond the polis should be superfluous, exactly as Aristotle had formulated. If more collective power than that in the oikos or the polis was unneeded, Greek society could elude elaborated liabilities of dependence and obligation that would emerge from a nation-state.

59 The adoption of an advanced cropping pattern rarely occurs unless increased numbers demand it, for agricultural intensification always demands more work. Production of more than is needed contradicts the observation that primitive farmers “work to get the maximum return for the minimum effort.” This “Law of Least Effort,” is similar to the idea of the Russian economist A.Y. Chicano, in whose peasant model of agriculture the “tradeoff between the drudgery or irksomeness of farm work (disutility of work) and the income required to meet the consumption needs of the household (utility of income). “ Individuals in a primitive community do not produce as much food as possible and thus do not create a “relative” surplus, which can be exchanged for nonagricultural goods, become a catalyst for larger families, or allow for the maintenance of specialists who can be freed from the subsistence production pattern and thus devote themselves to pursuits for the benefit of the community. To the contrary, a primitive community produces only as much as it needs, leery to a person about expending valued leisure time just to produce more food. As Philip Smith and Cuyter Young observed, ‘The conclusion seems to be that what brings about changes in the cropping systems of independent cultivators is not a voluntary decision to produce more food above the needs of domestic consumption but population pressure, where there are more mouths to feed pushing against a naturally or artificially restricted amount of available land.” Hence when a population increases, the cropping or production pattern is intensified; conversely, when density is reduced the production pattern often regresses. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 33

60 Little buying is done, and that unwillingly; most necessaries are produced at home. Domestic manufacture supplies not only food but also clothes, furniture, agricultural implements, and foot-gear. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Michael; A History of the Ancient World, Volume I, p. 185.

61 In respect of the agricultural and industrial products of Greek lands we may take it that at this time every separate district in Greece was almost self-sufficing. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.19.
Why would the prospects of entanglement in liabilities of a nation-state terrify the Greeks more than it did the orientals? The decisive factor was commerce. Archaic Greece had a high mortality rate and a high fertility rate. If the mortality and fertility rates had both decreased, society would have achieved a surplus. But that was impossible. If the mortality rate decreased, automatically the fertility rate would rise, not descend. Average life expectancy in archaic Greece was from 22 to 25 years, and the life expectancy of urban life was substantially lower than rural life expectancy. Lower mortality rates would raise the fertility rate because the counterfactual survivors, being young, would have continued to procreate. The individual would see no disadvantage in procreation. Unless there had been external commerce, the intermittent productivity gains from a decreased fertility rate would go unnoticed; commerce would fail to instigate a political-institutional directive to reduce fertility. The oriental societies’ dependence on irrigation would quickly formulate the correspondence of prosperity and communal birthrates. Since a Greek kleros was minimally dependent on civic structure, as it did not pursue commercial agriculture, the oikos could not have been motivated to regulate reproduction out of consideration for its communal effects. A purely domestic motivation to reduce fertility would not obtrude because children, of whom few survived, had domestic

62 Human beings devoted a considerable part of their cultural and organizational capacities to ensure that further evolution did not occur. They seem not to have wanted to increase their collective powers, because of the distributive powers involved. As stratification and the state were essential components of civilization, general social evolution ceased before the emergence of civilization. Cf. Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social Power, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.39.

63 While mean life expectancy at birth is conventionally put in a range from about 20 to 30 years, the actual age structures of ancient populations (and thus age-specific survival rates) are generally unknown. Age records from some 300 census returns filed in Roman Egypt during the first three centuries A.D. have been used to reconstruct female and male age distributions that are broadly consistent with model life tables suggesting a mean life expectancy at birth of 22 to 25 years. Cf. Bagnall, R.S. and Frier, B.W.; The Demography of Roman Egypt, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 75-110.

64 An alternative reading of these records points to significant differences between rural and urban populations, and to exceptionally high attrition rates in large cities. Cf. Scheidel, W.; Death on the Nile: Disease and Demography of Roman Egypt, Leiden, 2001, pp. 118-80.

The idealization of the self-sufficient oikos economy eclipsed values that could have appeared only in a communal perspective. Archaic Greece had an equilibrium of low productivity, high mortality, and high fertility. Low productivity connotes low per capita production, and high population density aggravated poor soil quality. Varied food production prevented famine, because a variety of crops would compensate against failure in a specific food. On the other hand, variegated food agriculture produced a smaller total than monoculture, and therefore in the long term impeded population growth. Until the 8th and 7th centuries B.C., Greek agriculture, despite poor soil quality, could still supply itself with food. When agriculture could not improve intensively, commerce might have supplemented food supply, but the tight association of equality and self-sufficiency in the archaic mentality militated against commerce. Subsistence agricultural production would necessarily regulate their fertility in a home in a static manner. There is no sign that at the documented level of economic development and organization of labor, ancient Mediterranean populations were in a position to reduce average fertility in order to preserve intermittent productivity gains in a way that would have sustained long-term intensive growth. Among agrarian economies, “only populations blessed with the most advantageous institutions governing reproduction, surplus extraction, and use of surplus, would be able to progress into the next-higher technological regime.” Ancient societies were not among them.

The absence of famine suggests that food production was highly varied, for with varied production, the failure of any single component does not spell disaster. Since varied production usually indicates limited production, this method may guard against disaster in the short term but restrict growth (by Malthusian rules) in the long term. The change was due to very simple and natural causes. Greece is, by nature, a poverty-stricken country. Her bare hills and plains provide in themselves food for but a small population. Under the rude methods of cultivation then in use, a time was bound to come, in every City State area, when the land could yield no more increase. It became peopled up to its natural limits. If the slightest mishance occurred, if the rains came late or a sudden storm spoiled the harvest, the State would be face to face with famine. This point seems to have been reached in the development of the leading City States in the eighth or seventh century before Christ. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; The Greek Commonwealth; The Modern Library, New York, p.248.

67 Irrespective of the culture and early mediated incidentals of proximate agency, ancient populations would necessarily regulate their fertility in a home in a static manner. There is no sign that at the documented level of economic development and organization of labor, ancient Mediterranean populations were in a position to reduce average fertility in order to preserve intermittent productivity gains in a way that would have sustained long-term intensive growth. Among agrarian economies, “only populations blessed with the most advantageous institutions governing reproduction, surplus extraction, and use of surplus, would be able to progress into the next-higher technological regime.”. Ancient societies were not among them. Cf. Salares, Robert; Ecology, Ch. 2, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 74.
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goods were perishable, and transportation was cumbersome; trade was therefore limited to
the immediate local market.\textsuperscript{70} Greece had prepared neither raw materials nor manufactures to
exchange for imported food. Piracy and plunder became customary means of supplementing
food supply in the 8th and 7th centuries B.C.\textsuperscript{71}

Population growth is ambivalent; it can augur prosperity, but also degeneracy;
depopulation can be deleterious or constructive. Ancient subsistence societies were usually
preoccupied with the liabilities of depopulation rather than of overpopulation; a race could
easily go extinct because of incapacity to meet its replacement level. A family of many
children connotes that relatively less is invested in each child, while a family with few children
may thereby contribute greater economic benefit. A woman who bears fewer children may
contribute more to the replacement level and racial viability than a woman who bears children
beyond her economic capacity. However, this may not be evident on the personal level of
perception, and the effects of this difference vary between subsistence and surplus economies.
The oikos mentality comprised subsistence economy, since the oikos did not produce for a
market and did not store for a future.

The communism of the archaic community derives from the migratory era, in which
differences of social status do not exist. Insofar as every individual performed exactly the same
labor as others, there was no motivation to conceive the idea of private property; the product
of their labor was the same, so there is no benefit in dividing it in individual possession or
status. As yet lacking a notion of possessive individualism, no personal motivation existed to
urge greater labor.\textsuperscript{72} A woman in such a society may bear many children, but cost of childhood

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{70} The relative slowness of all forms of transport meant that most perishable goods were produced in
  the immediate vicinity of their market. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders}, the Power of the
\item \textsuperscript{71} When population presses upon subsistence, and there is not enough food to go around, there are only
two immediate remedies – less people or more food, to send away emigrants or to bring in supplies from
outside. Leaving the question of emigration aside, let us turn to the question of fresh supplies. How is the
food to be produced? It cannot be bought, for there is nothing to buy it with. There are as yet no surplus
products or manufactures. It must be hunted or stolen, “led off or carried off, as the Greek phrase ran. In
other words, the city must make her peace with the hunting instinct and learn to use it in her service. She
must learn how to conduct war. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; \textit{The Greek Commonwealth}; The Modern
Library, New York, p. 248
\end{itemize}
death would generate economic deficit because of the expenditure wasted on unremunerative care-taking. The subsistence level guaranteed as many deaths as there were births; in the case of famine or recession, the child mortality rate immediately shot up, but not the morality rate of the senile. In the late 9th-century, population surged due to improved nutrition. Population growth and commerce acted synergistically; despite land scarcity, commercial growth sustained the increase of population. If commerce had not begun, the population level would have subsided to its original carrying capacity.\(^{73}\)

If the archaic polis encountered a new resource or technological advantage, relative surplus would have immediately augmented survival vis-a-vis the birth rate, which would have enlarged the population, but would have maintained the prior per capita low subsistence level. Natural population growth and production were reciprocally related; the oikos intensified agriculture, and thus raised production when family number increased. Intensified production, when possible, entailed more labor. As the oikos did not utilize employment or slavery, the birth rate increased.\(^{74}\) Traditional disrespect of innovation would retard elaboration of initial technological advance. Larger population resulting from the initial surplus would reach a new equilibrium, but would immediately collapse if innovation did not continue. Population growth would cease at the limit of a new unsustainable level; per capita income would decrease when

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72 An egalitarian society is characterized by the community’s awareness that there are as many positions of valued status as there are persons capable of filling them. All adults of the same age and gender perform the same tasks. Egalitarian socialites are usually hunting, fishing, and gathering communities that do not recognize property as privately held. Cf. Fried, Morton H.; The Evolution of Political Society, An Essay in Political Anthropology, New York Random House, 1967 p. 52.

73 The increase in population appears to have been caused primarily by an improvement in nutrition, supplemented by greater opportunities abroad (trade); a larger population in turn led to improved food production and supplied more Greeks to go abroad. Thus food and trade caused and resulted from the population phenomenon. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 19.

74 There is a reciprocal relationship between population growth and economic productivity. As more labor becomes available through natural population growth, agricultural systems are intensified. This intensification eventually demands a still larger labor supply, and the birth rate, to choose one possibility, increases accordingly. Cf.. Young, T. Cuyler, Jr.; “Population Densities and Early Mesopotamian Urbanism”, p. 838, in Man, Settlement, and Urbanism, edited by Peter J. Ucko, Ruth Tringham, and G. W. Dimbleby, pub. Duckworth, London, 1972, pp. 827-842.
production ceased to increase. Increased agricultural production in a subsistence economy is unable to produce surplus or commerce, instead resulting directly in greater procreation. Under the condition that agricultural expansion correlates directly with increase of population, the increased production will again induce greater population.\footnote{The feedback from increased productivity to increased nutrition is the most important contribution here. Increased nutrition leads to population increase (a Malthusian notion); population increase leads to increased production (Boserup’s proposition). The increase in production then feeds back to the model’s start, and the cycle of growth and development continues, and the rate of population growth will accelerate. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 34.} The growth will cease only when there is no resource to effectively use the available extra labor of the larger population;\footnote{Technological progress stimulated population growth in pre-industrial economies and was stipulated by population growth insofar as it increased the aggregate demand, which generated division of labor, regional specialization, and liberated the economy from some of the constraints imposed by indivisibilities in equipment and learning.” Perrson, Karl Gunnar, 1988, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. p.31.} at this point the population will stabilize, or recede to equilibrium with possible food production.

Greater population will not produce equivalent increase in production due to greater labor input because dependence on the limitation of land would reduce the productivity of greater labor power.\footnote{Wood, J. W.; “A Theory of preindustrial population dynamics,” in Current Anthropology #39, 1998, pp. 99-135; p. 105.} From migration until the 9th-century the population of Greece had been stable, but just before the opening of the eighth century population suddenly exploded, instigating problems connected with land shortage.\footnote{On mainland Greece and the Aegean islands, the human condition and the number of persons experiencing it had not changed very much for several hundred years when, in the latter part of the ninth century, the population began rather suddenly to grow. This sudden growth had a devastating effect on the way people lived and produced their livelihoods. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 19.} Since the population of a polis grew while it was dependent solely on agriculture, and its land-area did not grow, the polis would afterwards be susceptible to famine and plague as its productive rate fails to increase with the rate of reproduction.\footnote{High child mortality motivated impoverished families to persist in a high fertility rate, because the labor of surviving children would be welcome in a private-ownership society without slavery or employment. Generation of many children entailed that investment in the...}
child would be much lower than if one's progeny were few. The high mortality rate might have mitigated scarcity, but aggravated problems of child-inheritance. The high fertility rate inhibited productivity. As long as no advantage seemed to emerge from greater investment in fewer children, however, procreation would not subside. The atomized perception of the oikos was unable to grasp the damage of high fertility to the community. Large families with child-raising low investment maintained poverty in a static equilibrium. Although higher child investment would have depressed the fertility level, the relative absence of slavery in archaic Greece motivated over-procreation to satisfy the labor-demand of the oikos.

The cellular nature of archaic society originated from its agricultural division of labor. Population density alone motivates the oikos economy to devote more time to labor; the kinship relations within the oikos economy are the only force that enacts the transformation to intensified labor. If living standards are above subsistence, the increased cost of children may reduce the fertility rate. In this case the resultant surplus capital propels further technological

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79 From improvements in productive capacity caused by the opening up of new resources or by technological progress, gross and per capita output may initially rise currently with population number. Eventually, growth in output and therefore population will decline as population size increases, especially once it approaches the sustainable equilibrium level. This constraint on population growth is a function of declining marginal productivity; without ongoing technological change, output will gradually rise more slowly than input (labor). When the latter is the main input, diminishing returns will reduce average consumption. In theory, a population may reach a demographic saturation point beyond which further inputs yield negative returns and additional growth is not feasible. At this stage, owing to the lack of capacity reserves, the population is increasingly rendered vulnerable to environmental shocks such as disease or food crises. Crucially, however, the notional equilibrium state or saturation point (carrying capacity) is entirely contingent on the current system of production, and will change with any modification of the technological and institutional framework. Cf. Scheidel, Walter, Demography, Ch3, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.52


81 An example from American history might suffice; when the market price of tobacco in Europe declined, all the American farmers produced more tobacco to recoup in quantity what they had lost due to lower prices. The result was catastrophic, since the increased quantity simply lowered tobacco prices more.

When procreation promises economic advantage to the family, its procreation would not decline even though it overburdened the carrying capacity of the community. Thus, child exposure was practiced when the infant looked sickly, that is, would economically impair the oikos, but was not practiced from civic reasoning. Because irrigation did not force communal organization, agriculture consisted of atomized family farms, all labor contributing exclusively to family capitals (i.e. not to temple accumulation). In consequence inheritance was the only transmission of capital. Marriage varied directly with the mortality rate, since a person acquired the means of finance only when his father died. The taboo on dependent labor signified that the young did not sell their labor elsewhere; youth came into social production only by taking over the paternal enterprise. Consequently a kinship structure of high intergenerational dependence persisted.

Private, rather than public, land-ownership sustained kinship. Land allotments were

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83 Accordingly, only when an increase in population density demands increased production will the initial labor sacrifice be undertaken, and it is often the case that kinship ties make it easier to make the commitment to invest that labor. The arduous practice of breaking new land involves more labor, but, after this commitment, an increase in output per worker-hour may soon result. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 33.

84 The relationship between normative living standards and physiological subsistence is the other main variable that mediates pressure for innovation. To the extent that minimally acceptable living standards exceed their subsistence (defined as the level of consumption and xxx a link survival and demographic reproduction at replacement level), demand for improvements in productivity will emerge before population growth reaches a final saturation point. The greater the average difference between these two consumption levels, the more capital reserves will be available, and the easier it is for innovation to occur. In principle, and in the very long run, normative living standards rise with technological advances inasmuch as the latter (which require human capital) increase the value of time and thus the price of children, thereby constraining fertility and permitting intensive growth. Cf. Scheidel, Walter, Demography, Ch3, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 55.


86 It therefore seems unlikely that ancient nuclear-let alone extended-families benefited from social or economic institutions that would have restrained marital fertility in the event of rising economic output. While the causes of secular fertility decline in modern history continue to be hotly debated, none of them seems to have acted on ancient populations. Cf. Salares Robert, Ecology, Ch.2, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 72
distributed to the citizens. The “kleros protos,” the allotment, was under the authority of the father, but its ownership was not in the father, but in the genos, the clan or family.\textsuperscript{87} The unit of the oikos ought to have first nucleated agrarian holdings, but to have culminated in great plantations; the repudiation of private ownership entailed by socialized agriculture on the contrary ought to have induced property equality, if not social equality. The Greek tribes cherished contradictory ideals: private ownership and equality. The annual and substantial variation of rainfall and production pressured the drive to own more land than was minimally necessary. On the other hand, the nascent Greek community was in the midst of war with its neighbors, and to escape absorption into another community, the proto-polis needed to maximize its number of soldiers. Since the only possible sustenance was agriculture, a maximum number of kleroi should exist in order to constitute a maximum number of soldiers. Either primogeniture or partible inheritance would eventually produce land scarcity and dispossessed population, but partible inheritance appears, prima facie, to favor social equality.

The kinship system resolved such contradictions. Despite the distribution of private ownership, the totality of the land was attributed to Zeus or some other god. Thus the private owner was not the ultimate owner; the land was in the prerogative of Zeus, and by extension the tribe; the whole kinship group was the final owner who had a right to redistribute privately owned land. Divine possession legitimated the reduction of privately owned kleroi to minimally viable units, and if an individual somehow acquired excessive land, he was vulnerable to public confiscation and redistribution.\textsuperscript{88} Athens never permitted a land market; the multiplication of smallholdings was meant to ensure a sufficiently large military force. One of the advantages sought in private property is the formation of an estate; the individual creates a permanent store of wealth that remains intact as it moves down the lineage of his

\textsuperscript{87} In earlier times the land, at least each of the old allotments (kleroi) originally distributed among the citizens of any one city, the kleros protos, belonged to the whole family, the genos, and not to the head of the family personally; that it remained “the collective property of the whole genos.” Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.44.

progeny. This was in direct contradiction with the idea of democratic land distribution. The aristocrats had not been conspicuously different from the ordinary people; subsistence dictates an equal distribution in contrariety to formation of office identities. The distinctiveness of the aristocrat is a function of population growth, agriculture, and redistribution. It seems incoherent for Greece to have allowed private property, but to have prohibited the formation of estates. Athens did not practice primo- or ultimogeniture. Patriarchal inheritance guaranteed against the vacancy of a kleros; if all male children were entitled to land inheritance, the land would engender at least as many soldiers as in the previous generation.

The reliance on distributive small ownership impeded ideologies of socialized land ownership. Primogeniture did not prevail in archaic Greece; the characteristic of kinship was

89 After the shift in many—though not all—communities from egalitarian to rank society, life in general is of the same quality as before: there is still equality in access to necessary things, and the main framework of economic relations persists. The main difference is the institutionalization and reduction (per capita) of positions of rank. The two most significant factors behind this are “ecological demography” by which Fried means an increase in population with a shift in production to agriculture, and the emergence of redistribution. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 90.


91 Agrarian practicality favored units which could be cultivated by, or under the authority of, one nuclear family, maybe with some hired or servile help, but were large enough to sustain such a family reliably. Inter-annual variability of yield and what appears to have been a rule of thumb of 1 ha per person, tended to generate productive units of at least 5 ha of arable land. Military need, shaped by the ever-present threat or opportunity of invasion, exerted pressure in the contrary direction: a community’s survival (or chance of gain) could depend on putting as many heavy-armed men into the field as possible, which encouraged division of the productive landscape into the maximum number of units of minimum viable size, each providing one such warrior. Communities, however traditional, minimal, or remote, had to devise an acceptable compromise between those opposed imperatives, and seemed to have done so into complementary ways: first, by asserting a primordial public authority over the landscape, and second by preventing excessive accumulation of property. The first expedient, typically the mythic form, attributing the community’s possession of its landscape to a God, both so that its individual members might have a share allotted to each, and so that the community as a collective could feel himself entitled in need to confiscate, redistribute, or reassign land. The second expedient involved favoring partible inheritance over primogeniture, ensuring at the extreme that a kleros did not become “empty” (eremos), setting a limit to the size of individual estates, and enveloping the acquisition of several kleroi in a cloud of social disapproval. Cf. Davies, John K.; Classical Greece: Production, Ch.12. in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.350.
individual property in which the principal devised his inheritance to a plurality of progeny. Kinship restricted the upper limit of land ownership; property regulations did not aim at maximizing the individual holder's enjoyment of wealth, but at social equilibrium. Limitation of individual right was out of consideration of the clan rather than of the good of the nuclear family. Despite its generally communistic properties, kinship compelled private property for the sake of greater progeny. On the other hand, a right to private property in combination with a right to bequeath to non-relatives or to only one son would have resulted in amalgamation of farm holdings, and consequently reduced procreation. The principal was compelled to bequeath his assets equally to his sons; the compulsion on filial inheritance intended to secure a sufficient number of soldiers.

Initially one would think that partible inheritance would aggravate the problem of land tenure; if every male child inherited land, very soon the land inheritance would be too small to sustain a family, thus encouraging primogeniture. However, the average lifespan was 25 years. The very high mortality rate entailed very high fertility rates. Whereas the population replacement level in the 21st century is 2.1, every woman in archaic Greece would have to produce 6.5 children simply to maintain the present size of the population. Because of very early widowhood and remarriage, each woman on average may have born six to nine children. Partible inheritance was feasible because within a 15 to 20 year period most of the presumptive heirs to a kleros would be dead.

Technological progress was notoriously disfavored in the Greco-Roman world. The

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92 If we adhere to Homer and Hesiod, we find that all ownership is private, so far as arable land is concerned. The estates of Alcinoos, Odysseus, of Perses, are private properties; nowhere is there any mention of cultivated land owned collectively. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.14.
93 The right of property was not unrestricted in earlier times. The making over, whatever form it might take, of the original lots could not be effected at complete liberty, without any guarantee for the economic and social equilibrium of the citizen-body. What, in the eyes of the ancient philosophers, justifies these limitations of individual right is the public good, the interests of the city, not concern for the family. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.46.
94 Inheritances were or might be transmitted undivided in practice, but there was no law that they must be. In Homeric and Hesiodic society there was not only private, but individual, property. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.16.
conventional explanation, that enough labor had to be provided for the slaves, is not only somewhat illogical, but initially wrong. Innovation was costly and prone to failure; archaic thought considered that the old, conventional operation had proved its efficacy by the fact of its survival. The conservative attitude would be very strong in a subsistence economy in which risk-failure did not mean lower living standards, but death from famine and disease. Technological progress germinates in an interval buffering a current standard of living and subsistence. Invention emerges in an open society with high population density, in which

95 High mortality usually went and in hand with high fertility. At ancient levels of life expectancy, the average woman surviving to menopause must have given birth to between 4.5 and 6.5 children in order to maintain the existing population. In view of likely levels of divorce, widowhood, and sterility, mean marital fertility must have been higher still, around six to nine. Cf. Scheidel, Walter, Demography, Ch3, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.41

96 While minor adaptations in productive technology and organization would occur on a regular basis, major improvements that permitted rapid demographic expansions were probably rare or even non-existent. Why do systems of production change at all? Technical inertia—the rational resistance to change that entails costs and especially novel risks—tends to keep systems of production from changing unless and until they are compelled to do so: economic decline and per capita output associated with rising population size raises the utility gain from innovation and therefore may well be the principal inducement to productivity-enhancing adaptations. Under these circumstances, the pressure for innovation is a function of the average level of well-being relative to the subsistence level which is in turn determined by the ratio of population number to current carrying capacity. Moreover, the rate of innovation is positively correlated with population size per se. It has been formally demonstrated that in the long term, population size and the stock of knowledge (which governs productivity) are not only mutually interdependent but serve as the two fundamental causal determinants of economic progress, while any other factors are ultimately reducible to secondary endogenous variables. [Simon 2000]. The main reason is that larger populations create larger markets for information about technology and institutional arrangements. Although the effects of this linkage are at best dimly perceptible for ancient economies, it seems that the rate of population growth in Greece and Rome and Italy may have been positively correlated with the rate of inventions. [Simon 1986: 66]. The principle that population size also contributes to economic development independently of population pressure is borne out by the observation that population growth tends to be proportional to population size in the sense that in the long term, rates of increase depend on previous population levels, a correlation that is supported from at least 4000 B.C. onwards. As a consequence, low-density areas would have been less conducive to innovation, there is growing population density and concurrent urbanization can reasonably be expected to have accelerated technological and institutional progress. Cf. Scheidel, Walter, Demography, Ch3, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.52.
ideas disseminate quickly. The oikos, strongly dispersed without a market, inhibited the travel of ideas. The oikos was cellular; the idealized self-containment of each unit of the population in separation from other units discouraged technological advance.

Population growth might be supposed to raise prosperity, because of the greater consumer market, or to contract economy, because per capita distribution diminishes as the population increases. The fundamental premise is that population growth will abet economy under the condition that the increment of population will produce more than it consumes. If the economy is agricultural and there is no territorial expansion, incremental population growth will be a dead weight rather than a source of greater production. Population growth ought to have stimulated technological development, because the Greeks refrained from the alternative, territorial expansion.

It is puzzling that the Greeks did not value technological progress. Population growth impairs the equilibrium between population and carrying capacity. If living conditions decline in an indigent society, any innovation that produces more at less cost ought to be highly valued. Oddly, a prosperous society is not likely to innovate insofar as the innovation does not produce a living noticeably better than what already obtains. If archaic society had living standards far above subsistence and experienced catastrophic fall, the Greeks would have valued innovation. But archaic Greece did not satisfy the first condition; its economy had never been higher than bare subsistence. Greek population growth failed to improve the economy because it occurred under conditions in which it did not stimulate technology. The cellular nature of archaic society guided Athens instead to accommodate overpopulation with colonization and commerce.

PATRILINEAGE

Precedence of communal over individual good motivated Athenian partible inheritance to discriminate between genders. It was a Greek conception that procreation and inheritance were the purposes of marriage; this idea engendered a large gap in the age and education of the husband and wife. The probability that the wife would outlive the husband presented a first ground against female inheritance. To satisfy the need of a large military force, females were to marry and procreate. Individual female wealth would have impeded procreation, since fewer women would feel impelled to marry. Males married old and females married young in order to guarantee infantile health and to sustain the authority (kurios) of the male; the circumstance that a man would not inherit the means of subsistence until his father died entailed that males would be older than their brides. This pattern, late marriage for the male and early marriage for the female, inadvertently optimized the probability that women would remarry. Because females were ten years younger at the death of their husbands, they remained fecund and remarried after the death of the first husband. The polity might have prevented the consequent disruption of inheritance simply by prohibiting remarriage, but such a rule would have reduced procreation.

Inheritance engendered a new problem. The purpose of a maximum military population

100 The oikos was the context of action and emotion for all Athenians and most non-Athenians, for much of their time. It was the context of much significant cult-practice, ranging from the everyday through rites de passage to such ancestor worship as was practiced. It was a centre of affective life, though a life clouded by the ideology and reality of homosexuality, by disparities in age, education, or expectations between husband and wife, and by a severely practical view of marriage which saw it mainly as an instrument of child creation and property transfer. Cf. Davies, J.K.; Society and Economy, in The Fifth Century B.C., The Cambridge Ancient History, The Cambridge Ancient History, eds. Lewis, D.M., Boardman, John, Davies, J.K., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.289.
101 The Greek citizen did not usually marry until he was close on 30, or even beyond. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; The Greek Commonwealth; The Modern Library, New York, p.351.
102 Very few indeed of the daughters of citizens remained unmarried. Antigone and Elektra, whose name itself means “the Unmated,” makes us feel the tragic loneliness, in the eyes of such true Athenian is Sophocles, of independent women. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; The Greek Commonwealth; The Modern Library, New York, p.341.
enjoined the remarriage of the widow. The sustained fecundity of the widow conflicted with patrilineage, since the assets of the first husband would flow through the wife to the second husband. Remarriage would divert the inheritance from the progeny of the first husband. This probability would have discouraged the first marriage, which however was essential for the institution of inheritance. Ineluctable natural force embodied itself in remarriage, which would undermine the religiously rooted commitment to patrilineage. The cultural preconception of male control of wealth entailed that the second husband would commandeer the inheritance for the sake of his own children, destroying the only preference that motivated the first husband to marriage instead of concubinage. Matrilineal inheritance would also have dissipated land from the male decedent to a new male line in the event of remarriage. The natural human lifespan of archaic Greece militated against male transmission of property.

Property was concentrated in one person, the father. A son had a right of ownership, but the family estate was concentrated exclusively in the father until his death. It must be investigated what the causes of this reasoning were, and what its consequences. Why should archaic society have been patriarchal? Relation to a family member was somehow different from relation to a third person, a colleague or a stranger; what constituted the difference in perception? Possibly the father might have regarded the immediate members of his family as property, or personal creations, or in some way as extensions of himself; distribution of wealth to family members might have been an instance of self-interest, deeply different from gift-giving to a non-relative. It might strain the topic to conjecture why the tribes, centuries before migration into Greece, had depotentiated women in preference for patriarchy; prior to settlement, the motivation could not have derived from property. Since men died earlier than women, and there was remarriage, it ought to have been more likely for a matrilineal society to have developed; the primordial Greeks had a Great-Mother goddess on which to form such a structure. The complications of archaic marriage and inheritance customs were stridently devoted to averting a penchant to matriarchy; possibly the archaic social development was a deliberate attempt to escape the tendency to matriarchy.⁹³

Athens legislated against matrilineage by a severe limitation of female control over her own property. Prior to marriage the father was the kyrios of the daughter; the father disposed
over any property that nominally belonged to the woman. Subsequently the husband became *kyrios* of the wife and controlled her dowry.\footnote{104} Disposal over the woman’s property following the death of the first husband was transferred neither to herself nor to her second husband, but to an adult son or to a male kinsman of her natal family. The dowry was essential to secure and compel the marriage of the daughter, and female inheritance was manipulated to serve nothing more than the purpose of patrilineal inheritance. A woman might ostensibly inherit from wills or intestate succession in addition to her dowry, but this inheritance flowed into the oikos of the husband; the daughter did not receive autonomous control of her inheritance.\footnote{105}

Subsistence agriculture enforces rigid correlation between food production and population; a sudden access of wealth increases population, a desideratum of the archaic Greeks, but maintains the increased population within the previous per capita poverty level. Direct correlation between economic gain and greater fertility keeps the living conditions of an agricultural economy permanently stagnant. Only a factor of industrial production enables a windfall to raise living standards, permanently, instead of expanding population within the previous low living standards.\footnote{106} Themistocles’ resolve to build a navy with the Laurion windfall is perhaps the only instance of this phenomenon in ancient Greek history. The archaic Greeks could not have perceived the economic deficit of virtual female disinheritance partially

\footnote{103} The Athenians held a unitary conception of household property, in which the husband was *kyrios* or manager of his wife’s, as well as his own, property. Adult sons had the legal capacity to own property, but did not realize full legal control of the family estate until the death of their father. Cf. Saller, Richard P., *Household and Gender*, Ch. 4, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 92.

\footnote{104} The Athenians practiced a system of partible inheritance in which sons receive equal shares of the patrimony, whereas daughters were provided with dowries for marriage. The dowries could be substantial and usually comprised movables (cash, furniture, slaves), leaving the real property to male heirs. As security for the value of the dowry, husbands offered land, marked by inscribed stone *horoi*. On the extant stones, the mortgages range widely in value from less than 500 drachmas to over a talent. As a proportion of the family wealth, the values attested by the orators run from less than 5% of the patrimony to nearly 20%. As long as the marriage continued, the husband as *kyrios* controlled the dowry and was responsible to provide maintenance for the wife, but not according to any fixed formula. The inability of poor families to dower a daughter could endanger her chances of getting married. HOUSEHOLD AND GENDER Cf. Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, & Saller, Richard, editors; *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, Cambridge University Press, p. 93.

\footnote{105} Schaps D.M.; *Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece*; Edinburgh; 1979, ch. 3
because they would instead admire the efficiency of the division of male and female labor proceeding from this arrangement. They could justify female labor and inheritance laws with an essentialist interpretation of female inferiority.

Sparta contained the threat of matrilineage very differently. It was desirable that a woman marry at as early an age as possible, to maximize procreation; that the male be the authority of the family and that succession of property be patrilineal, and that a bereaved wife would remarry. These preferences were inconsistent. The law of the Spartan Epitadeus, that the decedent should have a right of arbitrary bequeathal, served to assure the husband that his assets would not be squandered on the progeny of the subsequent husband, thus securing the eagerness to marry, and hence apparently inducing greater progeny. However, the original kinship laws of inheritance had intended to keep each kleros intact at its original size, so as to prevent concentrations of wealth and land. The right of arbitrary bequeathal had on the contrary produced a small group of very wealthy citizens, followed by hordes of extremely poor citizens. In consequence, Epitadeus' law discouraged population growth, because both large and small landholdings discouraged procreation.

The archaic religious conception of property bound property to male lineage, whereby property was bequeathed to male, not female, progeny. To countermand the natural pressure

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106 Without the flow from population size to technology, the whole system would tend towards a stable equilibrium, prepared by exogenous forces but always returning to a steady state. It is the capacity for building up and applying knowledge that is the pivotal determinant of long-term change, and, in so far as innovation is in turn a corollary of population size, the latter is an equally critical variable. The inversion of the conventional positive correlation between increasing knowledge and real wages on the one hand and rising fertility of other is a late development, as is the amelioration of health hazards through knowledge. Cf. Scheidel, Walter, Demography, Ch3, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 53.

107 What do we learn from these various documents? Merely that the right of the father of the family over the early kleros was limited by the law, for economic and social reasons, chiefly because the law giver wanted to prevent the land from becoming concentrated in too few hands and to save families whose kleros had been sold, given, or bequeathed to others than the natural heirs from falling into destitution. What happened at Sparta when the law of Epitadeus was put into force justified those fears. Any quality of fortune became excessive, for very soon there were a hundred very wealthy citizens as against a multitude who were extremely poor. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.44.
to matrilineage, Athens legislated against property inheritance to a daughter; a daughter could not inherit land, but only personalty. Correlatively, the husband could not bequeath property to his wife, but only to his sons. There was a strong fear of the effects of matrilineal society, due to association with property dissipation.\textsuperscript{108} The legislation of the \textit{epikleros} stipulated that the wife of a decedent would receive her dowry, but could not receive immediate inheritance. Inheritance went either to the decedent's daughter’s son, or temporarily came into the authority of the father’s nearest kinsman if she married him, until the daughter gave birth to a son, who would then inherit.\textsuperscript{109} If an unmarried daughter succeeded her father she became an epikleros; she was married to her closest male relative, who controlled her inheritance, which was made into the property of the sons issuing from this marriage two years after puberty.

The high male mortality rate rendered a high rate of minority-heirs. Inheritance might instead have been legislated to a collective transference, but both Greek and Roman Law adhered to individual property inheritance. Laws of civic guardianship during the minority of the child were installed to protect children’s inheritances from both mothers and stepfathers.\textsuperscript{110} Male progeny received equal shares of the landed inheritance; to consolidate the landed inheritance and, equally important, to compel marriage, daughters received dowries instead

\textsuperscript{108} The case of the epikleros daughter was governed by quite a different idea—the idea that daughters had no right to the patrimony at all. Cf. Toutain, Jules; \textit{The Economic Life of the Ancient World}, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.45.

\textsuperscript{109} The interpretation often given to the case of the epikleros, the sole daughter, goes much too far beyond the evidence. The epikleros’ daughter could not herself inherit her father’s property. The heir to that property was the son to whom she gave birth, provided that she had married in her father’s lifetime, or her future husband had been named by her father in his will, or she had married her father’s nearest kinsman, the lawful heir. In any of these cases, the inheritance included land that land sooner or later became the property of the son born of her. Cf. Toutain, Jules; \textit{The Economic Life of the Ancient World}, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.45.

\textsuperscript{110} In the context of high mortality and late male marriage, both Athenian and Roman society included many children who inherited their father’s property as orphans before adulthood. Within a legal framework of individualized property rights and a social context of nuclear family households, such orphans and their property required guardianship by adult males outside the household. The broad outlines of guardianship of underage children, and the economic implications, were broadly similar in Athens and Rome. Cf. Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, & Saller, Richard, editors; \textit{The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World}, Cambridge University Press, p.99.
of inheritance. Land was mortgaged to procure security for the value of the dowry, and the mortgage would eventually be redeemed.\textsuperscript{111} The probability of redemption alleviated the father's resentment of the dowry payment. Prior to marriage the father was the \textit{kyrios} of the daughter, disposing over any property that nominally belonged to the daughter.

**TRUSTEESHIP**

The father was the owner of property, but he held his property in trust for his progeny; he was not the ultimate owner, but rather the patriarch. Thus the father's property should have automatically passed to the sons, regardless of the father’s will, because the father was the owner only in trust to his family lineage. In Sparta the inheritance fell wholly to the oldest son; in Athens the inheritance was partible, with the larger share falling to the oldest son. Ownership within the \textit{genos} prohibited the father from alienating his land, so that the equal sizes and numbers of land ownership would remain the same. Prevention of land engrossment would maintain social equality.

The idea of kinship applied to both male and female the concept of trusteeship, thus limiting the archaic idea of private property. The decedent was not entitled to bequeath property to someone outside of his genetic stream, and laws existed to prevent the owner from misusing or squandering other property that was heritable to his progeny. The Aristotelian theory of private property did not extend to bequeathal, since the utility of the possession, which lay at the basis of Aristotle's property right, did not apply to a decedent who, a fortiori, could not use a possession better than others. The decedent, the prior owner, did not control bestowal of his property at death; he could not, for instance, bequeath his property to a friend on the ground that the friend would use the property better than his son. The prior kinship concept of property prevailed; the decedent's property became the property of his family/clan. The right of private property was not absolute, but a corollary of a more primitive axiom, the good of the community. The concept of private property had not developed from the contrariety: the good of the individual vs. the good of the community. Private property

was justified as an inference from the good of the community. The private owner was thus constrained to produce for self-centered interest in such a way that its side effect would produce for the good of the whole. Private property remained contingent on the utility of this arrangement to the good of the community.\textsuperscript{112}

\section*{MARRIAGE}

Considering the measures to prevent female property-holding, it seems odd that a woman should have had a prima facie right of inheritance in the first place. The solution lies in marriage alliance. Marriage in archaic Greece was an affair of the oikos, not the polis. Legitimacy and illegitimacy of marriage must have preceded polis government in classical Greece, because no kinship alliances could have developed until after marriage was distinguishable from concubinage.\textsuperscript{113} The structure of archaic Greek society was natural; the social ranking of kinship was by genetic order, not invention; similarly, procreation was not of human invention, but a natural phenomenon to which social advantages could be appended in the same secure way as authority could be appended to the elders of a genetic stream. A natural order was more stable because of its immunity to arbitrary decision or reinterpretation.

\textsuperscript{112} For the Greeks set out from a different starting point, in their early world of tribes and brotherhoods and families no one thought of his own “rights” or questioned the claims of society. Practically everything that he had belonged to his kin. He would not claim his own life for himself, if they asked it of him in time of need. Why should he dream of claiming his house or his field or his cattle? They were indeed his own, for he needed them daily and could not live without them. He had made them his own by making use of them, and his chief claim upon them was that no one else could use them, like the bow of Odysseus, so well as he, the father of the family or head of the clan. But if it fell to him therefore to administer the family wealth, this did not bring with it any rights over its bestowal. He could not give them away and so beggar his dependents, or will them all way to strangers when his life interest in them ended. He held his wealth in trust for the little society around him: and if it belonged to him, as head of the family, rather than to them, this was simply because, in the slow evolution of generations, it had been discovered that private ownership, in this limited and primitive form, was better for the community as a whole. Property held in this way did not involve rights; it simply bestowed duties. It was the tradition of Greek economic policy-and nowhere was the Greek practical genius seen more happily at work-to bestow these duties upon those best qualified to perform them and in such a manner as to call out their best powers in doing so. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; \textit{The Greek Commonwealth}; The Modern Library, New York, p.293
Marriage was a natural order through which property transfers could be trusted. Land scarcity connected with class formation articulated the concept of marriage; a concept of legitimacy was needed for the regulation of inheritance. Land transference through marriage strongly depended on a very strong distinction between concubine and wife; otherwise the marriage would not have guaranteed that the inheritance would not pass to the children of one of the other consorts. It was probably the device of land transference through the wife through which inheritance maintained the importance of women. Legitimacy determined whether children could be citizens and whether they could inherit. Kinship forbade marriage to a woman outside of the clan.

Marriage was a form of gift giving; both marriage and other forms of gift-giving were the fundamental means of establishing alliances between nobles. The arrangement for acquiring a girl for marriage was to give the father a large gift; the surrender of the daughter to marriage had the form of a counter-gift. In this practice of gift-giving the return of a gift or service was compulsory. Thus gift-giving could compel exchange nearly as accurately as buying and selling. Individual consciousness conceived of land, being the substantive basis of the blood-line, as being in private ownership in the area each individual cultivated; consequently marriage, as a mixing of blood, was the most logical basis for land-transference.

The dowry was intended to be a security for the well-being of the bride. The dowry

113 In classical Greece the legal validity of a marriage was a matter of public concern, for it established both the citizenship of the children and the application of the laws of inheritance. It was primarily around the legitimacy of the children that the law of marriage gravitated. This pivotal point, however, was missing in Homeric Greece, where there was no polis, no citizenship, no political problem of legitimacy. Who then drew the distinction, which clearly did exist, between a wife and a concubine? The answer lies in one of two directions: either this matter lay within the jurisdiction of the kinship group, or it lay within the much smaller body, the oikos, the household. Cf. Finley, M. I.; Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, Viking Press, New York, 1982, p.243.

114 A marriage was, among other things, a political alliance; in fact, marriage and guest-friendship were the two fundamental devices for the establishment of alliances among the nobles and chieftains. The exchange of gifts was their invariable expression of the conclusion of an alliance. Cf. Finley, M. I.; Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, Viking Press, New York, 1982, p.238.

115 Gifts of wooing were precisely comparable. They were given to the girl’s father with the intent of provoking a counter-gift, the girl in marriage. Cf. Finley, M. I.; Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, Viking Press, New York, 1982, p.238.
amounted to between 5% and 20% of the patrimony. Failure of the woman to marry or
remarry would cancel the award of the dowry to the woman, returning the asset to the male
progeny. The father’s failure to provide a patrimony would reduce the daughter’s opportunity
for marriage.\textsuperscript{116} The dowry went directly into the control of the husband, not the wife, and
therefore posed the problem of how the dowry, given in personalty, (slaves, money, furniture)
could support the wife in case of divorce or death. Perhaps expressed too cynically, the dowry
amounted to a bribe to take the daughter in marriage; more trenchantly, the husband lost his
property in the dowry in the case of divorce. The contingency of the dowry thus stabilized the
marriage for both partners to the transaction. Upon receipt of the dowry, the husband reserved
an area of land that was equivalent in value to the dowry. The land was determined by stone
markers, \textit{horoi}.\textsuperscript{117} The land remained the property of the husband, which he continued to use,
but the land became the property of the wife's natal family if the husband divorced or died, to
be given by the wife's familial guardian to her son when he came of age.\textsuperscript{118}

This is perhaps confusing. A gift is given to the woman's father in a venture to acquire
the daughter in marriage, but the dowry was a much larger "gift," by which the father bribed
the man to marry his daughter. But, even after the marriage, the natal family might reclaim the
dowry. The bedrock of the marriage transaction was conditional land transfer. The dowry was
an insurance for the future well-being of the daughter, and therefore had to be reclaimable as
the independent property of the daughter. At the same time the land, as a property-acquisition,
had to be sufficiently secure to motivate the man to accept the marriage. It was deeply
embedded custom that the female should have no control whatever over money and property,

\textsuperscript{117} Cox, C.A.; \textit{Household Interests. Property, Marriage Strategies, and Family Dynamics in Ancient Athens},
\textsuperscript{118} As security for the value of the dowry, husbands offered land, marked by and described stone \textit{horoi}.
On the extant stones, the mortgages range widely in value from less than 500 drachmas to over a talent.
As a proportion of the family wealth, the values attested by the orators run from less than 5% of the
patrimony to nearly 20%. As long as the marriage continued, the husband as \textit{kyrios} controlled the dowry
and was responsible to provide maintenance for the wife, but not according to any fixed formula. The
inability of poor families to dower a daughter could endanger her chances of getting married. Cf. Saller,
Richard P., \textit{Household and Gender}, Ch.4, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; \textit{The}
and yet most inheritances passed to or through the female. 

Despite inheritance, Athenian women apparently never used capital to engage in commerce or formal money-lending.\textsuperscript{119} A woman of any status could engage in a legally enforceable transaction only to the maximum of one medimnos (= one week’s worth of food.)\textsuperscript{120} Athenian women could not engage in commerce, nor could they lend money, except informally to relatives.\textsuperscript{121} Restriction of female property and business engagement exempted society from extensive training of women. The labor pool was consequently narrower, suggesting that laws to inhibit matrilineal bequeathal constrained productivity. Female wage rates vary inversely with fertility;\textsuperscript{122} if Greco-Roman culture had condoned female employment, the general economy would have improved from diminished procreation. However, problems of inheritance seem to have precluded female participation in production.\textsuperscript{123} It was noted throughout Greece that Spartan women, who were not constrained by similar laws, were more capable than women from any other polis. Production in a market economy is a reaction to demand; it varies flexibly to how much will be purchased at a given price. In such an economy livelihoods relied directly on predictable market demand. The oikos economy by contrast was insensitive to market fluctuation; increment or decrement of demand did not affect oikos production.\textsuperscript{124} An oikos may sell a surplus in a market, but since the surplus would be sold in the market at any price, the market does not regulate production. Without a full market, reduced productivity due to female disemployment escaped notice.

Greek society concentrated on continuity of the marriage in the kin lineage of the

\textsuperscript{119} The sources do not reveal Athenian women using their capital to engage in large-scale commerce. Though they occasionally made loans to relatives, they do not appear as professional moneylenders. Schaps, D. M.; Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece, Edinburgh, 1979, ch. 3.

\textsuperscript{120} The law of classical Athens gave citizen women very limited discretion in dealing with property. Before marriage an Athenian girl had her father as her kyrios; and after marriage either an adult son or a male kinsman from her natal family would serve in that role. On her own, a woman could enter legally enforceable transactions only up to the value of a medimnos of barley (about a week’s food for a family). Cf. Saller, Richard F.; Household and Gender, 92, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, & Saller, Richard, editors; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press.

\textsuperscript{121} Schaps, D.M.; Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece; Edinburgh; 1979., p.63

male. Family labor predominated because of the low circulation of labor between different households. The relation of patron and client provided the only welfare insurance to the client. Finally, conventional marital living standards were low. These conditions promote high fertility. WHY?

123 The economic “low equilibrium trap” that inhibits sustained intensive growth has an important demographic dimension: a low-productivity, high mortality and higher fertility regime typically rests in an equilibrium state that can only be perturbed by a boost in capital and the stock of knowledge that favors increased investment in offspring. For most of human history, the default position was a low-level equilibrium with little human capital and low rates of return on investment in human capital (i.e. education), associated with large families and low investment. Conversely, it takes high rates of return on human capital relative to return on children per se to increase investment to an extent that ultimately depresses fertility, although the existence of large families does not necessarily imply demand for them, and the diffusion of cultural preferences may arguably matter more than micro-economic forces. There can be little doubt that these crucial economic preconditions must obtain for changing preferences to translate to secular shifts in fertility levels. In the absence of dramatic changes in productive technology or (non-urban) labor markets, no transformation of this kind can have occurred in antiquity. Fertility declines in developing countries have been correlated with improvement in the status of women: women need to benefit from a fertility decline in so far as their wage rate is inversely correlated with their fertility. Again, no comparable process can be posited for Greek or Roman societies. Cf. Scheidel, Walter; Demography, in The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, & Saller, Richard, editors; Cambridge University Press, p. 72.

124 Greece never developed a full market economy, in which people intentionally produced surplus and relied on market purchase; the fundamental oikos economy maintained a self-sufficient subsistence economy throughout the archaic and classical periods. For as long as production did not respond to prior market demand. Before one can argue that any such system existed in antiquity, however, the self-regulating feedback mechanism must be proved to be in place; that is, it must be demonstrated that goods were produced to be brought to market because (most) people depended for their livelihoods on the incomes so generated. For example, when a peasant producer sells goods in the market for a particular price, there may be an appearance of supply and demand being regulated by price, but, in reality, this peasant will bring his goods to market at virtually any price, since there is no advantage in keeping his surplus production at home. The peasant’s self-sufficiency usually insulates him from any meaningful dependence on the market. Similarly, deliveries of goods may occasionally respond to demand, but in many situations such as Euneos’s one-time market- the goods have been produced probably without such intention, and a shortage has attracted existing goods to a specific spot. Unless production can be shown to be responding to demand and unless most people can be shown to depend on the market for their incomes, a self-regulating market system is not in operation. Save for late fourth-century Athens, nowhere before the Roman Empire can it be said that the majority of people in any settlement derived their livelihoods from markets. Until the late fourth century B.C. there is no evidence for a supply-demand-price mechanism in international exchange. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 125.
A drop in the mortality rate is not per se a cause, but can be an indicator, of improved productivity. In the context of ancient Greece talk of the mortality rate concerns essentially the male mortality rate. Males at marriage were ten years older than females; the female would normally marry twice and bear children to at least two men, and women did not labor in pecuniary work. Reduced mortality would imply that fewer men were dying, that more men were producing, and that the population as a whole had better health; less time in the average life was immobilized by disease. Therefore production rose. The correlation of low mortality and higher productivity is however contingent on low birth rates; if fertility remains high in a time of a low mortality rate, population growth will cancel the economic potential of a low mortality rate. If on the contrary the fertility rate also declines, the increased productivity associable with a low mortality rate will return more wealth on investment and propel a stable rate of high productivity.  

If women had authentic inheritance, financial autonomy, and potentiality for higher remuneration, the fertility rate would have declined. The Greeks however idealized high fertility because of its association with constituting a powerful army. The tendency to

126 Disproportionate emphasis on kin relations through the male line fostered virilocality that limited the economic freedom of new couples; low levels of labor circulation between rural households ensured a strong commitment to family labor; patron-client links constituted the main welfare agency; and socially approved minimum living standards for marriage were low. This combination of features tends to facilitate high fertility. Cf. Salares Robert, Ecology, Ch.2, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 71.
127 If mortality rates drop, intensive growth is unlikely to be sustained in the long run unless fertility follows suit. Although fertility transitions are now known to have occurred under diverse conditions, mortality decline is undeniably a necessary-if not a sufficient-condition for them to unfold. Mortality decline is of crucial importance also because of its correlation with HALE: lower death rates will necessarily be accompanied by improved health among survivors that raises returns on investment in human capital, thereby curbing fertility and facilitating productivity growth. Cf. Salares, “Ecology”, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 73.
procreate many children, but to invest little in them, locked the society into stagnancy. Economic saturation is a condition in which a society cannot transcend low-level equilibrium. If production is exactly as much as demand, no surplus allows for innovation or for population growth. If there is population growth nevertheless, per capita distribution will decrease more than production will increase. Since distribution will fall beneath subsistence, the mortality rate will increase, returning the economy to the previous equilibrium. Innovation will not overcome subsistence economy because there is no surplus with which to finance innovation. If on the contrary the living standard is above subsistence level, economic recession will mount pressure for innovation because a persistent social surplus can be applied to innovation. To elude the low equilibrium trap, technological advance must outpace the attrition of surplus capital resulting from population growth. Greece did not develop a high-level equilibrium with normative living standards considerably above subsistence because of the studiously low status of women in Greek society.

The priority of males over females was very clear; only sons inherited land. The dowry of a daughter was exclusively personalty, never land. The implication thereof is again obstinate resistance to dissipation of heritable wealth. If the daughter had been dowered with

129 The economic “low-equilibrium trap” that inhibits sustained intensive growth has an important demographic dimension: a low-productivity, high mortality and high fertility regime typically rests in an equilibrium state that can only be perturbed by a boost in capital and the stock of knowledge that favors increased investments in offspring. For most of human history, the default position was a low-level equilibrium with little human capital and low rates of return on investment in human capital (education), associated with large families and low investment. Conversely, it takes high rates of return on human capital relative to return on children per se to increase investment to an extent that ultimately depresses fertility. Although the existence of large families does not necessarily imply a demand for them, and the diffusion of cultural preferences may arguably matter more than micro-economic forces, there can be little doubt that these crucial economic preconditions must obtain for changing preferences to translate to secular shifts in the fertility levels. In the absence of dramatic changes in productive technology or (non-urban) labor markets, no transformation of this kind can have occurred in antiquity. Fertility declines in developing countries have been correlated with improvements in the status of women: women need to benefit from a fertility decline in so far as their wage rate is inversely correlated with their fertility. No comparable process can be posited for Greek or Roman societies. Cf. Salares, Robert; Ecology, Ch.3, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 72.

land, the female would in the long term have acquired not only power, but preponderance. The prohibition of female property in land guaranteed lasting female impotence.\textsuperscript{131}

The dowry posed a problem of agency. Although it was given for the future security of the wife, the husband, as \textit{kurios}, controlled the dowry, over which the wife had no power. As the dowry was not absolutely the husband's, though he had almost absolute disposal over it, he might embezzle or use the dowry as a cat's paw to exploit a venture for which he wouldn't dare to use his own assets. Questions about the disposition of the dowry could not be posed legally unless there were a divorce or death. The wife's only control over the dowry was divorce, in which instance it had to be returned to her. Since the dowry-laws did not regulate the use of it during the husband's possession, the dowry might well have deteriorated by the time of divorce. A blind account should have entailed legal supervision, but Athens did not institute a right of the wife or guardian to monitor the dowry, on the ground that, absurdly, such a right might disturb marital harmony.\textsuperscript{132} The dowry did not exhaust the daughter's claim on natal family assets; upon the death of the father, mother, or other relatives, the daughter stood to inherit. Since in marriage the daughter entered a different family, it should have followed that the natal family should have no further obligations to her. Perhaps such an inheritance was arbitrary, since in any case land would never be bequeathed to a female. Whatever the daughter otherwise inherited would come under the control of her husband; there was no chance that through some accidental twist, for instance an unexpected inheritance or death, the

\textsuperscript{131} The Athenians practiced a system of partible inheritance in which sons received equal shares of the patrimony, whereas daughters were provided with dowries for marriage. The dowries could be substantial and usually comprised movables (cash, furniture, slaves), leaving the real property to male heirs. Cf. Saller, Richard P., \textit{Household and Gender}, Ch.4, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.92.

\textsuperscript{132} It is the husband who controls the dowry during the marriage and his wife has very limited opportunity to determine whether his administration is competent and beneficial; her only real leverage, in most instances, is the threat of divorce. The situation is a difficult one, since it is not even controlled by the indirect mechanism of annual rental payments, which can broadly signal if the agency relationship is working properly. On the other hand, it is easy to see why the jurists were reluctant to impose any direct means for the wife to audit her husband's conduct, since that would be arguably destructive of marital harmony. Cf. Frier, Bruce W., and Kehoe, Dennis P.; \textit{Law and Economic Institutions}, Ch.5, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.125.
that a woman might become autonomous.\footnote{133} Athenian women could receive estates from
testaments or from intestate succession, but the law regulated the passage of such inheritance
to pass \textit{through} the woman to a male \textit{kurios}.\footnote{134} An orphaned and unmarried woman became an
epikleros, according to which the girl was married to her closest male kinsman; the estate was
in the control of the husband until the son was two years older than puberty, at which point it
became his property.\footnote{135}

\textbf{INHERITANCE}

Inheritance was the motive force of \textit{synoekismos}. Why should economic expansion have
resulted from \textit{synoekismos}? The presumption that the purpose of unification was to accelerate
commerce is anachronistic; market economy had not been a desideratum in the archaic period.
The purpose of earlier concentration in the polis had been centralization, and only later in the
peisistratid era had commerce figured in. Communication could remain fragmented for as
long as each oikos was in the autonomy of an aristocrat by kinship. Coordination of different
clans in a polity required communication, which entailed concentration in a polis.\footnote{136} Put more
cynically, motivation to form a polis from an ethne was desire to consolidate more land.

The agora, the center of the polis, did not originate from retail trade. In the early Iron Age

\footnote{133} Since the dowry did not automatically satisfy the daughters’ claims on their fathers’ estates, they
stood to inherit additional property from their fathers and also their mothers, other relatives, and friends.
\footnote{134} Schaps, D. M.; \textit{Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece}, Edinburgh, 1979, ch. 3.
\footnote{135} Aside from the dowry, Athenian women could benefit from wills or intestate succession. They did
not acquire independent control of the bequests, but were the conduit through which the property flowed
to another \textit{oikos}. The starkest illustration of this principle was the institution called the epiklerate. In
those cases where an Athenian man died with an unmarried daughter and no sons, the daughter became
an \textit{epikleros} and was married to her closest male kinsman. The estate was managed by the husband
and then passed to the ownership of the sons of this marriage two years after puberty. Alternatively, an
aging father with only a daughter could adopt a son to be a husband to his daughter; that son had to give
up his claim to his natal patrimony. Cf. Saller, Richard P., \textit{Household and Gender}, Ch.4, in Scheidel,
Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; \textit{The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World},
when the basileus was both monarch and priest, his dwelling had an area like an open porch from which he presented himself.\textsuperscript{137} The agora had originally been this porch, where the leader organized the people, and afterwards became a religious location from which metics and slaves were banned. Was the commercial agora, the market, inaugurated from religion, or did some equal power introduce it despite religion? A tight connection between money and religion had obtained in the oriental theocracies; the Greeks had likewise developed the redistribution pattern of their economy from a custom of storing and accumulating wealth in the temple, presumably because the sacrosanct atmosphere would protect it.\textsuperscript{138} On the contrary, location of the market in the agora conflicted with its religious pretension, since commerce was despised and merchants were metics.\textsuperscript{139} When the market was first introduced into the area of the agora, it was located separately from the place of military and religious events, presumably to uphold the dignity of the latter.\textsuperscript{140}

Why were markets introduced into the agora? How did the semantic conflict of the agora develop? This "front porch" had evolved into the \textit{agora}. The agora became completely

\textsuperscript{136} The major Greek communities shifted from the loose structure of the ethnos to the far more tightly integrated polis system before 700, but a polis was not in itself a city, even if the concentration of all significant activity at one point was an important encouragement to urbanization. Athens, for example, did not change from a group of villages into an urban agglomeration with its focus in the agora until the last part of the seventh century; embellishment of its public and religious centres came only under the Pisistratids. Cf. Starr, C.G.; \textit{Economic and Social Conditions in the Greek World}, in \textit{The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C.}, edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.429.

\textsuperscript{137} In quite a number of Early Iron Age settlements, the house of the local ruler gave on to an open area that probably functioned as a “proto-agora,” as an assembly place and perhaps also an open-air sanctuary for outdoor religious ceremonies. Cf. Crielaard, Jan Paul; “Cities,” in \textit{A Companion to Archaic Greece}, Eds. Raaffaeb, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 365.

\textsuperscript{138} Originally markets were held, as we have seen already, in the \textit{agora}, a free place destined for political gatherings and religious festivals of the \textit{polis} by ancient traditions. The Odyssey already describes, for the \textit{agora} of the Phaeacians, economic and non-economic use in a probably late passage. Markets were of course most frequent in coastal towns and were often connected with some Temple, the God of which was to guarantee the peace during market gatherings. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; \textit{An Ancient Economic History}, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.248.

dissociated from the basileus when it became the place for social gathering and for markets. Prior to market activity it served for religious ceremony; subsequently it became the gathering place for something cognate with religion: military excursion. Ca. 620 BC Draco's homicide law first refers to the mercantile market as the *agora ephoria*, that is, as an exchange-center at the outermost border of the community. Finally the market place located in the agora, though not until the 5th century B.C. From military-assembly it evolved into the place of democratic assembly, but this “democratic” assembly, just as the prior agora, was a gathering of equals, not of the déclassé labor class. Although *agora* may be translated as market-place, the market was in reality prohibited from the agora, the center of the polis. The word *Agora* had originally meant the convention of individuals for political deliberation, but from this custom the term eventually came to mean the location of that convention.

Although gods had different rank, the conception that every Greek had lineage from a god seems to have produced a conception of equality-within-hierarchy amongst the clan


141 Draco’s law on homicide, which dates from about 620, makes reference to an *agora ephoria*, a “border market,” presumably along the shared boundaries of city states. Cf. Tandy, David W.; *Warriors into Traders*, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 120.

142 In the definition of a city the presence of specialized economic sectors is essential along with the physical patterns of his public architecture, yet social, political and religious requirements were the primary causes for the emergence of cities in Greece. The major buildings of an early city were its temples; economic functions did not affect the planning of urban centres until the fifth century. Cf. Starr, C.G.; *Economic and Social Conditions in the Greek World*, in *The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C.*, edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.430.

143 Certainly in the big Dorian settlements in the Peloponnesse their natural xxx bad, if such it was, was confirmed by circumstances. They were the last comers among the immigrants, and the memory of their community as a body of warriors cleaving their way through Greece was always lively in their minds. The old gathering of equal and disciplined fighting men, the Agora, which is the only form under which the people appear in the *Iliad*, lasted on through the medieval period, and was transformed at its break-up into a Democratic assembly. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; *The Greek Commonwealth*, The Modern Library, New York, p.105.
members. The heads of clans outranked ordinary clan members by genetic order, but the collection of family or clan leaders, people united from different clans, had no alternative but to regard each other as equals, if they were to achieve cooperation. Insofar as different clans saw a benefit in unification, this would also have presupposed attributions of mutual equality. The equality of land apportionments and of rights was thus a ramification of the prior need for clan heads to attribute equality to each other.\footnote{At a certain point, the signification of the word agora was extended to designate not only an assembly of individuals but also the place where that assembly met, and it might be supposed that the designation and laying-out of a specific area for meetings of the assembly would offer some guide to its importance within the day-to-day governance of the community. Cf. Hall, Jonathan F.; “Polis, Community, and Ethnic Identity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, Ed. Shapiro, H.A., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 47.} But by conceding equality to aristocrats of a different genealogy, the clan leaders had undermined their self-presentation as superior to their own demos on the basis of the compromised kinship order. Clan lineage from common ancestors being a relation of blood, nonmembers of a clan were not eligible to membership, let alone equality. Equality-within-hierarchy entailed 1) that civil rank replace genetic, gentilian order, for otherwise kinship ranking would have excluded one or the other group, and 2) the elite classes could not assert equality to each other unless there were an underclass with whom to contrast their internal equality. If there had been conquest, hierarchy would have ensued from subjugation of the other clan. The only logical accommodation of alien groups was a separation of groups into what would eventually become a civic hierarchy; exclusion of metics, thetes, etc. from the agora served the purpose of equality.

Long prior to taxation, inheritance was the most powerful force in the emergence of civilization. Whereas the commercial aspect of the agora did not appear until the 5th century B.C., inheritance on the contrary was a timely institution that could motivate synoekismos.\footnote{All heads of families were thought of as equal, and were symmetrically grouped on the land and in the state as a community of equals. Equal lands and equal rights were deep-rooted in persistent traditions of Greek life. All through the history of the City State, whenever a colony was founded, the old equal arrangement was maintained, whatever the inequalities that had supervened in the mother state. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; The Greek Commonwealth; The Modern Library, New York, p.82.} Land transfers ingredient in synoekismos were probably transacted through marriage. Previously there might have been no distinction between women taken in sexual union, but
this indifference was untenable. If such things as land transfers and alliances were based upon conjugal union, the family of the woman needed to protect the gain that was to accrue from marriage; if deep, legal division were not made between concubines and wives, marriage could not have achieved alliances. Otherwise, the child of the concubines would have equal rights to the inheritance as the child of the wife.\footnote{147} Introduction of monogamy and primogeniture would protect the possibility of synoekismos and other alliances. Marriage in turn entailed private property, since marriage could not have functioned for the transfer of socialized property. Private property alone enabled alliances through marriage, and was furthermore conducive to defense because it promoted procreation more than either communal property or plantation. The need for aggregated military defense may have attenuated the concept of the collective clan-ownership of land into a concept of egalitarian ownership.

It might seem credulous to entertain the marxian thesis that all of history is class warfare, but not all conflict is conspicuous. Whenever a religion becomes obsolescent, an economic shock intervenes, or a new ideology intrudes, the privileged class is either supplanted or at risk; any innovation can shift the configuration of social classes. The ruling class attempts to suppress whatever jeopardizes its ascendancy, and any social class interested in the innovation tries to raise its social stature through deployment thereof. Monopoly of social control and power ensues through inheritance, while the burgeoning class uses innovation to alter social

\footnote{146} In the definition of a city the presence of specialized economic sectors is essential along with the physical patterns of his public architecture, yet social, political and religious requirements were the primary causes for the emergence of cities in Greece. The major buildings of an early city were its temples; economic functions did not affect the planning of urban centres until the fifth century. Cf. Starr, C.G.; \textit{Economic and Social Conditions in the Greek World}, in \textit{The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C.}, edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.430.

\footnote{147} In classical Greece the legal validity of a marriage was a matter of public concern, for it established both the citizenship of the children and the application of the laws of inheritance. It was primarily around the legitimacy of the children that the law of marriage gravitated. This pivotal point, however, was missing in Homeric Greece, where there was no polis, no citizenship, no political problem of legitimacy. Who then drew the distinction, which clearly did exist, between a wife and a concubine? The answer lies in one of two directions: either this matter lay within the jurisdiction of the kinship group, or it lay within the much smaller body, the oikos, the household. Cf. Finley, M. I.; \textit{Economy and Society in Ancient Greece}, Viking Press, New York, 1982, p.243.
structure in its favor. The preferability of private over socialized property consists in the capacity of inheritance to entrench the ruling class.\textsuperscript{148}

It ought to have been possible to value sons according to order of birth, but the Greeks refrained. Why did the Greeks not practice primogeniture? It would have reinforced the aristocratic government. Land was limited; it was obvious that subdivision would foreclose family subsistence, and converting to non-agricultural work was in most cases dishonorable. Partible inheritance had been an element in the Greek concept of equality on that it effected equal distribution to the male descendants.\textsuperscript{149} However, \textit{equality} is a concept that could emerge only much later, in a civic context, whereas the concept of \textit{order of birth} stemmed from a much earlier context of kinship. Patriarchal organization, an institution of kinship, comprises primogeniture; it coheres much better than equality with the conjecture that the concept of inheritance was devised to entrench aristocratic hegemony.

Incoherence emerged. Marriage outside of the community was forbidden. Marriage and guest-friendship functioned to establish alliances between natives within the community; marriage was structured for the self-containment of the clan. The interests of land acquisition and synoekismos strongly motivated intermarriage of aristocrats of separate communities, which infringed on the religious prohibition against foreign wives.\textsuperscript{150} Kinship cohesion had made it impious to marry a woman outside the clan. Fraternization and common interests with aristocrats outside the clan had loosened the prior kinship solidarity of aristocrats with the non-elites of their own clan; the new function of marriage for achieving alliances and

\textsuperscript{148} If a new source of wealth develops in a society, if the practical importance of knowledge grows, if an old religion declines or a new one is born, if a new current of ideas spreads, then, simultaneously, far-reaching dislocations occur in the ruling class. One might say, indeed, that the whole history of civilized mankind comes down to a conflict between the tendency of a dominant element to monopolize political power and transmit possession of it by inheritance and the tendency toward a dislocation of old forces and an insurgence of new forces; and this conflict produces an unending ferment of endososis and exosmosis between the upper class and certain empowerings of the lower. Cf. Mosca, G.; The Ruling Class, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1939, p. 65.

\textsuperscript{149} Nowhere did the societies of the ancient Mediterranean develop systems of primogeniture or ultimogeniture inheritance; all practiced partible inheritance in one form or another. Cf. Saller, Richard P., \textit{Household and Gender}, Ch.4, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; \textit{The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World}, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.91.
acquiring new land had overpowered kinship solidarity. Land transfers implicit in synoekismos prompted aristocrats to marry women outside the clan. Marriage became the lynch-pin by which synoekismos proceeded. The earliest formation of the polis was an aristocratic, not a popular interest, that effected the first conspicuous division of aristocracy from demos. Increased population density engenders early class society because the diversification of labor individuates what abilities individuals have. Concomitant is a distinction between individual and office occupied by the individual; those individuated by office holding will control how the wealth of the society is distributed.\textsuperscript{151}

The class-formation had resulted from the aggregation needed for self-defense. There was an important peculiarity to the partible inheritance. The \textit{kleros}, the allotted parcel of land, could not be sold, but also could not be divided, according to law. The idea implicit in this law adverts to a surpassed social situation, when there had been sufficient land. The law of the \textit{kleros}, originally preserving ethnic equality, gradually became incompossible with partible inheritance. The \textit{kleros} could divide only at the moment of plural inheritance. The inalienability and indivisibility of the \textit{kleros} ought to have forced conversion to extended family residence, plantation, and primogeniture, because divided inheritance would become too small to finance an oikos.\textsuperscript{152} The concept of equality had emerged in historical time, in the more recent civic context, to demote the prior concept of inheritance. In outcome the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item A marriage was, among other things, a political alliance; in fact, marriage and guest-friendship were the two fundamental devices for the establishment of alliances among the nobles and chieftains. The exchange of gifts was their invariable expression of the conclusion of an alliance. Cf. Finley, M. I.; \textit{Economy and Society in Ancient Greece}, Viking Press, New York, 1982, p. 238.
\item Rank societies have more “qualified” persons than positions of status; that is, in rank societies the number of status-laden positions is limited. It is not difficult to see how an increase in population density can create such a situation. It is also clear that increased density will also increase the amount of goods controlled by the holder of each status-laden position, for, although per capita wealth remains the same, the total wealth of the community has increased more than has the number of leadership positions. Property is ordinarily assigned for usufruct by a chief, who acts on behalf of the community. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders}, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 89.
\item The legal prohibition on division of the \textit{kleros} must have had the practical effect of forcing the choice of a principal heir, and it must also have encouraged the maintenance of extended xxx facilities. Cf. Weber, Max; \textit{The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations}, Verso, London, 1988, p. 166
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smallholders lived in nuclear families, whereas the aristocracy through the basileus-era lived as extended families together with agnates of the clan; this method of living facilitated the integrity of inheritance and aristocratic cohesion. Instead of primogeniture, cohabitation of a large body of elders within the extended aristocratic family preserved the integrity of inherited wealth.

_Synoekismos_ probably conveyed exorbitant land-holdings to the aristocracy. Although marriage might have promoted land acquisition, the countermeasure, that possession was in the father but ownership was in the genos, ought to have militated against land aggrandizement. Female inheritance, such as it was, had originally been devised to maintain patrilineage within the community, but the integrity of female inheritance or its primitive antecedent might have survived by serving an unpremeditated purpose: synoekismos. The epikleros and dowry may have been reconfigured for achieving the land conveyances requisite for synoekismos; villages or poleis might merge on the basis of a marriage through which the husband received the land grant as an epikleros. A further evasion of the prohibition of out-of-clan marriage for the sake of synoekismos seems to have been the alteration of the law of adoption. A father could adopt a son to be the husband of his daughter, perhaps in order to effect a land transfer in the process of synoekismos. To impede land engrossment, the adoptive son was required by law to renounce his natal patrimony. The positive sense of the kinship rule, that the decedent could not dispose over inheritance, was that family wealth would pass intact to the son rather than to

153 Whereas the masses lived in nuclear families, nobles and Kings-at first the same-lived as elsewhere in large households including agnates of a clan (genos). The purpose of this was to preserve the unity of inheritable landed estates. 148

154 Aside from the dowry, Athenian women could benefit from wills or intestate succession. They did not acquire independent control of the bequests, but here the conduit through which the property arrived flowed to another _oikos_. The starkest illustration of this principle was the institution called the _epiklerate_. In those cases where an Athenian man died with an unmarried daughter and no sons, the daughter became an epikleros and was married to her closest male kinsman. The estate was managed by the husband and then passed to the ownership of the sons of this marriage two years after puberty. Alternatively, an aging father with only a daughter could adopt a son to be a husband to his daughter; that son had to give up his claim to his natal patrimony. Cf. Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, & Saller, Richard, editors; _The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World_, Cambridge University Press, p.93.
someone outside the clan.

Primogeniture ought to have served the preservation of kinship structure best by its integration of family wealth; why did partible inheritance prevail? One hypothetical explanation might suppose that partible inheritance served the Greek idealization of social equality, but such an idea is anachronistic. The determination of the structure of inheritance was settled in a social context in which aristocracy was conventionally established, whereas social equality was idealized centuries later, within social forces that were promoting prevalence of the demos over aristocracy. The later classical period revived the kinship atavism prohibiting marriage to a woman outside the clan, a practice that had abounded in the intervening period of synoekismos. In 451BC Athens legislated that only children both of whose parents were Athenian could receive citizenship, and seven years later the law was applied retroactively to all Athenians born prior to the law. The revision of the law seven years later implies a very strong valuation of this law. It appears to present a strong, anachronistic resurgence of the oikos mentality, according to which the polis and clan should be self-contained. The same law in a different time frame might accomplish intentions different from the original law; the 451 law confronted different social forces. The archaic marriage law had originally served to prevent generation of the thes, the unpropertied kinsman, but following the emergence of the polis it prevented the dissipation of wealth to metics or other non-kinsmen. The legislation that Solon initiated allowed the patriarch to bequeath his property arbitrarily to an outsider, thus apparently violating the basic principle of inheritance. However, the principal had to adopt the heir as his son prior to bequeathal; this would mean 1) that the adoptive heir could not inherit from his cognate father, and 2) that the inheritance would in fact remain within the clan of the adopting father, even if it were bequeathed to a

155 But here the mass of the people cried foul; for they were not yet ready for this liberalizing intrusion upon the old sanctities of tribal life. To take a wife outside the city seemed an act of impiety, a dangerous reach of the old unwritten laws. In 451 this faith belief found public expression. A law was passed that in the case of children born subsequently to that date only those of Athenian parentage on both sides should be eligible for citizenship; and seven years later, on the occasion of a large gift of corn by a foreign potentate to the Athenian people, the rule was made retrospective and many names were struck off the citizen lists. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; The Greek Commonwealth; The Modern Library, New York, p.346.
non-cognate member. The new citizenship did not erode the intention of tribal cohesion.

Solon's law did not allow arbitrary bequeathal to landholders who had children. Bequeathal to a legitimate son was compulsory. The positive motivation of the liberalization of inheritance law might be elucidated by a Scylla-Charybdis contrast. Epitadeus had similarly altered the Spartan inheritance law. The land equality of Spartan citizens had been maintained by regulating the transfer of the kleros from the father to the son. Following Epitadeus, though Sparta lacked the clause making adoption indispensable for non-cognate inheritance, the head of a family had unrestricted power to bequeath his land to whomever he liked.  

Why had Epitadeus not needed the adoption clause that seemed essential to Solon? Containment of wealth in the family was vital to the kinship organization, but inessential to the civic, polis organization. The kleros had been a contingent property, possessable and heritable by sufferance of the polity, whereas the property law introduced by Solon retained its basis in private property and kinship inheritance. The reform of Epitadeus resulted in catastrophe. Because Solon's reform allowed arbitrary bequeathal only under the condition that there were no legitimate sons, his reform sustained the intention of the ancient kinship system to maintain rough land equality. The Athenian inheritance laws aimed at substantial, not formal, equality. Apparently Solon conceived that legal-political equality could not be sustained unless there were also an equality of wealth. The ultimate failure of Sparta after the Peloponnesian War was prepared centuries earlier in the law of Epitadeus, which culminated in property inequality and manpower depletion of the citizen class. Solon prevented the extinction of the ancient clans by allowing arbitrary bequeathal through adoption, but if the adoption clause had not  

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156 In many Greek cities the law forbade the sale of the original allotments; others mentioned measures or precautions taken to keep the number and size of these allotments the same and to prevent estates becoming too unequal. Plutarch relates that before the time of Solon the Athenians were not allowed to make wills, the land and house having to remain in the family of the deceased; and that Solon gave every Athenian who had no children the right to dispose of his goods as he pleased, so making those goods the property of those who held them. The same author tells us how and why, at Sparta, the law of Epitadeus gave every father of a family full power to make over his property by deed of gift or will, whereas previously the father had had to leave his kleros to his son, whereby the size and number of landed estates had been the same. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.44.
been included, the citizen class would have dwindled as a result of land aggrandizement.

**ARCHAIC EXCHANGE**

The importance of priesthood for aristocracy consisted in its control of the ascription of divine lineage and of clan membership. From the early Iron Age the power of the priests mysteriously evaporated, not from banishment or revolt, but from dissolution into the nobility; they apparently discovered better prospects in something contrary to religious pretension. The earliest foreign trade, conducted by aristocrats, had been to procure iron, which was needed for weapons and warfare. Greece had its own supplies of iron, but instead bought it from the Orient. Considering that trade would make iron more expensive, why would the aristocrats have preferred to obtain iron from commerce? The kinship organization had reserved subsoil rights prior to the maturation of the polis. Iron mined from a Greek location would have obligated the aristocrats to share the profits of iron with the community. Since the laws of kinship did not extend to foreign culture, aristocrats could accrue profits from trade for iron without incurring the same obligation to share its profits with the demos.\(^{158}\) In result, government leadership conducted both religious and political functions of the community: the inverse of the Orient. The disappearance of the purely religious personnel was a retreat; the

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157 The right of bequest is still narrowly limited. Where there are male children the old religious conception of property, as bound up with a given family line and the care of ancestral spirits, demands that the estate should automatically pass to the sons; the father owns the property only in trust for the family dead, living, and to be born. Whereas in Sparta the patrimony is indivisible and goes to the eldest son, in Athens it is apportioned among the male heirs, the oldest receiving a moderately larger share than the others. Cf. Botsford, G.W., *The Athenian Constitution*, New York, 1893, pages 53-4. As early as HTS ideology we find that doesn’t limiting his family in Gallic fashion, lest his estate be ruinously divided among many sons. The husband’s property never descends to the widow; all that remains to her is her dowry. Cf. Durant, Will; *The Life of Greece*, MJF Books, New York, 1966, p. 259.

158 Why did Euboeans go abroad seeking iron? This question is not so simple. It appears that iron obtained in one’s home territory or at least from nearby sources was not as desirable as iron obtained at a distance. Iron (or any other commodity) generated at or near home was perceived as obligated in some way to the community in which it was generated; iron (or any other commodity) obtained at a distance was not so obligated and could be used by individuals (and groups) without concern for the community at home. Cf. Tandy, David W.; *Warriors into Traders*, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 64.
priests had been an endogamic warrior clan that had changed from warriors to priests, and now returned to the warrior status roughly in Homeric times.\textsuperscript{159}

The ease with which warlords became priests, and then reverted to warlords, exhibits a distinction of Greek religion. Lacking a material base such as an irrigation system, no natural force enabled the priests to regiment the demos. The \textit{oikos} isolated the priest from family; Greek priests did not conduct baptismal or marital ceremonies.\textsuperscript{160} A civic religion hardened in distinction from a personal, intra-familial religion. As exemplified by Teiresias, priests were wandering solitaries, not integrated in civic society, more given to prophecy than ritual. In the tension between nature and civilization, nature prevailed. The patriarchal organization of the \textit{oikos} emphasized self-sufficiency, separated Greek communities from each other, and failed to develop a communal church.

Hypothesize that economic goods circulate by reciprocity, redistribution, and markets. Theocratic societies functioned by redistribution; the unification of all priests in a class, culminating in a pharaoh or priest-king, facilitated the contribution of all subjects into a universal redistribution system. All social products were surrendered to the State, which then used redistribution not only to feed, but to regiment and control its people. Such societies apportioned the accumulated goods to individuals according to the social positions and roles to which the State had assigned them. There was no market; a social deviant received nothing, with the consequence that there were no social deviants. A priest was possessed of the wealth that accorded with being a priest, a peasant with the subsistence consonant with being a

\textsuperscript{159} In Greece the kings of the early Iron Age and similarly the priests lost their privileges in the course of a few generations without any very great opposition. The Old Hellenic families of priests, originally a separate and probably old endogamic Indogermanic warrior class, took their places now with the nobles in rank without much difference being felt as early as during Homer’s time. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; \textit{An Ancient Economic History}, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.278.

\textsuperscript{160} There are regions of life into which the modern state has hardly dared to intrude, or if it has ventured in at all, has crept on tiptoe. There are solemn moments when the modern man feels himself stripped bare of his citizenship, when even the statesman used to living, like a Greek, in the world’s eye, retires into privacy and feels himself just a man alone with his God or his clan, in a world of strangers. At such moments, at birth, at marriage, and particularly at death, the old patriarchal system resumed its sway. The Greek was not baptized or married or buried by the church. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; \textit{The Greek Commonwealth}; The Modern Library, New York, p.65.
peasant, etc., and there was no social mobility. Redistribution was highly economical; if the various classes of people received goods by redistribution, the expense of military enforcement would cost so much the less.

Reciprocity characterized archaic Greece; redistribution could not prevail without organized priesthood. A proto-communism pervaded ethne society prior to the polis; neighbors mutually lent and gave things to each other, or helped each other, informally, on occasion of need without keeping formal records of debt. Ingredient in the communism of reciprocity was the element of prestige. If a person gave to another, he obtained prestige for doing so, and he would gain much more from the accrued prestige than he would from a material profit. When the concept of the future was weak, money, a fortiori profit, could not balance a present expenditure. A debt that informally accumulated could not be paid off in money, i.e. a promise of an equivalent sacrifice in the future. A debt would be paid off better in consideration rather than in a material or pecuniary return. It was this mode of exchange, reciprocity, within the oikos, which anticipated redistribution within the polis, and the earliest methods of communication between poleis. Within the oikos, the family members contributed to the patriarch, and the patriarch redistributed; the pattern was adopted in concentric circles. Informal aid, as a component of the distribution principle of reciprocity, forestalled the need for market distribution. Prior to money, all family members used the resources of the oikos indifferently. Exchange within the oikos carried a communistic spirit inasmuch as whatever was available was relatively accessible to any member; this was a corollary of self-sufficiency.

Archaic society had no concept of exchange value. When there was exchange prior to market economy, the intention of the trade item was only to obtain the use value of the item

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162 The premium set on generosity is so great when measured in terms of social prestige as to make any other behavior than that of self-forgetfulness simply not pay. Cf. Polanyi 1944, p.46. Polanyi, Karl; The Great Transformation, New York, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1944, p.46.
received; there was no concept of profit arising from exchange. Motivation for this sort of exchange was the profit or surplus arising from the use of the item received after the exchange, rather than increase of value from the exchange per se. One of the properties of barter is to delay the concept of exchange value, and hence the idea of deriving profit from exchange; in a later phase of barter, when exchange value was initially appreciated, barter evolved into an artful process of exchanging less for more. 163

The distribution of goods in archaic society was embedded in the institutions of gift-giving, guest friendship and redistribution, all of which reflected the priority of religion over economic exchange, and the primacy of aristocracy over demos. 164 The highly valued principle of self-sufficiency would have been impossible if this religiously embedded will to share informally had not existed. Priests had not been able to install a formal taxation system because an institution such as irrigation did not exist to combine finance and religion. Because the absence of a natural factor deprived priests of persuasion, communistic reciprocity frustrated concentration of power in the priests. 165

Divine lineage persisted despite obsolescence of Greek priesthood. Since the Greek godhead was a plurality, Greeks could claim priority or rank by claiming descent from a more illustrious God. All Greeks, peasant or noble, claimed descent from a god, by virtue of clan membership. Egyptian religion, by contrast, lacked a doctrine of divine lineage for the peasants; life after death was reserved for the elite. In Egyptian history the kinship system had been overlaid by religion, so that kinship never came into strident conflict with civil law and religion. In the Greek polis, the claim of even the peasant to have descended from a god enabled kinship to endure. Since priority of social position was entwined in divine descent,

163 Also, it is assumed here that people in small-scale societies do not ordinarily attempt to “maximize” their specifically economic or material returns from transactions because they consistently seek to acquire only what is appropriate; and in fact, they engage in transactions primarily to meet social expectations and thus win social “points” or avid opprobrium. Cf. Tandy, David W; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 87.
164 Ancient economies are embedded in noneconomic social organizations by which their behaviors are dictated by traditionally prescribed rules. Cf. Polanyi, Karl; The Great Transformation, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, New York, 1944, pp. 43-55.
mythological religion would not fade quickly from credibility.

Exchange in the form of gift-giving, despite the pretense of the gift, necessitated a return gift equivalent in value, in the face of dire consequences. Entirely opposite to trade, reciprocity was primarily a device for social intercourse, and was interminable; the participants never completed reciprocity in such a way that no further obligations persisted. Reciprocity also functioned negatively; if one agent harms another, for instance by theft, the reactive obligation of the counter-agent to return the disfavor also generates an interminable relationship: a feud.\textsuperscript{166} Commerce by contrast was terminable, but cultural hostility to commerce made purchase and sale inadequate for social cohesion. The corrosive effect of market exchange on the social foundations of community retarded the appearance of market exchange.

Reciprocation and redistribution reinforced the status organization of members, whereas market exchange aggressively ignored the connotation of social position. Greek redistribution had not been unlike that of Egypt. All \textit{georgoi} yielded their produce to the center, obtaining use of the same only after redistribution. It was the advent of trade that abolished this communal scheme of private property; as wealth from external trade was not obligated to redistribution, eventually private property without redistributive obligation emerged.\textsuperscript{167} Foreign trade not being integrated in religion as it was in Egypt, external trade inflicted severe mutations in

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165 The lawgiving of the Old Testament brought a definite stabilization to the Levite and priest class in Israel, the priest clans of the Greeks becoming part of the general aristocracy very early. A similarly stabilizing effect is connected with the well-known protective measures of the Bible against any extortionate oppression of free peasants, of the poor landless free peoples, and of the bondsmen and slaves. Consequently the ship of state’s heavy list to the side of King, nobles, and priests was largely combated, an important factor for the subsequent Jewish development away from Ancient Oriental practices. Against the royal power, which imitated the Ancient Oriental pattern since Solomon’s times, the primitive pattern of village civilization was upheld here, and even mummified. As we have already made clear, the biblical laws about usury, debt slavery, slavery in general, and the returning of homesteads to the original free peasant owners, were devised for this purpose. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; \textit{An Ancient Economic History}, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.278.  
166 Each and every example of reciprocity is open-ended: a balance is never reached whereby no further obligations exist. Something is always owed, in one or another direction. This is why a negative prestation, theft, predictably creates a relationship (enmity) between two parties. Just as people can be exchanged by reciprocity by means of marriage exchange, so the negative of such an exchange, the vendetta, is also characteristic of reciprocal societies. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders}, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 98.
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social structure.

The market originally formed outside of a community and entertained no interaction with the political or religious features internal to that community. The value of a trade item did not vary according to the prestige of the consumer, thus belying the prestige that aristocrats commanded in every other social nexus. The physical market, prohibited anywhere in the polis, was established in its outskirts. Exchange in the form of reciprocity or redistribution entails an obligatory relevance for the receiver to know how the donor obtained the exchange item, and for the donor to know how the exchange item will be used after it is the property of the receiver. These obligations strongly complicated exchange in the social relations of the community members. Commercial exchange accelerates trade by disavowing such ramifications, and for that, early poleis banned commerce.

Only gift exchange employed distribution as a means to communal solidarity. Archaic economy transpired by reciprocity rather than trade, and it took place only between relatives. Reciprocity was intended to tighten the emotional bonds between givers and receivers. Modern gift-giving is unilateral and relatively weak, but the bilateral structure of Greek gift-giving effectively forced alliances. Gifts might be given in compensation for a service received, or as

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167 The economic shift caused great stress for many. A fuller stratification was achieved in that holders of land, but not of luxury capital, were excluded from participation in the economic mainstream. Agricultural produce was no longer brought to a redistributive center, as presumably had been the case when Hesiod’s father moved into Boeotia; the locked-out peasants whom Hesiod exhorts found themselves forced to move their goods outside controlled areas. At this moment, the polis was born, spiritually if not physically. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 137.

168 The true sequence of events is thus: (i.) trade route (ii) market established on this trade route; and (iii) ‘local’ markets developing around the original ‘parent’ market as a network of tracks or roads develops. Hence a market depends on external factors for both its existence and its location; historically, a market did not depend on the activities of communities near it. In this essentially alien institution of the market we see the economy “disembodied.” A community that participates in this system must acknowledge the social independence of the system and the conflicts that arise from the goods being stripped of their social and ethical values. Market goods, however few, move separately from the rest of a society’s organization for transactions and are undertaken on the basis of only the denotation of a good, with no consideration for the connotation either of the good or of its transfer. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 114.
an atonement for some infraction, or it might deliberately invoke a counter-gift or service.\(^{169}\) The counter-gift of reciprocity conceived in reciprocity entailed that a person receiving a gift had to make a return.\(^{170}\) Far from liberal, gift-giving was more coercive than purchase and sale, in that the prospective gift-receiver could not compel the other not to give him a gift; thus the coercion on the gift-receiver to make a return gift was inescapable. The transaction was religious rather than mercenary; the gift-receiver would want to make a reciprocal gift rather than remain obliged. The obligatory dimension of gift-giving regulated polite relations. One could give a “gift” to coerce the other person to give up something that he absolutely did not want to surrender, for instance a wife or daughter.

When the giver and receiver approached equal rank, however, asymmetry diminished, and the justice of exchange could rest more on voluntary exchange of intrinsically equal gifts. If the gift-giving were between a social superior and inferior, the gift of the superior would be of less value than that of the inferior gift-giver. The Greek system of *xenie* was the opposite of the potlatch ritual; the inferior in the reciprocity of xenie had to acknowledge his inferiority in the relationship by giving more to the superior than the superior gave to him.\(^{171}\)

The strongly pluralistic nature of the Greek godhead implied that the god from whom one claimed descent individuated the person with special powers related to the stories of one’s

\(^{169}\) If sales were rare and altogether peripheral in the Homeric world, exchanges were frequent and indispensable under a great variety of circumstances- not in the form of sale but in the form of gift-exchange. In essence, Homeric gift-giving was normally a bilateral action, not a unilateral one. Although it retained the outward appearance of a free, voluntary act, it came very near to being obligatory. For all practical purposes, every gift either was a return for a gift or service already received or compensation for a wrong committed, or it was intended to provoke a counter-gifts, sometimes immediately and sometimes at a future date, not necessarily specified. Cf. Finley, M. I.; *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece*, Viking Press, New York, 1982, p.237.

\(^{170}\) The institution of reciprocity, which has often been called “gift-exchange” or “gift/counter gift,” is a system whereby goods within a society move along the lines of a grid of kinship or other relationships. The outstanding characteristic of this system is its symmetry, though goods need not move between the same two parts; rather the system is symmetrical in that when one party gives something to another it is understood that the giver will receive something, perhaps from the very recipient, but often from some other party located somewhere within the social grid. Gifts cannot be reused and are required by social norms: they create a social bond or respond to an existing social requirement. Cf. Tandy, David W.; *Warriors into Traders*, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 94.
patron-god. The oriental religions could not fulfill this function. Since prestige depended on the greatness of the god from whom one descended, the kings predominantly claimed to be scions of Zeus.\textsuperscript{172} The earliest trade relations developed from this origin, so that commercial exchange was very little different from its antecedent, predation. The basileus financed himself by demanding "gifts" rather than taxes, though he was hated for this form of extortion.\textsuperscript{173} Exchange developed asymmetrically because the exchange had to reflect the underlying social positions and obligations of the gift givers. Redistribution, in contrast to reciprocity, was communal. When a hierarchy formed, the prior rule of social etiquette obtained: the inferior had to make more expensive gifts than the superior, so that all goods would flow into the center; the basileus receives his revenue as a gift. Balance is maintained by a counter-rule, that the great man can preserve his prestige only by redistributing the wealth from the center to the periphery.\textsuperscript{174}

The acerbity of the dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon exemplifies this. Market economy was late, and precarious, because it tended towards abstraction from religion, which was what legitimated gift-giving asymmetry. Disregarding the underlying premises of social

\textsuperscript{171} In the Greek system, the rules of xenie ordinarily call for the inferior party to acknowledge his lesser position by out-giving the superior party. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders}, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 99.

\textsuperscript{172} These are the Zeus-born “Kings” whom we know so well from Attica. They were Zeus-born in a very special and peculiar sense. In historical Greece every one was in the habit of claiming divine descent from the God or hero to whom his community was believed to go back. Athenians, for instance, claimed to be descended from Zeus through Ion the son of Apollo. But aristocrats disdained the pedigrees of common folk and traced themselves back to the All-Father by lines of their own-some of them going back a suspiciously short way. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; \textit{The Greek Commonwealth}; The Modern Library, New York, p.83

\textsuperscript{173} Hesiod, \textit{Works and Days}: “bribe-swallowing basileis”.

\textsuperscript{174} The system of redistribution is characterized by centricity. Goods travel from the social periphery via a social-economic hierarchy to an appropriative center. The goods are then distributed back to the periphery, with the intention of maintaining or increasing the status of the center that attracted the goods to begin with. This is the \textit{form} that characterizes the \textit{rules} that regulate the movement of goods. Part of the \textit{substance} is that the periphery sends goods to the center because the center “deserves” to receive those goods and the periphery receives those goods back from the center because the social structure demands that return. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders}, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 101.
regimentation, market exchange posited equivalent values of the exchange goods, regardless of rank. Since this tendency would be deeply offensive to the assumptions of obeisance implicit in previous exchange relations, market exchange was strongly retarded.\textsuperscript{175} A purely economic rationality did not materialize inasmuch as social status interfered in reflection on the process of commercial transaction. In classical Athens the distinction between citizen, metic, and slave profoundly disturbed the structure of commerce and taxation; ultimately the structure of taxation accounts for the failure of Greece to have become a nation and, more specifically, the collapse of the Delian League.\textsuperscript{176}

There seems to have been some germ of the idea of equality in the tribal, \textit{ethne}, period. Previously redistribution presupposed an emergent social center; officeholders received the aggregate wealth, but also determined how to redistribute it. The prestige of the officeholder depended on his power to redistribute the wealth. Whereas members of the ethne society did the identical labor and therefore enjoyed an egalitarian society, the need for centralization and redistribution put a special function in the power of a few citizens, enhancing the divisions of class society.\textsuperscript{177} The primacy of archaic exchange had been the value that it instilled in the relationship of exchange, whereas market exchange concentrated solely on the value of the exchange-good.\textsuperscript{178} Despite the hostile appraisal of market exchange, the market gradually enhanced the idea of equality.

The autocracy of the basileus would not have deteriorated from formation of the polis if a priestly bureaucracy had formed. The priests would have prolonged the asymmetry of gift-exchange; furthermore the concentration of priesthood in the polis would have counteracted

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\textsuperscript{175} There were three mechanisms through which goods could circulate: reciprocity, redistribution, and markets. Only in market economies did individuals interact as disembodied social actors interested only in gain. In systems of reciprocity and redistribution, economics was always embedded in other social institutions. Cf. Polanyi, Karl; “The Economy as Instituted Process”, in Polanyi, K., Arensberg, C., and Pearson, H. W., editors; \textit{Trade and Market in the Early Empires}, Evanston, Illinois, 1957.
\textsuperscript{176} Max Weber suggested that locating the Greco-Roman economy’s performance along that primitive-to-modern scale mattered less than understanding the economy’s structure, above all how ideas about social status determined the production, circulation, and consumption of foods. Cf. Ian Morris, Ian, 1-14, ch.1, Introduction, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; \textit{The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World}, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 2
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the centripetal tendency of the land-owning aristocracy. Money economy impaired monarchical power only because it did not originate from religion; the oriental priests had successfully used commerce to strengthen the king's plenary authority through the traditional structures of hierarchy and redistribution. As a centripetal force, aristocrats, who were the earliest traders, did not conceive of commerce as entailing communal obligations. Aristocrats were obligated to redistribute domestic surplus, but gain from external trade was immune. Early trade strengthened the division between aristoi and demos, in that all the benefits of trade accumulated solely with the aristocrats.\footnote{179} The oikos hostility to commerce might have been complicated, originally, with revulsion at an activity that disregarded kinship obligations. Oriental priesthood had surpassed this inconsistency by making external commerce integral to the redistribution system from the outset, but because of the relative weakness of priesthood in Greece, society failed to incorporate commerce within redistribution.

The archaic period had no concept of marketability; all production was shaped solely from use-value. Manufacture, confined to the idea of producing what was needed, did not produce for exchange value or surplus value; industry had not achieved self-consciousness.

177 Generally speaking, the division of labor is the same as in an egalitarian society, with the modification that the holder of rank may have to do more work than the others in order to distribute more and maintain his rank. If an individual should expend energy in a specialization, the production from it will bring only an ephemeral prestige that does not lead to political power. Political power resides at the center of a redistributive system, where persons are perceived as ‘rich’ as much on the basis of how much they give away as on the basis of how much they hoard. It follows that rank has no necessary connection with economic status in any of its forms, though it frequently does acquire economic significance. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece}, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 90.

178 Market exchange and gift exchange are forms of social relation, but in market-exchange the relationship is entered into for the sake of the commodity, while in gift-exchange the commodity is exchanged for the sake of the relationship. Cf. Redfield, James M., 1983b, p.401. Review article of Gernet 1968, p. 401; American Journal of Philology, #104, pp. 398-403.

179 Trade was organized outside the older institution of the oikos. It appears that the gains from trade accrued to the traders in such ways that the traders, if not others, viewed the gains separately from their obligations to members of their communities at home. Furthermore, the traders were mostly \textit{aristoi}, and opportunities available to them were largely unavailable to the growing mass of Greek farms and herders. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece}, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p.4
Reciprocity, redistribution, and market exchange did not compete with each other. Subsistence goods circulated by redistribution and reciprocation, whereas the market exchanged only what the other exchanges did not deliver, luxury items exchanged in foreign markets between strangers. There could be no idea of elaborating manufacture per se. There existed no independent artisanal trade. All production was domestic; one did not employ an outsider to produce, although from earliest times it was permissible to use in-house slaves for all sorts of domestic production. The ideal of self-sufficiency caused artisanal work to originate in the oikos, as delegation of domestic manufacture to slaves was not considered to compromise self-sufficiency.

When market competition arises, extinction of one of the competitors is a possible outcome, but is unlikely. A more pacific result is for the competitors to specialize, so that, whereas confrontation starts as a zero-sum contest, it resolves into productions of slightly different products for slightly different markets, which thus cease to displace each other. Latent individualism in Greek culture seems to have debilitated the uniformity of production prescribed by the kinship system. The kinship system did not accommodate competition, for the oikos component of archaic mentality directed that all things be manufactured by oneself. In the late 8th century, limited market encroached on the redistributive system, in cases where redistribution did not satisfy need and market sale could complement insufficiencies. However, limited market exchange could not establish secular effects; it had begun with aristocrats, whose exchange did not involve the demos, and when it evolved to the demos, it concerned only subsistence goods that redistribution had occasionally failed to provide.

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180 Industry serves only to supply necessities and luxuries. It is not an independent form of human labor; it does not aim at the rational exploitation of the many and various raw materials which nature has to offer to man. The industries connected with food, clothing, would, hides are still purely domestic in character. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.23.

181 Domestic industry far outweighed craftsmanship in the proper sense. Homer tells of accordingly of slaves, men and women servants, at the courts of the Kings and nobles, who undertook practically all the work at home which proper craftsmen took over later on. Even the princes and the members of noble families knew, according to Homer how to do both simple and artistic works of craftsmanship. It was only in special cases and certainly not in normal circumstances that use was made of free craftsmen. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; An Ancient Economic History, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.263.
The prescription imposed from the kinship system for uniformity attenuated when artisans and farmers began producing for others, thus opening the first possibility for competition. Market economy thus eroded kinship, since producers sought to elude competition by such variation as would make their originally competitive products less competitive. The introduction of iron (iron age) may have been essential in breaking up the conformity from the uniformity of things as conveyed by the kinship system. Iron had enabled coinage; coinage attenuated the economic dependency of the demos on the aristocracy. Avoidance of competition accounts for the proliferation of colonies; competitors not only altered their products, but sought isolation from competitors by seeking different market locations. Coinage expedited this possibility. Production ceased to depend on domestic patronage of kinship aristocracy.\textsuperscript{183}

Origination of artisanship in domestic slavery impeded its evolution into independent enterprise; in a subsequent phase artisanal skills were housed in temples and large aristocratic estates. Inclusion of the ergasteria, the workshop, within the oikos prevented artisanship from being conceived as a separate, or separable, entity; this primitive conception may account for why innovations such as guild, labor union, stock-market, and corporation never germinated in Greece.\textsuperscript{184} In a later phase the appearance of coinage of small denomination enabled private and independent artisanal occupations within the polis, outside of aristocratic control. Development of artisanal workshops apart from estates of the basileus, priesthood, or nobility generated a self-consciousness not found in oriental artisanship.\textsuperscript{185} In the classical period this germinal autonomy made artisanship a more powerful social class than they had been in any

\textsuperscript{182} The limited market system is one in which goods move between two parties with limited consequences for other members of the community. The transactions take place along the “spokes” of a collapsed redistributive system. I propose that the emergence of this system can be seen in Greece in the second half of the eighth century. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 125.

\textsuperscript{183} Over and above these new methods there was further progress made by local competition and specialization, which had its roots in the new individualistic mentality of the early Iron Age. The new agricultural estates, both large and small, freed themselves from the control and supervision by state and tribe, and continued to develop their own individual economy. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; An Ancient Economic History, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.271.
previous society. Artisan-citizens were eventually admitted to the Ekklesía, and, according to Plato, predominated.

ARCHAIC ECONOMY

Every polis in its evolution from the oikos economy pursued self-sufficiency. Although wealth accumulated in temples, archaic Greek society refrained from external trade; archaic Greeks bartered for food or other requisites, but it was in a sporadic, opportunistic manner. If idealization of self-sufficiency develops from accentuated distrust of others, one must question why distrust, mutatis mutandis self-sufficiency, prevailed more in the Greek mentality than in that of any other racial stream. Distrust originated from the circumvalation of every polis from every other. Naval commerce was between immediately neighboring villages on the opposite sides of a water. Rowing, as was characteristic of archaic ships, was very expensive; naval transportation by rowing would quickly extinguish any commercial profit. In other societies, exchange originated between contiguous settlements because immediate exchange

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184 The workshop, on the other hand, was a part of the oikos, and hence there is no trace in Antiquity of all those fundamental legal developments which resulted- many centuries before the appearance of modern factories-from the later separation of family household from workshop in medieval Europe, accompanied as early as the 13th and 14th centuries by separation of private from business property. Hence too there did not occur any development of business organizations like our joint stock company which could in short continuance of enterprises despite the uncertainties which accompany partnerships; the exceptions occurred in tax farming. Cf. Weber, Max; The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, Verso, London, 1988, p. 56.

185 The craftsmen, merchants, and traders of this period had made a beginning in building up independent occupations and permanent workshops in which to conduct their work breaking away from the former economic dependence on the royal, temple, and aristocratic estates, and becoming eventually more effective in society and economic life than the most powerful collective undertakings of the Ancient Oriental Bronze Age. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; An Ancient Economic History, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.272.

186 His possible dependence on distant producers and his certain failure to hegemonize his own hinterland must have been together an enormous drag on more than one early polis. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 234.

187 In respect of the agricultural and industrial products of Greek lands we may take it that at this time every separate district in Greece was almost self-sufficing. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.19.
was more beneficial than domestic enclosure; the pattern between contiguous settlements expands to remote settlements, but only if profits prove greater than contiguous exchange. The sequestration of Greek poleis from contiguous communities retarded the germinal stage of commerce.

Trade is least profitable where it commences, between contiguous areas, but contiguous trade encourages extension to non-contiguous trade, where profit is greater insofar as the trade item has less native existence, and therefore bears greater value. Encapsulation of each community within mountains impeded subsequent appreciation of non-contiguous trade. External trade in archaic Greece was minuscule; the cost of overland transportation cancelled profit, and the accessible regions of trade were so close that native production would preempt interest in the trade item. Aristocracy or State would be needed to subsidize early trade; the demos could not have financed a trade venture. Subsistence was preferred over remote trade because the expense of any form of transportation canceled profit.

Conditions did not change appreciably in classical Greece, because neither technology nor economies of scale overcame the prohibitive cost of transportation. Foreign trade would have engendered diverse production; instead, the polis carried on very uneconomically because it produced for all of its needs. Because the essential subsistence goods were ubiquitously produced, no region could produce goods that would undersell the native production of another region; comparative advantage was precluded. Transportation canceling profit, no

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188 Ancient transport depended on the power of wind and muscle. Sailing could be quite fast and efficient if winds and currents were favorable, and otherwise slow and unreliable; rowing on the sea was expensive, given the numbers of men required to move any size of ship, so it was confined to military shipping; land transport was almost invariably slow. Cf. Morley, Neville; *Trade in Classical Antiquity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 26.

189 Far from being homogeneous, classical antiquity endured wide variations in the availability and quality of different goods, year by year. However, redistribution, let alone trade, was never the only available response, and it remains to consider the second part of the primitivist argument against the economic feasibility of widespread long-distance trade in the ancient world. Given the level of technological development, transport was slow and expensive: the question is whether it was so expensive that the movement of most goods was uneconomic unless subsidized or organized by the nobility or the state. Self-sufficiency was certainly a rational response to conditions of risk and uncertainty in agricultural production, but was it in fact the only available option for most people. Cf. Morley, Neville; *Trade in Classical Antiquity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 26.
local commerce could obtain.\textsuperscript{190} Since access to the production of other poleis did not develop, the poleis never specialized by producing that which it could produce more cheaply than other poleis.\textsuperscript{191} When external commerce did come into full flower, it started between remote, foreign ports, not at all negotiated by the usual pattern of contiguous creep.

Climatic uniformity did not alone account for commercial backwardness; it is possible for a region \( A \) that produces \( x \) more cheaply than region \( B \) to profit by ceasing to produce \( x \) and trading \( y \) for \( x \) produced in region \( B \). A condition such as this would highlight the arbitrariness of the trade item relative to a pure desire for exchange. Division of labor amongst the poleis could have accelerated domestic commerce. If a polis had forborne to produce certain products in order to mass-produce a specialized product, trade in surplus production might have been more economical than autarchic production. An economy of scale, producing surplus amounts of \( x \), would have made the unit price of \( x \) cheaper than native production of \( x \) in another polis. However, the mountainous terrain would have challenged any economy of scale for inland transportation.\textsuperscript{192} Commerce first emerged not between Greek poleis, but between Greece and the Orient, where comparative advantage was greater. The foregoing, however, could not have been the decisive factor.

\textsuperscript{190} The first line of argument emphasizes the homogeneity of the Mediterranean environment and of the way in which it was exploited. The basic components of the ancient diet- grain, wine, olive oil – were ubiquitous. No region could develop any comparative advantage in their production – that is to say, produce them so much more cheaply or efficiently than other regions that they could undercut local products once the costs of transport were taken into account - so there was no basis for their exchange. Individual cities and regions focused instead on ensuring their own self-sufficiency, since they could scarcely count on supplies from elsewhere. The same was true for other products: the raw materials, Cf. Morley, Neville; \textit{Trade in Classical Antiquity}, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{191} The scale of inter-regional trade was very small. Overland transport was too expensive, except for the cartage of luxury goods. Even by sea, trade constituted only a small proportion of gross product. That was partly because each region of the Mediterranean basin had a roughly similar climate and so grew similar crops. The low level of long-distance trade was also due to the fact that neither economies of scale nor investment in productive techniques ever reduced unit production costs sufficiently to compensate for high transport costs. Therefore no region or town could specialize in the manufacture of cheaper goods; it could export only prestige goods, even overseas. Finally, the market for such prestige goods was necessarily limited by the poverty of most city dwellers and peasants. [Hopkins, 1983 b:xiv]. Cf. Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; \textit{The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World}, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 4.
Archaic Greek economy had no concept of a profit-producing exchange value. The first items of remote commerce were "luxuries," items not necessary for subsistence. Subsistence goods such as food circulated by reciprocation or redistribution; only goods that were utterly unnecessary traded through markets. Luxury goods, whether purveyed or consumed by aristocrats, were innocuous for as long as circulation did not impinge on the demos. The first motivation of archaic commerce therefore was not profit, i.e. chremastike, but the pleasure or prestige of owning a rarity. Similarly to the decay of feudalism in the European Middle Ages, avidity for exotic luxury items stemmed from the nobility; remote commerce did not start from exchange of necessities.

Aristocratic prestige, initially an effect of redistribution, had derived from largesse. Neither redistribution nor market exchange intended accumulation of wealth, but aristocrats learned that possession of exotic luxury items enhanced their prestige more than largesse. Iron was a luxury item, in that it was chiefly needed for warfare, on which aristocratic primacy was based. Other than iron the first external commerce was for luxury items, not subsistence goods, because possession of luxury items enhanced their class division. From the eighth century, commerce in luxury items supported the distinction of aristocracy and demos. The nobility took control of polis government in its formative stage and used political primacy to...
It became necessary to emphasize the division of classes in order to justify the new distribution of social burden. The motive initially appears to be economic because economic advantage was the precondition of the new manifestation of prestige. The aristocrats began to coalesce into an exclusive group from the demos in order to preserve privilege; this mutation operated in the generation of the polis. Wealth was important because it could function to support religion for the effective division of classes. It was not acquisition of wealth, that then created class division as a device to stabilize its accumulation, but the reverse; class division was the absolute demand, and wealth was the ancillary means of making the ideal into the real.

Commerce was inhibited. Produce would be vendible in foreign markets under the conditions 1) that remote market prices would be higher, and 2) product plenitude reduced the item's effective price in the domestic market. Therefore remote markets became differentially advantageous according to social class; emporia meant "trade," but it also meant "passenger".

194 Luxury goods, not subsistence goods, were being moved in both directions. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 65
195 It is clear enough that, from the eighth century if not before, Greek society was producing a sufficiently large and reliable surplus to support social differentiation in burials and other material practices- expressed above all in the consumption of imported goods by the elite (Morris 1987; Tandy 1997; 19-58). Cf. Morley, Neville; Trade in Classical Antiquity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 44.
196 The most conscious force toward changing the position of the smaller famers was the incessant pressure of the upper classes, as they grew more eager to gain chremata for their own consumption and for the acquisition of foreign products. Already in Hesiod’s bitter epithet ‘bribe-swallowing basileis’ (Op. 38) and his fable of the hawk and nightingale (202-12) the abuse of political power for private economic gain is apparent; the rise of the polis, dominated by the upper classes, made exploitation even easier, as Solon’s comments attest a century later. Cf. Starr, C.G.; Economic and Social Conditions in the Greek World, in The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C., edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.424.
197 None of this can prove institutionalized positions of power, but the special treatment of many of the elite suggests that there is an attempt underway on the part of the elite to separate themselves from the rest of the community in order to maintain economic advantage over others. When Greek communities reached this extent of organization, poleis appeared. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 93.
The owner would have to accompany his produce to a remote market. A great landowner could employ an agent, but a smallholder would have to accompany his export. During his absence he could not cultivate his land, thus giving rise to substantial difference in the productivity of large and small landholdings. Potentially, the smallholder sold on the local market, less profitably, while the great landholder might benefit from remote markets. Secondly, the domestic price of produce rose in direct proportion to mercantile success in the remote market, so that external commerce impoverished the non-elite in the domestic market as success in remote trade raised domestic prices.

In the earliest archaic period, wealth, or rather, surplus, accumulated with the basileus or the aristocracy, but was redistributed to the demos. Domestic exchange galvanized the rapport of aristocracy and demos. Commercial wealth disrupted the distributive pattern. The individual aristocrat, trading outside his polis, was unencumbered with obligations to redistribute commercial profit, which instead was retained as personal wealth. Aristocracy accommodated its commercial opportunities by fostering the emergence of private property. Aristocracy was able to renounce the demotic contributions of the redistributive circuit, and thereby disburden itself of redistribution. As commercial wealth did not pass through the redistributive circuit, aristocracy became wealthy without the domestic contributions. Due to the failure of wealth to circulate, the informality of debt relations desisted. Hoarding of private wealth ruined the traditional recirculation and repayment of debts. The common people who could not pay their debts became excluded from political participation. Political exclusion was the most critical event. In the migratory stage, differences of wealth could not discriminate because there were no substantial economic differences. In the phase of early settlement, the kleros was distributively allotted to all clan members so that each member would remain politically equal. When the polis reorganized the army, it used categories of wealth to discriminate rank. Now,

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198 His (Hesiod) advice on sailing is thus not confined to “poor” farmers forced to engage in trade to make ends meet, but includes rich farmers who could afford to abstain but nevertheless also engage in it because it offers potentially great profits. Even at the highest social levels landowners sell their surpluses abroad, although they may employ agents rather than make the trip in person. Cf. Van Wees, Hans; “The Economy,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 457.
the aristocratic polis had advanced enough to deny what had formerly been the inherent, non-economic right of every clan member to be a political participant.

Subsistence goods remained within local exchange, and were paid in barter or the most simplistic form of money; items of remote trade were paid in an entirely different form of money. Subsistence goods were sold directly by the producer; middlemen, i.e. merchants who were not producers, first appeared in remote trade.\(^{200}\) By the middle of the eighth century population had reached its maximum. Land scarcity induced some who had previously been \textit{georgoi} to engage in external trade; aristocrats employed agents to administer foreign trade; such non-elite agents eventually became able to purchase and manage their own ships. The foreign trade subsequently owned and conducted by non-elites was likewise not subject to the obligations of reciprocity redistribution, with the consequence that private wealth without social obligations accumulated.\(^{201}\) Reciprocity and redistribution were \textit{exactly} matched to domestic production; debts were paid from the same production from which they had been created. When foreign goods were introduced, the symbiotic equality of credit and debt collapsed because domestic production was just enough, and not more, for what was needed to balance domestic credit; the foreign goods were instead balanced by debt.

Irremediable debt accumulated because the smallholders had been accustomed to subsistence economy; they did not customarily create a surplus, and were therefore unprepared

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199 The growing population forced changes in Greek life, but more important to the transformation was the new trade and the nature of the unobligated wealth that came from it. There were two important results of the appearance of this unobligated wealth. First, the collapse of redistributive formations completely reversed the manner in which status and wealth were handled. At the beginning of the eighth century, status attracted wealth; by the century’s close, the obverse obtained, as wealth became the attractor of status. Second, there is evidence of private property – and the debt associated with it – in Greece at this time, part of the response of the \textit{aristoi} (who made the rules) to their new opportunities in trade. The introduction of private property and the concomitant collapse of redistributive formations generated a new type of debt and resulted in the political exclusion of those who incurred such debt. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders}, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 4.

200 Full-time traders did exist, but the only merchants featured in Homer- Phoenicians rather than Greeks- sell “trinkets” such as jewelry: exotic craft products were among the few commodities traded not by producers but by middlemen. Cf. Van Wees, Hans; “The Economy,” in \textit{A Companion to Archaic Greece}, Eds. Raafflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 458
for market debt. Smallholders were highly reluctant to abandon subsistence farming for commercial agriculture or artisanship, although it was a rational adjustment against the liability of debt-bondage. The redistribution system had provided that debts, though frequent and informal, always tallied with the capacity of the individual to make appropriate returns. The market was in this respect unreliable because merchants, elite or non-elite, tried to manipulate systems of redistribution, making items catastrophically expensive. Throughout antiquity recourse was taken to the market, but in principle it was avoided. Market exchange compensated the shortages of redistribution. Aristocratic management of market exchange tendentially put the demotes more deeply in debt. Although the smallholder cautiously adhered to subsistence agriculture, he might have been forced to enact commercial agriculture in order to pay taxes or rents. The prevalence of private ownership enabled private ownership for smallholders, but substitution of reciprocity by market exchange was also the precondition for

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201 We may surmise that by the end of the population boom, by the middle of the eighth century, there was sufficient pressure on the land in individual communities to encourage out-movements of people. Some of these people took to the sea to move goods abroad. Goods brought in from outside market activities augmented the already increased wealth per leader that was the result of the centripetalism inherent to redistributive formations. While it is unclear what role the initial, population-driven increased wealth per leader may have played in the origin of outside trading, it seems likely that the new wealth from abroad wreaked havoc within the communities. Because not received from the community, the wealth was not obligated back to it. There were no rules by which to handle these unobligated kerdea, acquired both by gift exchange and through markets. The result was a series of changes of the highest order, especially in the way property was handled. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 136.

202 Autarchic redistributive households, large and small, still operate as they did before, but the economic relationships among the households, and especially along the “spokes,” have become disembedded. Goods, subsistence and prestige, no longer move between the center and the periphery according to social expectations. All goods that move between separate households, including the fictitious commodities of land and labor, do so without regard to the kinship grid. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 125.

203 Urban consumers, of course, had no such choice. The market was unreliable, not – or not only – because of the profiteering of merchants, but because of the technological limitations of antiquity and the nature of its environment. This created an opportunity for systems of redistribution and for individuals to profit from them, but it also left trade in antiquity permanently associated with crisis, disaster and abrupt changes of fortune. Cf. Morley, Neville; Trade in Classical Antiquity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 33.
the possibility for a smallholder to acquire insuperable debt.\textsuperscript{205}

The Greek ethos had embedded the presupposition that any other living was worse than agriculture.\textsuperscript{206} Although this position had ancient roots, it was probably reinforced in the present period by the supposition that only smallholding, because of self-sufficiency, would provide the opportunity to escape debt. Hesiod, contemporary in these circumstances, exhorted the smallholder to retain his land, but to participate as little as possible in commerce. The implication was that if a farmer produced all he needed, he could remain independent, whereas he would probably incur debt (\textit{chreia}) and lose his land if he pursued commercial exchange. Market exchange extirpated the deference embedded in reciprocation and redistribution. As the kinship order weakened, the circulation of goods became unpredictable. Market exchange disrupted the informal social support of debt; the debtor suddenly discovered that debt was not a comfortable condition that ebbed and flowed, but a legal peril from which his community did not rescue him.\textsuperscript{207} Possibly Hesiod's advice was pertinent, but it is also plausible that, because of the human preference for what is known and customary, his advice

\begin{footnotes}
\item[204] In such circumstances – certainly not because of the homogeneity of the environment – self-sufficiency and the avoidance of dependence on the market were an entirely rational, if rarely realizable, strategy. The peasant farmer might have realized greater profits by concentrating on crops for the market, or he might be forced to trade to be able to pay rents or taxes, but he might equally see his means of subsistence being shipped off to the consumers in the city because the price was better there. Even the market-orientated villas of Roman Italy, specializing in wine, oil, or grain, seemed to supply most of their own subsistence needs rather than depend on the market. Cf. Morley, Neville; \textit{Trade in Classical Antiquity}, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 3
\item[205] Relationships among households and the movement of goods among them are now negotiated with little regard for the social grid. Previously, smaller households could depend on the "spokes" of the system to provide help in hard times; now the smaller households are forced to use the "spokes" to acquire all nonsubsistence and some subsistence goods. Since the center is able to control the negotiations, the peripheral person or household becomes indebted. In a redistributive system, thanks to the social "safety net," a person owes only so much as he has or can give; after the introduction of private ownership, in this system of limited markets, as in any disembedded system, a person can owe more than he has or can give. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders}, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 127.
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might have militated against what was rationally effective against debt liability.

The surplus of the aristocrats had formerly been exhausted by the traditional and obligatory redistribution to the demos; the equilibrium was broken when aristocrats came into a source of surplus unencumbered by the traditional obligations. Aristocrats did not mix the surplus of external trade in the traditional communal obligations; they could relax collection and redistribution of domestic surplus due to their new reliance on the wealth of private commerce. The system of redistribution fragmented because aristocrats had discovered a source of wealth uninvolved in the cooperation of the demos. Because aristocracy did not depend on the traditional "gift" of the demos, it was also free of the concomitant obligation to distribute wealth downwards. The demos became unable to pay off debt because of waning of redistribution from above. Aristocracy was able to hold the smallholders to their debt without collecting it, and thus make debt accumulate, because aristocracy did not immediately rely on the gift. The debt-holder could no longer extinguish small debts in the heretofore conventional way, instead accumulating inextinguishable debt. This configuration was the first step in the direction of debt-bondage.\footnote{208}

Subsistence farming did not, but commercial farming did, raise per-unit production. Commercial agriculture, perhaps like modern stock speculation, was perceived to be

\footnote{207 The total disembedding of the economy is completely and utterly disruptive, for even subsistence goods move through haggling, and kinship and social relationships are strained even shattered. Previously, movements of goods supported social ties, and those social ties maintained a predictable movement of goods; now, goods move without much regard for the complex grid of social expectations. One consequence of a shift to a market-dominant economy is the introduction of debt, with the debtor no longer able to fall back on the social constitution for relief. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece}, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 123.}

\footnote{208 The cause of a shift from redistribution to limited markets is the participation by the redistributive center in outside controlled markets. The rules of redistribution are not perceived to apply to the prestige goods acquired on the outside, and so the rules change. The new wealth renders unnecessary the accumulation of wealth from within the existing redistributive economy, because the center is able to provide itself with its own status symbols and thus does not need to collect or redistribute those symbols from the periphery. The rules have changed, and the redistributive folk view no longer obtains; the prestige of the center, which is the glue that has kept the redistributive system intact, is threatened as the old economic formation breaks down. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece}, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 125.}
detrimental to the smallholder. The essential characteristic of redistributive systems is that they do not expand, although this conflicts with the example of Egypt. Redistributive systems entail close acquaintance with the members in the circuit, similarly to reciprocity, so that the exchanging community is very limited. Migratory tribal groups never exceeded 500 members, because 500 is roughly the maximum number of people with whom a human being can be familiar; reciprocity and redistribution worked in the early agrarian settlements before population growth, but neither type of exchange could function when the community, exceeding 500, might involve virtual strangers. Establishment of reciprocity and redistribution therefore prevented economic expansion. Archaic poleis and ethne did not trade with non-Greek communities because archaic exchange transpired only through religio-cultural patterns; unless the trading community had the same pattern of living, there could be no exchange. The spread of trade would have presupposed that the same Greek way of life, with its traditional and detailed patterns of behavior, had been implanted beforehand.

Supererogatory manufacture did not develop partially because there was no market, and a fortiori, no market demand. Innovation, hence wealth-creation, becomes possible when agricultural surplus can sustain a non-agricultural sector. However, innovation is likely to go quickly into disequilibrium; only when failed production results in less per capita supply is a valuation of innovation likely to overcome inhibitions against risk. Improved living standards do not materialize because the impulse to innovation is likely to cease as soon as supply to the increased population returns to the normative status quo ante. Surplus production could not have developed spontaneously.

The plausibility of external trade within the same culture would still depend on comparative advantage. Since the climate of any society on the Greek coastline was similar, no region was sufficiently remote as to produce something that other regions could not

209 In Homeric society, there was very little, if any, room for a working class, for really expert workers. Since the manufactured articles needed for daily life were almost all made at home by the people who were going to use them, the need of professional craftsmen was practically not felt. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.57.

produce for themselves more cheaply. Surplus production being nonexistent, reaction to commercial opportunity was inert. The population could not develop the idea of trade for non-subsistence imports because they had not in the first place the wherewithal to trade for such items. Commerce for subsistence items could not germinate because seasonal production and transportation would have been far too unpredictable for items on which survival depended. It is therefore logical that the first item that did become regionally specialized expressly for commerce was something unnecessary: wine. Although archaic Greece disfavored commerce, different regions did produce commodities that were slightly different, and this latency was instrumental in the birth of commerce. By the close of the archaic period, wines of specific regions vivified substantial external commerce within the area of cultural uniformity. It is significant that the first large-scale commerce was in something unnecessary. Any region

211 However, while the preconditions for innovations are best at optimal population size—when the size of the non-agrarian sector could, at least in principle, peak in a given system of production—the demand for innovation grows only as productivity declines. Moreover, in the absence of systematic family limitations, optimal population size is inherently unstable. (barring effective birth control, and optimal population size could only be stabilized through increased surplus extraction without food re-circulation.) This particular configuration of factors in turn undermines any “critical minimum effort” to escape the low-equilibrium trap. Innovation was a self-limiting escape mechanism: over long stretches of time, population and food supply may leapfrog over each other, generating ever larger population sizes and more intensive systems of production but never gaining any permanent improvements in well-being. Cf. Scheidel, Walter, Demography, Ch3, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 56.


213 Surplus production was limited, so that the mass of the population had little capacity to consume non-subsistence items and few areas could afford to become reliant on regular imports. The result was that there is no trace in antiquity of the development of regional specialization. Cf. Morley, Neville; Trade in Classical Antiquity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 20.

214 From the start of the archaic age, the various regions of mainland Greece not only produced their own range of local specialities but were part of the economically even more varied eastern Mediterranean world. By the end of the period, they were part of Mediterranean-wide networks. This could not fail to encourage agricultural specialization, attested especially by the proliferating export of local wines, and it caused both craft production and trade to develop rapidly to exploit new opportunities for profit. Cf. Van Wees, Hans; “The Economy,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 464.
could produce its own wine; preference for a certain wine was arbitrary.

This intimates that it was a lust for exchange, rather than for the item of exchange, that first motivated commerce. Market exchange, untrammeled by religio-social obligations, introduced exchange that was voluntary and immune to cultural norms, whereas the native economic patterns, reciprocity and redistribution, had been compulsory. Each exchange was based solely on the values of the exchange-items without regard to the social rank of the traders. Each exchange was a termination, without entailing further obligations, and market exchange typically originated in exchange between strangers or foreigners. When wine succeeded in external commerce, more of Greek agriculture moved to commercial farming for the sake of higher profits from remote markets. The motivation of commerce was not in order to obtain what was domestically unavailable, but to obtain wealth that was immune to redistribution or communal sharing.

The kinship mentality lingering in the early polis formations discouraged commerce; foreign Greek merchants and ships were regularly denied right to sell in a polis.\footnote{215} This sheltered native aristocratic commerce and flattered the smallholder's prejudice against market exchange. The ideology of a unique polis culture developed to repel external commerce and foreign influence.\footnote{216} In the 8\textsuperscript{th} and 7\textsuperscript{th} centuries B.C. naval trade had not developed into an independent industry, although trade might occasionally be ventured to offset failures in other enterprise. In the 8th and 7th centuries B.C. Greek village communities, not more advanced than the European villages of the Bronze Age, developed from agrarian and fishing locations, and from promontories convenient for piracy; occasional trade was conducted only if the settlers could not obtain enough out of agriculture, fishing, piracy, and war.\footnote{217} Though a polis ineluctably needed something which it could not derive from its resources, it resented

\footnote{215} Furthermore trade was still hampered by inter-state relations which discouraged commercial intercourse. Goods traffic was even difficult and open to delay between states which were friendly to each other. Not every overland merchant or sea trader was granted permission to take temporary residence and to trade as a matter of course. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; An Ancient Economic History, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p. 225.

\footnote{216} Thus the creation or emphasis of culture became a defensive posture. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 123.
dependence on external supply, preferring "self-sufficiency" in its piracy or predation rather than to acknowledge dependency on a foreign trading partner.\textsuperscript{218} 

Piracy preceded commerce, presumably because the oriental societies had already developed Aegean commerce; the very earliest record of the Greeks in the Orient was a reference to their piracy.\textsuperscript{219} The archaic Greeks had nothing to offer that the Oriental societies, thousands of years evolved, did not produce better; even if the Greeks had wanted commerce with the Orient, there was no exchange that the Orient wanted to receive from Greece.\textsuperscript{220} Greek merchants preferred areas of piracy and war to areas of trade because they could gain more from plunder than from exchange; they made no moral distinction between piracy and trade.\textsuperscript{221} Warfare was glorious in Greek culture, whereas trade, in archaic Greece, was contemptible.\textsuperscript{222} The oriental societies, immeasurably advanced over Greek civilization, influenced Greek poleis through commerce; consequently the Greeks exaggerated their own values, of which "freedom" was to become the most prominent, in order to repel engulfment in

\textsuperscript{217} The Greek \textit{polis} colonization of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. developed nevertheless in no way from active trade yet. Rather did it begin, as we can establish with great certainty, from agrarian settlements, fishing stations, the castles of political overlords, the strongholds of pirates, or from mining outposts. Only a not too prominent factor in the development of Greek colonization was the occasional active trading indulged in by the citizens as a supplementary activity, especially in lean years when fishing, farming, piracy, or wars did not produce enough for their living. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; \textit{An Ancient Economic History}, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.239.


\textsuperscript{219} The Assyrian king Tilglat-Pileser III (744-727 BC) expanded his presence northward, defeating the kingdom of Urartu, and westward, taking control of Byblos and Tyre (Rollinger 2001). Shortly after these conquests, the city-states of Syria informed the Assyrian king that they were under attack by a people they called “Ionians” (whom some scholars see as a more general reference to the the peoples of Euboea, Athens, Samos, and Naxos (Burkert 1992:13). Cf. Noegel, Scott B.; “Greek Religion and the Ancient Near East,” in Ogden, Daniel; \textit{A Companion to Greek Religion}, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{220} But their way of life was primitive, and what they could offer by way of exchange was not specially attractive. Their wealth was confined to slaves and a certain amount of raw produce. Hence their expeditions in search of what they needed were more like piratical inroads than commercial ventures. Plunder, not purchase, was the purpose that carried them to Asia Minor, Egypt, the coast of the Black Sea and of Italy. But these descents were dangerous and not always profitable, while their need of metals was urgent. Thus trade was not entirely squeezed out by piracy, and the Phoenician merchants were welcome guests in Greece. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Michael; \textit{A History of the Ancient World}, Volume I, p. 187.
the superior features of the orient. Prior to the 7th century B.C. Greece did not conduct regular trade with foreign countries; consequently more plunder than trade goods were imported into Greece. The prior economy impressed on all Greeks to produce all needs within the oikos, and hence what might have been imported could only have been a small volume of luxury articles. The Greeks did not regulate external trade in the archaic period; they bartered for food and other requisites, but it was in a sporadic, unplanned manner. The Greeks, well attested by Hesiod and Aristotle, regarded piracy and robbery as honorable ways to acquire goods. The idea of personal property was still an extremely weak concept, not amounting to much more than that an object was in another's hands rather than one's own. Piracy and predation were religiously founded; they were ritualized as an agon. Hesiod preferred gift-giving to robbery, and herein suggests that gift giving had evolved as a tradition out of agonistic robbery. Combat, like labor, is a form of exertion; one might easily feel greater achievement from murdering someone than from picking grapes. The ideal of self-sufficiency comprehended a sense of shame for the dependency exhibited in exchanging for something, whereas no disgrace attached to robbery, which did not impugn one's self-sufficiency.

The Greeks interpreted aggression more lightly than oriental societies, as if combat and war were the most interesting type of game. In heroic warfare of the archaic age, the aristocrat,

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221 The potential gains from piracy were considerable, as there was no need to hand over goods in return, but so were the potential risks; trade was more efficient in so far as it required the involvement of fewer people, and less hazardous for the individual. It also offered a better prospect of repeat transactions and a more regular supply of necessary resources, especially those which were not common in a region. Cf. Morley, Neville; *Trade in Classical Antiquity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 18.

222 Merchants liked to journey to countries where piracy was possible, or to armies on campaigns rather than going after peaceful trade exclusively. Piracy and war offered the best opportunities for quick and considerable gains. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; *An Ancient Economic History*, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.224.

223 Even in peace times the early Greeks considered contests and robbery as morally permissible if they only were conducted under certain ritual rules, those of the so-called agon which continued into the Classical period. Hesiod knew robbery as quite a useful and common method of acquisition of property, even if he rejected it in favor of gifts. In the fourth century B.C. Aristotle still held robbery both by land and sea to be quite legitimate. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; *An Ancient Economic History*, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.260.

224 One can just speak of Greek exports, but they were much rather a payment in kind, mere barter. Cf. Toutain, Jules; *The Economic Life of the Ancient World*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.20
the hero, stood out in the front lines to combat another hero; the ordinary soldiers gathered in the peanut gallery and booed the contender, made cat-calls, and threw coke-bottles or darts. Unlike the impression that the Iliad conveys, heroic warfare was minimally harmful, somewhat like attending a boxing-match. Archaic Greeks, instead of annihilating the enemy polis, divided all movable goods into equal, 50%-50% accumulations, awarding one half to the victors and one half to the defeated.\footnote{Iliad, II. 18.509-12; 22.114-21.} Oriental armies exterminated the people of the defeated army; archaic Greek armies preserved their victims. In the subsequent stage of hoplite warfare, following a battle the defeated party supplicated for liberty to retrieve their dead; the request signified acknowledgement \textit{from the defeated} that they had been defeated. When a battle had been won, the victors placed a \textit{tropaion} at the exact location where the enemy gave up and fled. \textit{Tropaion}, trophy, derives from \textit{trope}, meaning turning point, the place from which the enemy fled.\footnote{Wars of annihilation, as we saw, were very probably rare. An alternative to complete destruction of a city is hinted at in the Iliad and might well have been practiced in archaic times, i.e. the equal division of all its movable goods between attackers and defenders. The custom of a truce after battle to enable both sides, but especially the defeated, to bury their dead, must have become standard in the archaic age. So too the custom, absent in Homer, of marking with a “trophy” (tropaion) the “turning-point” (trope), the spot at which the enemy first turned and fled and battle was decided, by the victor after battle. P. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in \textit{A Companion to Archaic Greece}, Eds. Raafflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 595.} It was dishonorable for a Greek army to engage in battle when it was perceived that the enemy numbers were not as great. It was dishonorable if the army launched a surprise attack; the archaic army lined up on the field and waited for the enemy army to form facing them; it was dishonorable for the enemy army to refrain from meeting the invading army. If the defending army did not form, the invading army did not besiege the polis. The emphasis on honor, prior to the manifest objective of survival and gain, embedded in rules of battle, suggests that war was more like an entertaining sport to them, instead of the plain life-and-death issue that it was to oriental societies. Possibly the reason for the more humane conduct of war in Greece was due to a residual consciousness that the enemy was also Greek. When in the Hellenistic period the enemy was indiscriminate and non-Greek, polite restraints on war disappeared. Apparently war was religiously founded, and when war extended to non-
Greeks, the religious restraints on war, together with religion, no longer applied.

Whereas piracy sustained the image of self-sufficiency, it made the environment too insecure for commercial exchange. Archaic Greeks conducted only local, coastal navigation; their proclivity for piracy may have developed from an assumption that what was in their coastal waters ipso facto belonged to them; the sea was not in the jurisdiction of any polis, and could not be, because there was no coordination between poleis. Theft and assault were marks of honor because they manifested self-reliance. In the classical period Sparta encouraged its youths to steal from each other, and the only punishment was not for theft, but for having been detected. Piracy and predation bore positive valuation as a mode of successful coexistence with neighboring but alien poleis. Not being guaranteed by any jurisdiction, the poleis exercised their innocent egoism in the sea more than anywhere else.

The agonistic ideal destroyed the necessary reliance of commerce predictability. Broad commercial naval exchange between nations could not stabilize. Only Phoenicia had established regular trade with Egypt. The early contempt for commerce and the

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227 It was concerned with nothing except to fill its granaries and its treasury. National trade was foreign to its purpose. It was the intervention of the all-powerful state which hindered the growth and development of commerce. The ideal of the city-state was always isolation and self-sufficiency. If it had not in its own natural resources sufficient to maintain this isolation it must, however unwillingly, seek elsewhere for supplies of necessities. If these could be obtained by peaceful means, so much the better, but if not, or if the opportunity presented itself of obtaining them by force or plain piracy, then the state was quite ready to do so. Cf. Michell, H.; The Economics of Ancient Greece, Cambridge University Press, 1940, p.225.

228 The whole Greek world lacked that stability and security which is indispensable to overseas trade. The directing principle of the ancient state was utterly incompatible with the development of international commerce. Cf. J.G. O’Neill, Ancient Corinth, Baltimore, 1930, p.139.

229 Athens, like Corinth, was not engaged in peaceful activities but in plain robbery and exploitation. Cf. J.G. O’Neill, Ancient Corinth, Baltimore, 1930, p.140.

230 From all the pieces of information contained in the Homeric and Hesiodic columns one gathers that the Greeks practiced coastal navigation, but did not go far from their own shores. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.20.

231 The whole Greek world lacked that stability and security which is indispensable to overseas trade. The directing principle of the ancient state was utterly incompatible with the development of international commerce. Cf. J.G. O’Neill, Ancient Corinth, Baltimore, 1930, 139.
cumbersoness of international exchange with neither coinage nor bank transaction constituted piracy as a more effective circulation of goods. People from alien settlements were not regarded as human; the intense struggle for survival between different tribal groups precluded a marginal anxiety that piracy might be painful to their victims. The priority of surviving amidst hostile tribes made thoughts of humanity inoperative; an alien race was as inhuman as another species of animal. It was impossible to see moral superiority in trade over murder and spoliation.

The conception of the identity of commerce and predation derived from a graduation from predation to commerce, not, as would seem obvious, the reverse. In a context in which robbery was more economical, trade was perceived as weakness; one traded only if one could not steal. Trade had been minimal because there was no concept of equity. When theft was impossible, the slender consciousness might germinate that Self and Other might value one and the same thing, x, differently; gradually awareness could grow that one might trade something one does not value for something one values, entirely dependent on a value-dissonance between self and other. Although piracy was more profitable, it became clear that continuity of profit could be achieved better by offering exchange.

A compromise employed violent force to coerce an “exchange” that was highly asymmetrical and which could be conducted only by belligerent threat. Piracy prevailed until the collapse of the Minoan civilization, and probably afterwards. Even when the greater profitability of commerce was perceived, trade was disguised as piracy and plunder. The predatory nature of commerce was further disguised by presenting predation not as

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232 It rarely happened that two countries which were separated by the sea were successful in establishing regular and permanent long-term trade of their citizens. Even then only small neighboring areas were concerned, and such trade associations were never established very quickly. The most notable example of such progressive commercial exchange was the long-distance trade between Phoenicia and Egypt. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; An Ancient Economic History, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.225.

233 Piracy, robbery, and war were an extraordinarily important sector in the circulation of goods both in the Ancient Orient and in early Greece. They were in fact more often effective in transferring masses of goods from one area to another than the more peaceful methods of trade and transport prevailing in theory during later ages. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; An Ancient Economic History, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.260.
commercial exchange, but as gift exchange. Tribute also originated from this sort of disguise.

The archaic period had no concept of marketability; production was anchored in immediate use-value. That piracy and eventually trade were conceived as agonistic accounts for why both practices originate from the nobility, neither demos nor priests. Exchange was primarily for prestige, not for wealth, the 10% gain from which made it seem far inferior to piracy. The first “economic” endeavor had been piracy, which over centuries gave way to commerce only as the long term continuity of commerce was reluctantly appreciated. Piracy, an eminently aristocratic activity, was honorable, but trade was disgraceful; piracy prevailed until the collapse of the Minoan civilization and afterwards, until it was perceived that 1) commerce was more profitable, and 2) lucre outweighed the value of prestige; in the interim, trade was disguised as piracy and predation. Herodotus depicts oriental-Greek trade; in secret, the traders lay wares on the coast; natives then put gold next to the wares in exchange. The traders would then take the gold and leave the wares, or they would not take the gold until more was supplied. Transaction was carried out without any personal contact between the parties; honorable recognition of the trading partner was not yielded. The trading-site was vandalized to produce an appearance of assault. This seems to have been a carry-over from piracy. Early exchange disguised the trade to make it appear to be plunder. The romanticism which the Greeks attributed to piracy perhaps infused the bawdy, comical description they made of their gods; possibly a strong priest class would have given the gods the same boringly

234 Trade is very little developed. The Achaeans do no real exportation. A few exchanges take place between district and district, between city and city, would increase itself. The Ionian nations, the peddlers of the sea, land in harbors and on beaches, and there sell the products of their own industries, or foodstuffs, raw materials, and manufactured goods which they have fetched from all the shores of the Mediterranean and the distant lands of the East. All this trade is done entirely by barter. Money is unknown. Tripods or slave-girls are given in exchange for cattle, iron for bronze. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p. 23.

235 We see in the Homeric poems a transition period between the semi-piratical conditions that accompanied the downfall of the Minoan power and the establishment of organized trade routes. Cf. Michell, H.; The Economics of Ancient Greece, Cambridge University Press, 1940, p.216

236 We see in the Homeric poems a transition period between the semi-piratical conditions that accompanied the downfall of the Minoan power and the establishment of organized trade routes. Cf. Michell, H.; The Economics of Ancient Greece, Cambridge University Press, 1940, p.216.
august posture as they had in the oriental societies.\textsuperscript{238}

Commerce had not been part of the Greek mentality. Without the concept of surplus value, production could not achieve self-consciousness. Archaic Greek differed from oriental commerce in that it did not pursue profit. Why? Oriental societies occasionally monopolized commerce for state wealth, and usually comprised commercial profit entirely within religion. Why had archaic Greece, where wealth had also originally concentrated in temples, forborne from commercial activity?\textsuperscript{239} Greek government never involved itself further than to police against illegitimate business practices. Oriental society had to some degree understood mercantilism, a relation between commercial profit and the strength of the state; Greece did not. Idealization of self-sufficiency impeded the concept of exchange-value, which had been prominent in the Orient; opportunities for noticing the inequality of exchange in archaic

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\textsuperscript{237} Herodotus tells us the methods followed by the Phoenicians in trading with the primitive peoples in the Libyan country beyond the Pillars of Hercules. Casting anchor a little way from land, they would go ashore, lay their wares on the beach, and having made smoke to proclaim their arrival go back to their ship. The natives seeing the signal come down to the shore and lay beside the goods the amount of gold they are willing to give in exchange, and then retire in turn. If the Phoenicians are satisfied they take the gold, otherwise they wait until more has been produced. All this is done without direct contact between buyer and seller, on neutral ground which part takes of a sacred character over which the truce of the gods prevails. Cf. Michell, H.; \textit{The Economics of Ancient Greece}, Cambridge University Press, 1940, p.211.

\textsuperscript{238} In the Hellenic world of the ninth and eighth centuries powerful priesthoods were lacking, and the kings were usually set aside as the machinery of the polis was consolidated. The galvanizing factor, accordingly, in economic growth was produced by the upper classes as a whole. Overseas contacts were stimulated by the desires of this group for foreign goods; the search for disposable wealth was much intensified. Booty gained by war and piracy continued to be an important source, but new avenues were opened. Cf. Starr, C.G.; \textit{Economic and Social Conditions in the Greek World}, in \textit{The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C.}, edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.421.

\textsuperscript{239} If states were perhaps not often major economic agents in their own right, they did take an active role in regulating the private economic behavior of their citizens. Exchange in local markets and harbors needed to be closely monitored in order to limit the scope for conflict. An early example of state intervention here is Solon’s creation of a new system of weights, and measures, and regulation of the relative values of grain, livestock an silver. Such measures imply the existence of boards of officials like the later agoranomoi or metronomoi who amongst other things enforce the use of officially sanctioned measures. Cf. Van Wees, Hans; “The Economy,” in \textit{A Companion to Archaic Greece}, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 461.
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Greece were few. The archaic Greeks earned nothing from commercial manufacture; the oikos mentality remained irremediably rooted in subsistence agriculture.\textsuperscript{240}

Greek market exchange originated in the Aegean, where oriental and Greek settlements were mixed; market exchange was an idea prior in the orient, subsequently introduced into Greek culture where the two societies intersected. Quite consistently with contempt toward commerce, the Greek balance of trade with the Orient was negative, and during the monarchic period, the volume of trade remained negligible. Transaction in natural kind made exchange maximally inconvenient.\textsuperscript{241} Economy of transaction favored the preference of piracy over trade. Trade entailed production and transportation of natural kind; predation economized these disutilities. Barter aggravated the conditions of exchange.\textsuperscript{242} As Greece had no manufacture that the Orient did not manufacture better, the only trade-worthy item was livestock, which however was very cumbersome. Metal gained priority as a trade item because it was much easier to transport.\textsuperscript{243} In contrast to money payment, barter entailed presentation of the whole trade good. An extremely important property of both barter and money exchange is that the trading partner does not incur responsibility for how the other trading partner obtained the means of payment. The distinctive quality of barter payment in this regard is that natural kind may have concealed defects, and constantly varies in value according to perishability, whereas money payment is immune to both liabilities. Money-exchange could therefore eliminate the priority of piracy over commerce. Trade never flourished until the most convenient medium of exchange, coinage, was widely established. Until money exchange, border depredations, the

\textsuperscript{240} Neither industry nor trade is a source of profit to the Greeks. The society of the period lives chiefly by farming. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.23.

\textsuperscript{241} Whatever the character and extent of this trade may really have been, what gives it its special aspect is the absence of any money in the transactions of which it consisted. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.21.

\textsuperscript{242} Whatever the character and extent of this trade may really have been, what gives it its special aspect is the absence of any money in the transactions of which it consisted. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.21.

\textsuperscript{243} Purchase and sale are nothing but exchanges in kind, in which the two principal elements of the operation are, on the part of the Greek buyers, livestock and metals, not minted, but raw, and not only precious, but base metals. Livestock and metals are their chief form of wealth. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.21.
theft of livestock or harvest of a neighboring community, gave a precedent for piracy.

Commerce usually strengthens the polity, but the emergence of the polis inserted discrepant advantages between the basileus and the polity. The eventual predominance of commerce over piracy, though beneficial to the polity, undermined the Greek monarchy. Conforming to the heroic standards of honor, the basileus pursued piracy instead of commerce. The prestige of piracy rested in its capacity to concentrate food and wealth in the basileus, without prior peasant donation, thus giving the distribution to the demos a higher luster of largesse. If greater and more reliable sources of wealth, not through the agency of the basileus, appeared, such wealth would detract from the prestige of the basileus, on which his authority was founded. Commerce would eventually generate larger sources of wealth, and prove incompatible with the heroic practice of piracy.\textsuperscript{244}

The adequacy of the basileus depended upon barter economy. For as long as there was no such thing as money, the basileus controlled his retinue by feasts, religious festival, and other generosity. Absence of stable law in archaic Greece induced the relatively well off to complicate lending or other economic transactions with religion and kinship; no government existed to enforce the terms of exchange, but if the lender could lean on kinship, dependency, or religious obligation he would have more security that he would receive his return.\textsuperscript{245} Xenie, reciprocal hospitality, was a practice of hosting aristocratic travelers and giving them exorbitant gifts; in return the host would receive the same treatment from the traveler on the occasion that he traveled to the home of his guest.\textsuperscript{246} Xenie reinforced the basileus

\textsuperscript{244} The result of these shifts was to the disadvantage of the Greek kings once the royal hoard and table ceased to play a central role; that is, once a negative balance of trade with the Near East was replaced by a positive balance and military expeditions overseas. Cf. Weber, Max; The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, Verso, London, 1988, p. 159.
\textsuperscript{245} Ray D.; Development Economics; Princeton; 1998.
\textsuperscript{246} Reciprocal hospitality between guest-friends (xeinoi) was equally important, however, and the gifts which visitors could expect to receive from their hosts could be a great source of wealth and prestige. Although gifts would have to be reciprocated if the former host came to visit in turn, adventurous travelers could collect more and greater gifts than they would ever need to repay. Their kind of profit-seeking was a notable feature of the archaic economy. Cf. Van Wees, Hans; “The Economy,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 458.
government. The host gained prestige according to the generosity of his hospitality and gifts, and the gifts were important to the guest, who received prestige in his home due to receipt of the gifts. This pattern was associated with another custom: giving a receiver greater gifts than the giver received, as a measure of his prestige and superiority over the receiver. Some of these customs were adverse to commercial progress, but they generated a minimum of exchange security.\footnote{Population was small, political leadership weak, external contacts minimal, and many advanced skills had been lost. It made sense for poor families to attach themselves to larger oikoi, and for wealthy families to have dependent laborers work their lands. New belief systems formed, explaining and justifying contemporary poverty relative to the lost heroic age. When trust and knowledge were scarce, it also made sense even for those rich enough to take risks to embed exchange in other social relationships. Gift-giving made it difficult to respond to changes in supply and demand or to exploit advances in knowledge. But information and transaction costs were so high that the potential of guest-friendship to control exploitation counted far more than its rigidities. Few of the conditions that development economists identify as favorable to growth were present. Cf. Morris, Ian; Early Iron Age Greece, in The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, & Saller, Richard, editors; Cambridge University Press, p.235.}

Gift-giving preceded true barter, insofar as barter was naked economic exchange. The basileus was too dignified to have interest in acquiring more wealth; gift-giving disguised aristocratic avidity. A primary characteristic of xenie had been confinement exclusively to communities of the same religion, never to alien cultures such as that of Persia or Phoenicia. Whereas xenie was a precursor of synoekismos among Greek communities, it did not operate for alien cultures. Gift-giving inhibited the growth of foreign commerce for as long as aristocrats conducted it. When money appeared, there were better uses for wealth than the prestige invested in feasting or land grants, and without the singularity of the king’s generosity, retinue and non-elite merchants sought advantage in ways that challenged the primacy of the basileus. For as long as traders, i.e. aristocrats, did not depend for their livelihoods on market exchange, the market did not endanger archaic polis society. When commerce expanded to exchange in subsistence goods, the vicissitudes of market exchange could obliterate the traditional social relations informed by reciprocation and redistribution, possibly leading to dislodgment of the traditional class relations. Aristocrats had originally used people of the demos as agents and
operators of shipping; when these non-elites managed to possess their own ships and conduct commerce independently, trade eroded the archaic class divisions.\textsuperscript{248} Navies provided a better use for wealth, and with the appearance of a positive trade balance, navies were used to attack either pirates or the oriental trading rivals.\textsuperscript{249}

Though piracy was preferred over commerce, it compelled conversion to trade. Greek pirates customarily sold off their plunder before returning home; piracy thus became a hybrid of piracy and commerce; the custom strengthened the concept of money as a standard of value. Although piracy inhibited commerce, exchange for money entailed cooperation and led to pure exchange.\textsuperscript{250} The inconsistency of “No concept of equity” with the concept implicit in equal land allotment reveals a long-term underlying struggle in Greek history. "Just" exchange had been based not on equal commodity value but on a proportionality of prestige; the lesser person would give proportionately more to the greater person. Only exchange between adversarial cultures initiated the replacement of proportionality with equality.

To conduct piracy, iron was needed, obtainable only by trade. Contact with Asia Minor stimulated the first engagement in trade; if there had been no oriental societies, commerce would not have commenced.\textsuperscript{251} Greeks commenced trade in northern Syria roughly between

\textsuperscript{248} In a market-dominant economy individuals in a community depend on the existence of markets for their livelihoods. A sudden dependence on markets frequently leads to social disruption, brought on by the subordination of the “substance of society” to the “laws of the market.” Communities beset by the arrival of dominant markets often suffer social disjunction and cultural recommitment or reformation. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 122.

\textsuperscript{249} The result of these shifts was to the disadvantage of the Greek kings once the royal hoard and table ceased to play a central role; that is, once a negative balance of trade with the Near East was replaced by a positive balance and military expeditions overseas. Cf. Weber, Max; The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, Verso, London, 1988, p.159.

\textsuperscript{250} The ubiquity of trading farmers, raiders and adventurers left only a marginal role for the professional merchant at the start of the archaic period, but his significance soon increased. Growing demand for high-status commodities made by specialists was one factor encouraging the intervention of middleman traders. Another was the expansion of exchange networks, from ca. 650 onwards, into the Black Sea and the far Western Mediterranean, where not only Greek craft products but also Greek wine and olive oil could be traded at highly profitable rates. Cf. Van Wees, Hans; “The Economy,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaffaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 459.
800 and 750 BC. The port, Al Mina, was an emporium, neither a residential settlement nor a Greek colony, devoted entirely to commercial exchange.\textsuperscript{252} The Aegean, i.e. naval commerce, developed from what had been the poorest region of Greece in 1,000 B.C. to the wealthiest by 700 B.C.; the key had been the formation of polis government that secured private property but which did not exhaust commercial profit by excessive tax and rent.\textsuperscript{253}

Exchange value commenced in the early classical period when remote Greek colonies from the Black Sea to Spain enabled a planned commerce in specific items, and when enough georgoi had converted to commercial farming subserving trade in Greek wine and olive oil. Initially Oriental societies were uninterested in them, and demand for these items was entirely from the resident Greeks in the Oriental societies. When the Greeks treated with the Oriental societies, they had to pay for the most part in silver, of which Greece had much and the Orient had none.\textsuperscript{254} Although it was wine and olive oil that eventually sustained Greek commerce, it was silver which first created the possibility of sustained commerce between Greece and the Orient. Commerce could not have overtaken piracy had it not been for the external demand for wine and olive oil, and the corresponding conversion from subsistence to commercial

\textsuperscript{251} In their Aegean effects they were encouraged by a probable increase in population and still more by an energetic leading class which was freed from the trammels of ancestral patterns by the great intellectual and religious upheavals of the age. Only after the initial, decisive steps to gain contact with a wider world did cities and new economic elements emerge. Cf. Starr, C.G.; \textit{Economic and Social Conditions in the Greek World}, in \textit{The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C.}, edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.421.

\textsuperscript{252} Greek involvement at Al Mina (the Port), on the Orontes Delta in northern Syria, began before 750, perhaps before 800. Al Mina was an emporium (port of trade), a controlled market where goods were in some manner exchanged. The settlement did not resemble at all the Greek communities at home, because it was devoted exclusively to the movement and transfer of goods. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders}, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 62.

\textsuperscript{253} Around 1000, Aegean Greece was one of the poorest regions in the north Mediterranean but by 700 it was one of the most dynamic and expansive. It was still poor compared to Egypt, Anatolia, the Levant, or Assyria, but over the next quarter-millennium a structural revolution pushed Greece into the “optimality band,” in which the state is strong enough to provide security and guarantee property, but not strong enough to engage in destructive rent-seeking. Cf. Morris, Ian; Early Iron Age Greece, in \textit{The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World}, Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, & Saller, Richard, editors; Cambridge University Press, p.241.
AGRICULTURE.

When in the early 6th century external commerce finally prevailed, it was under the condition of famine, and trade aimed solely at food.\textsuperscript{255} When in the subsequent centuries Greek population increased, Greece could produce only ¼ of the food she consumed. Since Greece needed an uninterrupted external supply of grain, regular commerce developed with Egypt, Southern Russia, Syracuse, etc.\textsuperscript{256} Since market exchange neither added nor subtracted from the social value of the individual, conceptions of exchange value and of exchange for profit emerged, and commerce moved into non-elite hands. It was exactly because exchange had no dependence on cultural norms that market exchange was able to expand far more widely and quickly than reciprocity or redistribution.\textsuperscript{257}

Why had the inherent opportunism of taxation not stifled the growth of commerce in its germination? The new commerce undermined the kinship form of government, i.e. the basileus. Previously all foreign exchange had been in the form of piracy under the aristocracy

\textsuperscript{254} However, in the Levant and in Egypt Greek craft goods could not compete with those from the long-established and skillful native workshops, nor did olive oil and Greek wine become staples of native diet. Resident Greeks provided a small market for these, but for the native commodities which they desired Greeks had to pay mainly in silver. The goods carried for trade, then, were conditioned by the nature of the markets that they had to serve in Aegean cities, Greek colonies, and foreign lands. Cf. Roebuck, C.; “Trade,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, second edition, volume IV: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C., EDS. Boatman, John, Hammond, N.G.I., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.450.

\textsuperscript{255} In Homeric times accordingly commerce was obviously not yet a separate form of occupation, and this period was, in fact, hardly above the level of that of the village communities of Europe during the Bronze and the earliest Iron Ages. Hesiod similarly does not yet mention professional naval trade, but only occasional trade, in which the peasant was compelled by necessity, especially in years of bad harvests, to make trade voyages carrying home foreign produce for sale. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; An Ancient Economic History, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.245.

\textsuperscript{256} Obviously there was no regular and permanent export of such objects of craftsmanship in existence before the seventh century B.C. Plunder, booty, political presents, trophies for athletes, and keepsakes acquired by sailors, merchants, mercenaries, and travelers were more common imports than proper trade goods. Any normal needs of everyday life were practically provided for by the small tribal and early polis areas in a more or less autarchic manner. Even precious metals, jewels, lead, copper, iron, or tin were generally only brought home to provide for some immediate requirements and needs. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; An Ancient Economic History, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.225.
or the basileus; the same group who would receive tax revenue were receiving the same wealth more directly. However, during the monarchic period prior to 700 B.C., aristocratic piracy engendered a negative balance of trade with the orient; Greece had not developed anything desirable for commercial exchange because of the priority of piracy over trade. The mode of aristocratic commerce was defective. Aristocrats did not conduct foreign exchange for profit, but for the prestige of owning luxury items; therefore the volume of commerce was minimal. True commerce began only when a non-elite people, merchants, took over trade by exchanging without the asymmetric religious prestige relations. Taxation would have been advantageous at this point, but aristocrats were still conducting commerce, the emergence of an as yet unrecognized class of people was indiscernible, the activity heretofore conducted by aristocracy had not been taxed, and, finally, trade in luxury items had been too small to advert to the fiscal potentialities of foreign commerce.

It was Aegean commerce that first emancipated aristocracy from the redistributive circuit between demos and aristocracy, making it desirable for the aristocracy to institute private property. By partially releasing the demos from kinship obligation to make gifts to the basileus, the smallholder acquired property in the land he cultivated. "Private property" thus initially conveyed that the small holder, no longer obligated to transfer the greater part of his crop to the aristocratic center, became thereby the private owner of land and yield. The equal allotment of kleroi had transpired under the arrangement that the yield was not the cultivator's private property, but communal property; upon the abolition of redistribution, there no longer

257 The driving force in the transformation that shook the Aegean was the introduction of markets into the economic realities of the Greek communities. These markets constituted the third form of economic integration, which Polanyi called exchange. Exchange is a system in which goods move between two parties. This stem has two distinctive characteristics that allow us to identify it as a separate form of integration. First, a market exchange is negotiated (quid pro quo) between individuals or groups inside or outside the community and therefore is voluntary. Second, a transaction in this system neither responds to nor creates a social bond: the relationship is terminable at the end of the transaction. Some networks are established, an apparent grid of relationships that resemble social ones, but these are strictly temporary “business” relationships, for the individual goods involved have specific values independent of the social constraints that in other systems inform the transaction itself; that is, each good or batch of goods is valued separately. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 113.
existed a real condition that protected equal property distribution. Three advantages accrued to aristocracy from conferral of private property on the smallholder. First, the wealth from foreign commerce came into private possession of the aristocrats conducting trade. Second, aristocracy was released from obligation to redistribute surplus wealth. Third, since the land privately owned by the smallholder was no longer communally owned land, the same land would come into the personal property of the aristocrat in the case that the smallholder were dispossessed. The aristocracy thus informed the demos with debt, because redistribution from the basileus no longer to canceled the petty debt that regularly developed.\(^\text{258}\)

**EARLY TRADE**

The emergence of trade in the Aegean implies that (1) trade developed through the medium of money and (2) trade developed most efficiently between enemies. Gift-exchange and xenie could not obtain between foreign cultures. Barter, because it disregarded extraneous features such as religion and social rank, could not develop fully between Greek poleis, but from the outset constituted the basis of exchange with foreign societies. Money entered commerce first between Greece and the Orient, where kinship, patronage, and xenie relationships could not facilitate exchange. Greek commerce originated in what was the border area of Greece and the Orient. The primitive exchange of gift-giving retarded economic progress (1) because it was difficult to adjust gift-exchange to the immediate realities and vicissitudes of demand and supply, and (2) because the social motivations of gift-giving, oriented to gratitude and obligation rather than profit, discouraged technological improvement. Technology would augment profit, which was not yet a developed concept, but technological improvement would enhance gratitude and obligation. In the heroic age gift-giving and

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\(^{258}\) One of the symptoms of this breakdown is the introduction of private ownership, the transfer of community wealth from public space to private space. Eventually, many goods end up in the private space of an elite ruling class. The wealth at the center, previously required to be redistributed to the periphery, is no longer so distributed. At the same time, the periphery is no longer required to contribute to the center, and thus its property is now socially unencumbered, hence “private.” But, importantly, while the periphery is no longer required to contribute to the center, neither does the periphery receive anything from the center. Cf. Tandy, David W.; *Warriors into Traders*, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 125.
patronage relationships persisted as the only methods for dispelling insecurities of transaction. Between foreign cultures, reliable equivalence of the products exchanged could be the only ground of stable exchange. Because no relations persisted beyond the moment of exchange, no transaction could be left incomplete.

Money made equivalence of value prima facie evident, but upturned distribution. The aristocratic manipulation of market and redistribution, in combination with labor surfeit and land shortage, disrupted the prior economic balance. Market exchange, based on exchange of equal values, ought to produce equilibrium; objects of need are taken from a market, and those needs are fulfilled only by adding objects of equal value to the market. The equality of sale and purchase within an enclosed market inhibits formation of insuperable debt. A feedback mechanism adjusts the price and the volume of purchase to an equilibrium at which the intersection of price and volume renders maximum benefit. Price varies according to availability of the item and effective demand. Commodities are volatile, in that their price and volume react quickly to demand. When however only one social sector gained access to a source of wealth not enclosed in the community, the alien wealth ruins the balance within the enclosed market; as one group acquires greater buying-power from external wealth, another group accumulates debt. Land and labor lagged behind market prices first of all because of the culturally specific element that they were not allowed to be market items. Population growth, though reactive to the market, adjusts to market fluctuation only in long term equilibrium. Since population does not regulate itself to labor demand in short-term equilibrium, imbalances of labor and land tend to disrupt traditions based on different population distributions. 259

Commerce, being dishonorable, had been delegated to slaves and metics, while citizens extracted profits indirectly by transaction through ownership of the slave or by debt and taxation relations to the metic. This relation resembles the covert participation of the Roman senatorial class in commerce through the equestrian class, circumventing the prohibition on Roman senators from commercial participation. Although citizen-forbearance from commerce did engender some class dislocation with the metic, a similar cultural prejudice against commerce in Rome eventually inverted power relations between the senatorial and equestrian classes. Class frictions seem to have invigorated prejudice against commerce;
Greeks considered commerce to be ignoble because of the combination: 1) it created wealth but 2) did not produce any goods. The combination suggested immorality because the wealth it created, not deriving from production, could be explained only from excessive expense to consumers. A merchant bought cheaply in one location and tried to sell it for higher prices in another; this supported the presentiment that commerce made no positive contribution. Considerations of comparative advantage, marginal utility, production to scale, etc. had not yet been noticed. This rationale supported aristocracy; since aristocrats produced a tangible good, from agriculture, their wealth was not exploitative, whereas the wealth of the non-landowner had to result from exploitation.

The ideology of the immorality of commerce supported the ascendancy of the aristocracy; the ascription of immorality was not uncontaminated by self-interest. Natural trade had favored the aristocracy. Since equivalence in barter was difficult to equilibrate, barter in large quantity was more practicable. Smallholders reciprocated, but traded hardly at all, and a fortiori trade was not conceived to be an opportunity for profit. If there was trade, it was likely to be conducted by aristocrats, for they could handle in large quantities. If the smallholder

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259 One direction that a market system may take is the self-regulating market. It is this system that economists, including Polanyi, mean by “market economy.” In this market-dominant system, the livelihoods – food, shelter and clothing - of the majority of the members of the society depend on the presence of markets, and such a market system is characterized by a feedback or self-regulating mechanism such that the quantity of all goods supplied at a specific price will equal the demand at that price, and in which the supplier requires payment in money that can be earned only by selling one’s inputs in the market. In the self-regulating market system, there are markets for goods, labor, land, and money. The markets for labor and land especially accentuate and exacerbate the disembedding of the economy. (Land and labor are in fact fictitious commodities since the amount of land and labor does not respond to the market’s demand but are products of nature. Only the price may fluctuate, and only to that extent is there a “land market” or a “labor market.”) Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 123.

260 Trade is similarly scorned; to the aristocratic or philosophical Greek it is merely money-making at the expense of others; it aims not to create goods but to buy them cheap and sell them dear; no respectable citizen will engage in it, though he may quietly invest in it and profit from it so long as he lets others do the work. A freemen, says the Greek, must be free from economic tasks; he must get slaves or others to attend to his material concerns, even, if he can, to take care of his property and his fortune; only by such liberation can he find time for government, war, literature, and philosophy. Cf. Durant, Will; The Life of Greece, MJF Books, New York, 1966, p. 277.
traded, it was by contributing to the large exchange of the aristocrat, from which the aristocrat mainly profited. This pattern was neither perceived nor favored for the sake of pecuniary profit; its importance was that, so long as trade continued in barter, neither wealth nor power would concentrate in another locus that might compete with aristocratic ascendancy. It was not until small denomination coinage appeared that this configuration deteriorated.²⁶¹

It seems inconsistent that a country, which by the classical period was dependent for most of its nutrition on imported grain, should in its archaic period have disdained commerce. If ancient Greece did not locate aggrandizement in territorial expansion, it ought to have been likely to seek commercial expansion. The land of Greece was too small and infertile to support larger populations without recurrent famine. Without commerce, the alternatives were either to produce more food or to reduce population.

Despite neglect of territorial expansion, synoekismos, land distribution, and inheritance were, on the contrary, intended to augment the tribe. Most poleis desired smallholding due to its military benefit, but smallholding inhibited remote trade. However, although the oikos economy was oriented to subsistence agriculture, poleis, though not ethne, began to desire surplus production, first, because the urban population could not produce its own food, and second, because the creep of population growth gradually exceeded carrying capacity of the land. Conflict between traditional subsistence agriculture and surplus agriculture needed for urbanization developed, which in the first phase entailed consolidation of land in order to maintain subsistence agriculture. Synoekismos helped to delay commercial, surplus agriculture, but by the time of the classical period, when synoekismos could stretch subsistence economy no further, the economy of surplus production prevailed throughout all of Greece. Surplus agriculture sustained population growth, a major desideratum, but eventually led to commercial dependence of Athens on Egypt and southern Russia.²⁶²

²⁶¹ Clumsy barter made such transactions (local trade) difficult for the small owners, and made them dependent on large estates which were able to market the larger quantities of their surplus products against proper money payments. In Israel full advantage was taken by rich men of the opportunities offered for exploiting the poor, which were inherent in the still Ancient Oriental system of local trade in Palestine. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; An Ancient Economic History, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.252.
The Greek temples were erected centuries prior to the poleis; it is very intriguing that urbanization arose remotely and independently of the temples, rather than as adjuncts to the temples. The Greek religious shrines were not controlled by the polis either in the archaic or classical periods, and remained politically neutral. This was a symptom of archaic social organization; the inhabitants as yet had no concept of themselves as belonging to a polis or any other static community, and had as yet no concept of landed property; presumably the first concept of property concentrated on the number of goats one tended. Wars or skirmishes between Greek communities consisted of stealing crops rather than of annexing land. The indiscriminate accessibility of the shrine to any Greek regardless of polis or ethne may have been what sustained the national affinities of Greeks for each other, despite internecine war. Synoekismos was probably preferred to conquest because archaic warfare was internecine, between distant relatives.

The first settlements were *ethne*, not *poleis*. Such *ethne* were rural habitations, without a walled city, centralization, landed property, or a clear distinction between members and non-members. The ethnic rural settlement was relatively dissociated. When a warlord, i.e. basileus, set out for predation or piracy, his retinue was related to him by kinship; the original concept of membership, antedating the polis by centuries, was blood relation. There was no occasion for wars of extermination or annexation, because villages had no organized military, because land had not been conceived as belonging to one village or another, and because races or kinship groups were either the same or not yet discriminated. Greek settlements gradually changed into villages, but not into a large community such as a polis. This was still a period of land abundance; instead of colonization, adaptation to a growing population could be more efficiently achieved by intensive, rather than extensive, development. More appropriate than

Since prehistory, interannual variability in rainfall required communities to develop risk-buffering strategies such as fragmenting land holdings, diversifying crops, and trading surpluses. As population grew, the peoples of the ancient Mediterranean elaborated these techniques. Cf. Garnsey, P.; *Famine and Food Supply in the Greco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis*, Cambridge University Press, 1988.
war was a merging of two villages into one village: *synoekismos*. The internecine fighting of the basileis in progression from rural settlement to village to small and large poleis was a process within intensive growth. Smaller communities, once subordinated or merged in the suzerainty of a larger polity, could no longer aggress on each other. Synoikismos was a progression of pacification.

The poleis did not solve nascent problems of overpopulation or alimentary insufficiency by territorial expansion; synoekismos delayed population pressure by its intensification of the present land area. In a subsequent period the poleis strewed their excess manpower in remote colonies rather than to focus them where they could have abetted territorial expansion. The parallel tactic, *Synoekismos*, substituted for territorial expansion. It seems to have functioned well in the early archaic period, when intensive rather than extensive growth best preserved a community. The earliest polis formations were the final result of amalgamation of communities. Intensification resulted from amalgamation of neighboring, not remote, communities, so that those ultimately melding into a polis were always close tribal relations. Theseus is credited for the unification of Attica ca. 900 B.C.; its political process is not recorded, although there is evidence of subsequent economic improvement.²⁶³ Attica became the hinterland of Athens, but it was not a subjugated annexation. The semi-mythical origin in Theseus suggests that the rationale of synoekismos of the late archaic period was more religious than political. A religious ground would sustain the traditional kinship structure, and aristocratic rule; political bonding would have been secular, against kinship, military, and anachronistic.²⁶⁴

Synoekismos resulted from concentration and self-defense; small settlements fused

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²⁶³ We cannot see the political process by which the isolated settlements in Attica were induced to join together in a unified state, only the social and economic improvement it brought, in comparison with the dark times after the Mycenaean collapse. If unification was completed around 900 the event could well have been lost to exact memory and in consequence have been attributed to Theseus of the heroic age, before the Trojan War. Cf. Andrews, A.; *The Growth of the Athenian State*, in *The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C.*, edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.363.

into larger communities. Possibly the internecine nature of the earliest form of war partially accounts for Aristotle's conception that only defensive war is justified, and that the only object of war should be peace; Sparta's wars were between alien races, whereas the belligerency of Athens was between clans of the same tribe. The peacefulness of Attic synoekismos relative to the process of other migratory settlements was conferred by a distinction between two phases of settlement. First, the Ionian tribes had entered Attika in unthreatening numbers and cohabited with the native inhabitants who were the progeny of the defunct Mycenaean civilization. The Ionian tribe benefited from the Mycenaean legacy whereas the other invading tribes did not. In the second phase, tiny communities merged from settlements of the same genetic stream. The village was a self-contained *genos*, an extended family of blood-relatives; the outlying villages were not members in the family of the first village, but were nevertheless consanguineous. The many villages bound by more indirect blood-relation constituted a *phyle*, a tribe. The Greek villages were divided according to *phyle*; each village formed as the center of a clan within a tribe. The subdivisions of the clan were located in separate geographical divisions: the *deme*. If several poleis belonged to one clan, they were united by virtue of a cult and were called an *amphyctyon*.  

The *amphictyon*, the sanctuary, was a place such as a temple where one could enjoy safety from pursuers; it seems to derive from the political neutrality that had to be preserved if religious institutes were to exist. It was built prior to forts or walled cities. It was located on the border between different communities so that members of either community could indifferently find sanctuary. Reliance on an amphictyony between several communities, together with the mediating role of religion, probably preceded synoekismos or philotes between those communities. The archaic Greeks made a distinction between alien settlements on the basis of *philotes*, friendship, and incidentally affords an insight into the

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265 In private life the old clan divisions are kept up: each citizen is member of a brotherhood (*phratria*), family, and tribe (*phyle*); the last is a large subdivision of a clan. This is also a geographical division into districts (*demes*), each of which has some town or village as a center. Within the limits of one clan there are often several city-states forming an alliance; one example is Boeotia. Such alliances are often due to certain cults common to a number of city-states, and then the alliances are called “*amphictyonies*”. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Michael; *A History of the Ancient World*, Volume I, p. 206.
aboriginal meaning of "friendship". A settlement could not form an alliance with another without previously having established *philotes* with that settlement, and two settlements in philotes would categorically refrain from predating on each other, while liberally raiding other settlements.\textsuperscript{267} This suggests that the establishment of philotes was preliminary to synoekismos. Since the *spondaei*, the religious ceremony invoking the gods, could take place only between communities observant of the same religion, the amalgamation into synoekismos & c. which an amphictyony introduced could never function between Greek and non-Greek tribal settlements.\textsuperscript{268} The relations of *philotes* and *xenia* aggregated communities so that they would cease fighting each other, forming stronger defense against alien communities. The original social organization was in this respect unproblematic; socialization was naturally ordered from age and blood relation.

\textsuperscript{266} Interstate sanctuaries and festivals reinforced it further, especially where permanent forms of cooperation developed between communities that maintained a common sanctuary. Known as Amphictyones, such cooperations are attested for a number of sanctuaries in the archaic age, the most important of which were those of Delphi, Delos, and the Panionion at Mycale. It is tempting to assume that such forms of cooperation in religious matters paved the way for more political forms of interstate relations, but this is hard to prove. Where amphictyonies were more or less coextensive with well-defined regions and clusters of communities they may indeed have facilitated the creation of regional federations, as in the case of Boeotia in the late sixth century. But in other respects their political impact was probably more indirect. Notions of restraint in warfare among neighbors were easily connected with the common bonds created by an amphictyony, and again Apollo at Delphi played an important role in this; in any case, the Delphic amphictyony was later believed to have formally introduced a set of limiting conventions for warfare among its member states. P. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in *A Companion to Archaic Greece*, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 588.

\textsuperscript{267} In order to conclude an alliance, first a formal “friendship” (philotes) had to be established. Without it, there could be no question of a treaty whatsoever. The inhabitants of Ithaca, for instance, recognized the Thesprotians as bound to them in friendship and hence would not allow raiding of Thesprotian territory. By implication, all those not recognized as “friends” were fair game for plundering. Such bonds of friendship are to be expected primarily between neighbors rather than between more distant communities, but this does not necessarily mean that in the absence of philotes there was a “natural” state of war. P. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in *A Companion to Archaic Greece*, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 587.

\textsuperscript{268} At the same time, a growing network of xenia- and philia-relations bonded more and more poleis together in an “interstate community” that was partly designed to prevent wars and partly to regulate them to some extent. P. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in *A Companion to Archaic Greece*, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 590.
Synoekismos perfused Attica under religious aegis; the prior political atomization of communities subsequent to immigration had persisted despite communal fusion in religious affinity. Synoekismos proceeded quickly if the basileis could remain in control of their tiny, religiously related communities. It created a more extensive sense of community growth, in which politically separate communities gave up their proper basileis in exchange for the advantages of political integration. Neither the invading Ionian tribes nor the previous Mycenaean culture of Attica instituted serfdom; furthermore, the Ionian tribes had not conquered Attica, but rather mixed with the previous inhabitants. Small and numerous communities developed from this mixture, each small community developing its own aristocracy.

Each community prior to synoekismos was tiny; the "aristocracy" had its practical claim to such as the promachoi, the actual warriors who defended the community. Primitive social groups almost universally pursue warfare, but upon settlement the frequency and lethality of warfare tremendously increases, and the greatest intensity of lethal warfare is posterior, not prior, to civilization. Aggression increases with civilization because concentration instills a collective identity. Since aggregative warfare is far more effective than distributive war,

269 Thus the first stage in the union of Attica is the reduction of the small independent sovereignties throughout all the land, except the Eleusinian plain in the west, under the loose overlordship of Athens. In the course of time the feeling of unity in Attica became so strong that all the smaller lordships, which formed parts of the large state, but still retained their separate political organizations, could be induced to surrender their home governments and merge themselves into a single community with a government centralized in the city of the Cephisian plain. Cf. Bury, J.B., A History of Greece, London, 1906, p. 166. 270 In Attica the process of unification was unlike the corresponding process in Sparta. One reason for this may be that there was no class of serfs as a basis of economic life in Attica of the Mycenaean age, and that the new order was established, not as a result of conquest, but by evolution and agreement. At all events, instead of foreign invasion and the reforms, military and social, of Lycurgus, we find a transaction of uncertain date, connected with the name of a mythical king, Theseus, and called by the Greeks synoecismos or sympoliteia. It is quite possible, in Attica as in Sparta, that the mythical name conceals the real name of some great statesman belonging to the eighth century B.C. But the transaction itself was this— that the separate communities of Attica, each of which had possessed its own individual aristocracy in each of the separate communities, and the certainty that these aristocrats must join forces if they were to cope with domestic and foreign dangers. At any rate, tradition is unanimous that the change in Attica was gradual and peaceful, and free from the revolutionary convulsions familiar to the Ionian world of that age. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Michael; A History of the Ancient World, Volume I, p. 215.
identity strengthens from aggregation. Prior to the polis warriors organized genetically, according to blood-relation; the polis conferred on individuals a civic in addition to a genetic identity, greatly increasing potential organization. The greater numbers of integration that civic organization achieved in comparison with genetic order gave civic identity great strength. As the Greek villages concentrated into a polis, the members of the group needed military protection in direct proportion to the concentration of potentially belligerent communities. To the degree that belligerency became essential to survival as communities concentrated, the priority of aristocracy became paramount. In the earliest context, aristocracy was synonymous with those individuals who defended the community in combat. The effort to reinforce stability by polis-formation ironically strengthened the forces oriented to its destruction.

Until 550 BC Greece was militarily volatile; border war and civil war were unpredictable and frequent. Wars were organized under concepts of honor, revenge, and ranking, which made otherwise needless wars a matter of inevitability. Such battles were relatively harmless; the use of promachoi rendered the slaughter of battle minimal. Athens did not conquer and spread over Attica in the manner in which Rome occupied Italy. Athens developed as the center of the Attic polity more as an afterthought, due to substantive advantages, rather than as a nuclear conquistador.

The tininess of the communities compelled the aristocracies of several communities to join in common defense; this initial cooperation enabled the aristocrats to identify with other aristocrats, of alien clans, more than to identify themselves with the demos of their own clan, of which they were the leaders. Polis formation quickly altered the archaic form of war that characterized the early polis. Fortified city walls did not encompass the mainland poleis

271 In a quantitative study, only four out of fifteen primitive peoples did not routinely engage in warfare. Second, comparative anthropology shows that its frequency, organization, and its intensity in lives killed, increase substantially with permanent settlement and then again, with civilization. Cf. Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social Power, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.48.

272 In all this warfare there was a considerable overlap of private and public spheres. The heroes who assembled for the expedition against Troy took part on the basis of kinship obligations or other personal bonds with the leader. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 587
until the 5th century, presumably because the Greek communities could rely on the restraints called for by the amphiktyonies. 273 In the archaic period, clear distinctions between inhabitants of one community from another had not solidified: it is probable that as the polis-formation created strong distinctions between membership in one polis or another, the utility of a polis wall became more pressing. 274 Aggression developed into a need for walled enclosure: the polis. Pressure to build a larger population for purposes of defense might explain both partible inheritance and synoekismos. 275 The discovery of the exponential superiority of aggregate over distributive power motivated the villagers to appreciate the collective power that would increase from aggregation. The alliances thus formed led to synoekismos.

Although progression to the polis was a pacification, the polis made the distinction between member and non-member more imperative than previously. The Attic communities would incline to synoekismos because of their greater vulnerability to attack; synoekismos occurred on the mainland, not the islands. When individuals adopted polis-identities, distinguishing themselves against other poleis, the idea of synoekismos with the non-member became perplexing. 276 One of the factors of synoekismos alluded to above by "self-destruction"

273 Thucydides: 1.2.1-2; 1.7.1.
274 The absence of city-walls is probably another indication. City-walls were well known among the Greeks in Ionia in the eighth century, as well as in Sicily in the seventh and sixth centuries, but in the Greek motherland they were practically nonexistent. According to Thucydides, city-walls were a recent phenomenon in his day. Presumably, many archaic communities had not considered it imperative to protect themselves with walls, either because wars were rare or limited in their objectives or both. Release of prisoners against ransom, too, is well attested in the archaic age – though admittedly it was also frequently practiced in later centuries. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 597.
275 To keep a surplus, even one individually produced, requires social organization. It requires norms of possession. As these are adhered to imperfectly, it also requires armed defenses. Also production is normally not individual but social. Thus the possession, use, and defense of natural resources are greatly affected by even the simplest practices of social organization: Three men (or three women) fighting or working as a team can normally kill or greatly out-produce three men acting as individuals, however strong the latter may be as individuals. Whatever the power in question- economic, military, political, or ideological- it is conferred overwhelmingly by social organization. Social, not natural, inequality is what matters- as Rousseau observed. Cf. Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social Power, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.51.
was its collateral effect on lineage. The basileus of a village was a perfect basileus; by genetic order he was the ranking individual, and a relative of everyone in his community. Synoekismos mixed the villages of two lineages, so that neither basileus could remain genetically prior. If genetic preeminence could not identify the basileus, the position could persist only by lending in its conception more weight to civic office than to blood inheritance.

The "localist aristocrat" in distinction from the cosmopolitan aristocrat disdained affinity with alien aristocratic groups, instead emphasizing his kinship with the demos. A village basileus might resent the merging tendency of synoekismos, which threatened his eminence, and prefer the perfect eminence as a village basileus according to his genetic order. This brachiation resisted synoekismos in order to keep intact the original kinship order and local sovereignty; synoekismos threatened to disassemble this sovereignty without supplementing the loss. Thus, the "local" aristocrat fought to maintain isolation and blood lineage, whereas the "cosmopolitan" aristocrat tended to appreciate his high social position, which he had in common with alien aristocrats, and rely less on the purity of lineage on which his preeminence had originally been founded.

War was primarily conducted for honor rather than gain; the village basileus could lose his position during the transition to synoekismos. The idea of honor, so incessantly adverted to by Thucydides, was not frivolous; although social position was structured by lineage, a figure such as a basileus had to demonstrate his preeminence over contenders. In the midst of consolidation with another genetic branch, the process of synoekismos, various basileis resisted Athenian organization in their efforts to preserve suzerainty of their own settlements. Mutual exclusion, ingredient to the formation of polis identity, conflicted with inclusion, 276 Early fifth-century Greece, then, differed greatly from that world of small communities in which wars had been mostly limited affairs which in general did not substantially change the political map. Now, new aspirations came to the fore: hegemony and domination. The larger poleis had absorbed smaller neighbors or subordinated these in a league. Boundaries had become hardened and communities defined themselves more than before as citizens against non-citizens. This again made further absorptions of other communities less palatable and stimulated new forms of domination: hegemonies in formal alliances under the leadership of a dominant state. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 601.
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ingredient to synoekismos; the emergent consciousness that one belonged not only to an oikos, but to a polis, informed static land possession.

Battles of the promachos-type had been fought out in the open, long prior to the enclosure of the polis within walls. The *promachos* had been feasible prior to the polis, but the fraternization of aristocrats between poleis led to its obsolescence; the idea of *promachos* entailed univocal dedication to one's community, which became less possible as aristocrats began to conceive of themselves as a self-interested class. Centralized surplus was not private property, as redistribution would entail return to the community. But surplus could be presented as having been spent on the community if it were devoted to warfare. In reality warfare was a benefit purely to the aristocracy, but since it was a communal action, the aristocrats could easily pretend that money spent for private ambitions was being used for the communal good.\(^{277}\) This pattern was a precursor of the capacity of a ruling class disaffected from its population to disguise self-interested use of revenue as expenditure for national interest.

The *aristoi* neither occupied nor limited access to the religious shrines; despite the amalgamations and mortal enmity over acquisition of neighboring land, archaic Greeks did not attack Greeks in religious shrines. The religious centers took on the connotation of a "neutral zone," where individuals from different poleis did not harm each other. When Cylon occupied the Acropolis following his attempt at a tyranny, the rule of sanctity was violated, and the violation became more egregious as the Athenian people besieged Cylon and his Spartan henchmen in the Acropolis.\(^{278}\) Two things are exemplary for the following argument: 1) Cylon was an Athenian aristocrat who solicited the help of Spartan aristocrats, and 2) Cylon's military

\(^{277}\) To illustrate: if the population multiplied by four times, and positions of paramountcy increased by only two times, at the end of the period of increase each paramount leader regularly collected twice as much as when the period of increase began. While this does not constitute a per capita increase in community wealth, simple arithmetic indicates that it does constitute a fourfold increase in centralized goods and a twofold increase in centralized goods per leader and could provide a greatly increased centralized source of goods that could be used for ventures abroad. The centralized materials were still obligated to the community, but it appears that gains generated by the movements of the materials at some point became unobligated. Cf. Tandy, David W.; *Warriors into Traders*, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 113.
force was Spartan, not Athenian. Any internal political dispute could easily catalyze military attack by another polis, because class membership could overcome genetic membership.

Aristocrats of different communities associated in the religious sanctuaries, and could negotiate things associated with synoekismos. Gift-giving was a primarily aristocratic device that occurred between aristocracies of different settlements. The ritual functioned to unite aristocracies of alien settlements into a unified identity; the action was affordable only to the aristocrats. Gift-giving opened commercial opportunities the profit of which was not subject to redistribution obligations. Fraternization between aristocracies of different communities reinforced prestige as it highlighted the distinction between aristocrat and demotes. The religious centers, together with the individual claim to descent from a given God, enabled the aristocrat to develop identities and loyalties separately from his native residence in a community.

Synoekismos generated internal social formation within the aristocracy; "cosmopolitan" aristocrats identified themselves with the groups of aristocracy in other communities, thus creating a strong distinction between demos and aristocrat. Synoekismos was complicated with marriage, the eupatrid, and the thetes. The eupatrid was the aristocratic great landowner,

278 General insecurity was enhanced further because probably in this early phase of developing state organization not all areas of Attica’s large territory were equally pacified. During any stasis, nobles and their followers may have controlled their own districts. Likely zones of potential violence were remote pastures and roads. Cylon, however, had violated customary rules by trying to seize by force the Acropolis, that is, the polis’s center which belonged to everyone and where, therefore, peace needed to be preserved. His opponents’ retaliation made the matter worse, since now even the shrine of Athena, the community’s patron goddess, no longer offered a “neutral zone.” Cf. Stahl, Michael, and Walter, Uwe; “Athens,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 140.

279 I have already discussed gift giving and gift-giving networks. Such exchanges serve to establish extra-community networks and encourage interest beyond the single settlement. In an incidental way, then, these prestations promoted Hellenic unity. In terms of social strategy, these prestations separate participants from nonparticipants; in terms of economic strategy, they establish a special collective that can exchange goods that are unencumbered by community demands. Status is acquired through prestation; more important, already established status positions are maintained and strengthened. Thus these networks simultaneously bring coherence to the leading group and distinguish participants from nonparticipants. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 141.
whose great divergence from the common man seems to have been due to synoekismos. Consolidation of two communities into one would necessarily have involved land grants; this is perhaps exemplified by Penelope’s suitors. Though sales were rare and peripheral in the Homeric world, exchanges were frequent and indispensable under a great variety of circumstances, not in the form of sale but in the form of gift-exchange. Homeric gift-giving was normally a bilateral action. Although it retained the outward appearance of a free, voluntary act, it came very near to obligation. Every gift either was a return for a gift or service already received or compensation for a wrong committed, or a provocation for a counter-gift, sometimes immediately and sometimes at a future date, not necessarily specified. This attitude facilitated the merging of settlements into conglomerated poleis, but the ancillary tendency of the aristocrat to disavow his affinity with the demos eroded the kinship organization in favor of obligation organized instead by civic structures. Initially difference between aristocracy and commoner had been inconspicuous, but the increase of population density induced a stratification by which shortages were economized; aristocrats thereby obtained priorities over commoners. Aristocrats socialized only with each other in order to strengthen their identity and privilege. Land and food shortage catalyzed the exclusion of the thetes from redistribution.

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280 In this account, interstate shrines were crucial to elitist ideology. Part of the appeal of these sanctuaries was, precisely, the fact that they were not under the control of any single city. Situated “in the interstices of the polis world,” they provided elites with a venue for competitive display through athletics and large-scale dedications. Investing in ostentatious, self-aggrandizing behavior at an interstate shrine could be a way of asserting solidarity with one’s fellow aristocrats in other poleis; to claim that wealth, or birth, or a special relationship with the gods was of greater significance than membership in a particular citizen community. Cf. Neer, Richard T.; “Delphi, Olympia, and the Art of Politics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, Ed. Shapiro, H.A., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 229.


282 A stratified society is one in which members of the same sex and equivalent age status do not have access to the basic resources that sustain life. Population density may often be a factor behind stratification and state formation, although it does not appear to be a necessary one. Two noteworthy aspects of stratified society are the exclusion of a segment of the population, and the concomitant tendency of the ranking individuals to socialize only with one another and to arrange to have their ranks accompanied by economic advantage. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 92.
As communities developed into poleis composed of diverse communities, the cosmopolitan aristocrat prevailed, and took positions of civic government in place of kinship order. Aristocrats in the earliest polis sought to preserve their priority by emphasizing their distinction as a separate class. Polarization between aristas and demotes entailed a reinforced exclusion of common people from privileged resources. Formal law issuing from the civic office-holder displaced kinship in order to reify the new hierarchy. Gift-giving functioned to institute alliances, feasts advertised wealth and generosity, and very expensive funeral ceremonies enhanced the prestige of those who could afford them. Expensive burial ceremonies were a device to advertise the priority-status of families; possibly the focus of Greek religion on funeral was due to the lineage affinity between gods and humans.
Throughout ancient Greek history there persisted a mixture of ethne and poleis, of which Sparta seems to have occupied a peculiar mid-point. The ethne were the more primitive social organizations; members did not concentrate in a village, but were strewn over the country, and their social organization was purely tribal. Some of the ethne evolved into polis-societies, comprising more elaborate social organization. Sparta resembled an ethne, in that it had not erected a wall around its city, and held closely to its primitive genetic social organization, but was on the other hand a polis, in that it developed a higher social organization including hegemonies.

The earliest ethne-societies cohered by an economy of immediate return; food etc. resulted from immediate labor; ethne societies were amorphous in that individuals could join or leave without substantial effect on the community. The polis, on the other hand, depended on the permanence of its members; tools and other infrastructure were built, making productive return long-term. Inhabitants could not leave the polis without loss of return on their labor; economics forced permanent residency in order to enjoy the delayed return for their labor. Therefore most ethne were located inland, while most poleis developed on the seacoast, where shipbuilding, as a prerequisite to piracy, rendered an economy of long-term return. The advancement of the polis was a result of initial poverty; if an ethne could live without further organization, it remained an ethne, but if it could not survive without further organization, it developed into a polis. Athens developed on the seaside, whereas Sparta, like inland ethne, did not build a wall. The present question concerns why Sparta had developed

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286 Internments are public activities, displays for the benefit of the eyes of all members, high or low, of the community. Thus when the deceased is accompanied into the ground by powerful symbols of his class, the viewers are reminded of the status of that class’s membership. The collocation of artifacts can be seen as a “status kit,” items possessed by individuals of rather high status in the community, which were used by those persons to assert and display that status, and hence to enhance it. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 164.
so differently from other Greek poleis.

Oriental class society was an immediate product of irrigation. Land acquisition ensued only from irrigation. The possibility of irrigation was posterior to centralization. Antecedent centralization caused land acquisition to accumulate in large holdings. Such conditions promoted the formation of a class society. The immunity from flood and irrigation exempted Laconia from reliance on centralization; the priesthood accordingly did not become the principal landholder as it had in the oriental societies. Land acquisition in Greece could be acquired piecemeal and individualistically. Individualistic land acquisition resulted in predominance of smallholdings, which inhibited polarization of society into rich and poor. The conditions of the settlement of Laconia had not as yet significantly differed from those of Attica; how could such a substantial divergence have ensued?

Formation of class society ought to have been the easiest result of Doric settlement in Laconia, but stratification did not take place because of a prior conflict between two forces. Both Thebes and Sparta depended on militance to achieve internal unity at the same time as they faced external hostility. Athens by contrast had enjoyed a comparatively propitious commencement because the inhabitants of Attica were of the same tribal root as Athens.289

288 How salient were these first societies? That depends on how fixed they were, how trapped were the people inside them. Permanence in primitive societies is guaranteed if they are “delayed return” rather than “immediate return,” “labor investment systems.” Where a group invests labor in creating tools, stores, fields, dams, and so forth, whose economic returns are delayed, a long-term and in some respects a centralized organization is necessary to manage the labor, protect the investment, and apportion its yields. Cf. Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social Power, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.44.

289 The memory of this synoecism was preserved in historical times by an annual feast, and it is fitting that it should be so remembered, for it determined the whole history of Athens. From this time forward she is no longer merely the supreme city of Attica. She is neither the head of a league of partly independent states, nor is she a despotic mistress of subject-communities. She is not what Thebes is to become in Boeotia, or what Sparta is in Laconia. If she had been, and she might well have been either of these things, her history would have been gravely altered. She is the central city of a united state; and to the people of every village in Attica belong the same political rights as to the people of Athens herself. The man of Marathon or the man of Thoricus is no longer an Attic, he is an Athenian. It is generally supposed that the synoecism was the work of one of the kings. It was undoubtedly the work of one man; but it is possible that it belongs to the period immediately succeeding the abolition of the royal power. Cf. Bury, J.B., A History of Greece, London, 1906, p. 166.
Sparta and Thebes amalgamated people of different racial roots. The Attic synoikismos was posterior to the successful mixture of the Mycenaeans residents with the invading Ionian tribes, whereas the Doric, Laconian tribes had not passed through a stage of miscegenation with the prior residents. The Spartan settlement ought to have eventuated into a class organization because the Dorian tribal migrations into Greece involved conquests and annexations of land from prior or neighboring groups; Sparta's late conquest of Laconia and Messenia may be a belated example of such a pattern. The Spartan conquests were uncharacteristic of Greek tribalism.

The Laconians and Messenians were aboriginal; they were not of the Greek tribal blood. Since the Spartan settlement was characterized by subjugation, one of three outcomes ought to have resulted. The Spartans might have exterminated the previous inhabitants, expelled them, or enslaved them. Presumably because of the labor value of the vanquished, none of the likely results took place. Therefore, a plantation economy ought to have ensued, in which the Spartans would be plantation owners and the ruling class, while the other races would be bound in some form of serfdom. The various villages were amalgamated into a form of

290 Undoubtedly there were other cases, including wars that did not end in the physical destruction of the defeated community but in its absorption by a neighboring state, as happened probably to Eleusis, incorporated by Athens in the seventh century, or Eleutherai and Oropus, annexed in the sixth. Nevertheless, such a fate was probably exceptional. The very existence of that multitude of mostly small poleis during the archaic age, among which only a few were in the end able to evolve to a status of “regional powers,” suggests the rarity of warfare and aggression on a grand scale, leading to the subjugation, absorption or annihilation of neighbors. Instead, we have traditions of the unification of neighboring settlements by peaceful merger or synoikismos. A notorious exception is Sparta. Having subjugated Laconia probably in the course of the eighth century, it turned to Messenia and started a series of campaigns that was to end only in the late seventh century with the incorporation of most of Messenia’s fertile land and the enslavement of the population as helots. In seventh-century Greece this was like an echo of what probably had been more common in the Dark Age with its unsettled conditions and migrations, just as the epic images of the destruction of Troy conjured up the harsh practices of an earlier age probably more than the everyday realities of Greece ca. 700. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 586.

291 One man could even be king over a number of poleis, like Eumaeus’ father. The mere fact of such power, however, does not of itself warrant the belief that feudal relations were present. Cf. Finley, M. I.; Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, Viking Press, New York, 1982, p.218.
subjugation, while the broader kinship relations among the Spartans encompassed a great plurality of villages, which coalesced into Sparta.\textsuperscript{291} Apparently subjugation of the indigenes caused the peculiar Spartan development; Sparta developed an elaborate government, unlike ethne, but, like ethne, did not build a wall. Elaborate government was necessary to maintain subjugation of the natives, but, because Sparta's greatest enemy, its helots, were within Sparta, there was no utility in having a wall.

Agricultural and military requirements discouraged plantation economy. The climatic uniformity of Greece preempted the possibility of greater per-unit economy that might otherwise have derived from land engrossment. The rainfall characteristic of Greece advantaged smallholding. Rainfall was highly irregular from year to year, and crops were differentially sensitive to rainfall. Because plantations are monocultural, they are more vulnerable to blight and drought than smallholdings. Fragmentation into smallholdings of diversified cultivation functioned as a buffer against crop failure.\textsuperscript{292} Drought or plant disease would not affect every crop; smallholding insured against famine. Nevertheless, Sparta had a military predisposition for plantation economy. Fragmentation into smallholding would weaken Sparta either by giving the subjugated race, qua farming class, great potential power, or it would deplete the strength of the Spartan military through dissipation of citizen labor in agriculture. The dilemma concerned the adjustment of agriculture to climatic conditions without undermining Spartan military ascendancy. Private ownership was desirable inasmuch as it would maintain military prevalence by engendering population growth, but therefore plantation economy was undesirable. The formation of a civic, in addition to a kinship organization, was inevitable because the ethne social structure could not have organized the several subject populations that were not Spartan. Formation of a polis, and hence of civic organization, intensified the internal identity-formation of the Spartans, but, unlike Athens, it reinforced not only the exclusion of ethne and poleis outside of Sparta, but also the exclusion

\textsuperscript{292} Since prehistory, interannual variability in rainfall had required communities to develop risk-buffering strategies such as fragmenting landholdings, diversifying crops, and trading surpluses. As population grew, the peoples of the ancient Mediterranean elaborated these techniques. Cf. Garnsey, P.; Famine and Food Supply in the Greco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis, Cambridge, 1988.
of the non-Spartans within Sparta. The formation of an inclusive identity necessarily amplified the exclusive identity, from which much more intense belligerence developed than had existed in the stage of the ethne.\textsuperscript{293}

This pressure was far more lenient in Attica, where neighboring communities were of the same tribe and religion. Racial difference and consequent inability to rely on religious affinity maximized the pressure in Laconia. Exclusion proceeding from polis formation accelerated military confrontation; Sparta was the first polity to preserve its dominance by hegemony. The idea of civic organization, taken as a distinct counter-tactic to natural organization, may have originated from racial mixture, if not conquest. Attica could pursue synoekismos rather than hegemony because of religious affinity; if a basileus achieved dominance over another basileus together with his deme, the expanded community would need to accommodate the new members who were not close blood relatives of the members of the dominant tribe.\textsuperscript{294} Dominance in synoekismos was undesirable; union would succeed only if there were equality. Civic order could in this case supplement the natural ethnic order.

In the case of Sparta, however, the ethnic order would be entirely incapable of operating conciliation between classes. Extermination, enslavement, and miscegenation were three possible solutions in Sparta, where the value of blood relation was too strong to resolve the addition of new population by miscegenation. For the most part subjugation and enslavement were not adopted. The Spartan solution, perhaps awkward, was to extend uniform rule and its political corollaries over both dominant and subject tribes, but make both tribes persist separately in their tribal identities. The Spartiates were made private owners of land, but did

\textsuperscript{293} Armed hostility between groups reinforces their sense of “in group” and “out group.” It also intensifies objective distinction: Economically specialized groups develop specialized forms of warfare. The weaponry and organization of early fighters derived from their economic techniques. Cf. Mann, Michael, \textit{The Sources of Social Power}, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.48.

\textsuperscript{294} But the village communities are not as they were in the Asian world, isolated and independent; they are part of a larger community which is called the \textit{phyle} or tribe. The tribe is the whole people of the kingdom, in the kingdom’s simplest form; and the territory which the tribe inhabited was called its deme. When a king became powerful and won sway over the demes of neighboring kings, a community consisting of more than one tribe would arise; and while each tribe had to merge its separate political institutions in the common institutions of the whole state, it would retain its separate identity within the larger union. Cf. Bury, J.B., \textit{A History of Greece}, London, 1906, p. 69.
not cultivate. The helots were thus dispossessed of land, and thereby rendered politically harmless, but they were made to cultivate the land owned by the Spartiates. Helots surrendered fifty percent of their agricultural yield, so that they could continue living as farmers, but could not accumulate surplus by which to oppose the Spartiates internally. The perioeki were subjected to a similar precautionary treatment. Unlike the helots, peorioeki were owners of the land they themselves cultivated and, although they paid a tax, they did not surrender 50% of their agricultural produce.

Unlike Athens, Sparta maintained an extremely strict sequestration of perioeki from Spartiates. Stratification and mode of production were subordinated to military dictates, because militancy gave Sparta higher probabilities of survival than an agricultural or commercial class organization. Industrial production was oriented to military supply; private property and helot labor did not produce the most profitable agriculture but invigorated military preeminence by freeing the citizens (Spartiates) to exclusive practice of war. The society of the Spartan citizens was organized by compulsory cooperation; commensality, sumptuary prohibition, military regimentation, etc.

The concept of the helot was perhaps a compromise. The helot was not exactly a slave; he had an irrevocable right to residence on a smallholding, whereas the Spartiate who was the landowner and the helot's master was no more the authentic owner of the land than the helot. The helot was entitled to 50% of his agricultural yield, which presumably was sufficient self-interest to inhibit the helot's recalcitrance. The Spartiate was thus free to practice military proficiency exclusively; since he was not the absolute owner of the smallholding allotted to him, and there was no land-market in Sparta, the Spartiate did not threaten to become a plantation-holder. The helot was left to cultivate the smallholdings, but his position as a sequestered serf eliminated the risk that helots would arrive to any political power.

Sparta innovated another solution for expansion: hegemony. This was a unique invention. Instead of extirpating the alien government and absorbing the substance into the native government, the vanquished polity was left intact, but was commandeered to transfer the surplus to the victor. The polis did not conquer or exterminate the alien polis, nor seize its territory, nor coalesce. Sparta could not have sent Spartiates to occupy and cultivate conquered
territory; the helot-population was so large that all Spartiates had to remain at home in order to prevent revolt. Instead, Spartan subjugation of the smaller poleis imposed taxes or tribute to the scale that the smaller poleis' total surplus production was transferred to Sparta. Totality of extraction prevented the vanquished from mounting rebellion and maximized the benefit to the victor. The idea of hegemony seems to have originated from the prior Spartan management of the helots and perioeci. There was no need for extermination of the alien polis, nor expropriation of its land, nor for supplanting its government, if tribute could extract from it more wealth and supplementary manpower than the dominant polis could possibly have gotten from having expropriated the land. The labor-power of the alien population could make hegemony more profitable than occupation. War was profitable not for its conquests but for its threat; occupation was expensive, but for as long as the threat of conquest was credible, occupation could be economized. Throughout subsequent Greek history, hegemony rather than territorial expansion motivated war. Hegemony provided more surplus wealth than conquest, and it segregated the polis-members from the non-polis members. Thus eleutheria in the ancient Greek context was primarily an epithet of the polis, and only secondarily of the individual, since the eleutheria of the individual could follow only upon immunity and severance of the polis from the control of another polis.

**BASILEUS**

How is it possible that the basileus could have originated from kinship, but possess a position of power distinguishable from religion? Agamemnon and Creon performed religious rites, but they are presented primarily as kings rather than as head priests. The term basileus, which the Greek tribes used to denote the leader in the initial period of the polis, had been the term used by the aboriginal Myceneans to denote leaders on the village level. 295 There were innumerable basileis, roughly one for each village-community. The archaic Greek aristocracy

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295 It can hardly be coincidental that the term basileis, employed to denote the leaders of the nascent polis, had in the Mycenean period defined local officials at the town or village level. Cf. Hall, Jonathan F.; “Polis, Community, and Ethnic Identity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, Ed. Shapiro, H.A., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 59.
had the institution of a king, but the position, the basileus, was unstable. In the Orient there
could not have been a distinction between the person of the king and the office of the king.
Although the basileus also claimed descent from a god, his station was dependent more on
prestige than on blood lineage, because person and office were distinguishable.Individual
difference of ability in the archaic social system had not been sufficiently strong to establish
one person's right to leadership over another. Insofar as an individual did not recognize his
subordination, the authority of the presumptive basileus might be ignored. The basileus
or warlord had to demonstrate his virtue, or superiority, on an individual basis in order to
persuade other near-equal individuals to obey.

The aristocrats were the equals of the basileus; all of them as well as the king descended
from Zeus, and were not related to him as servants, as the subordinates of a pharaoh were.
Selection of the basileus by blood-line was not absolute. The Egyptian Pharaoh was himself
god, but the basileus, as a blood-relative of god, might by the same logic of blood-line be
challenged by another close relative. The basileus was incorporated with other clan-chiefs
who were also pressured to prove their primacy. The clan-heads had good qualifications to
replace the basileus. The Pharoah, being himself god, could not be distinguished into the
king and the person occupying the office of king; therefore the subordinates were not potential
pharaohs. The prestige of a basileus was based more upon achievement than blood lineage.
If he were unsuccessful, the clan would replace him with a stronger member. Whereas a
Pharaoh was immovably the leader of society by virtue of divinity, the kinship origin of the Greek basileus is evident from his dependence on proving military leadership.

Given that the presidency of basileus was determined by descent rather than election, it is curious that Greek society had not evolved into a theocracy. The early basileis had motivated synoekismos. Dispersed oikoi or villages conglomerated for the sake of defense; the conglomeration would grow in the vicinity of the fortress of the basileus. The fortress, the home of the basileus, was built on a hill, for the sake of defense. Rather than from religion, the Greek polis seems to have originated from military defense; consequently urban development occurred more sporadically than the systematic union resulting from irrigation. A wall encompassed the fort, but as villagers came to reside under the fort, they would eventually
build a wall around the entire village. The protection provided by the wall encouraged further habitation. The wall thereby amplified the authority of the basileus, whose wall virulently distinguished his subjects from non-members. Originally both king and head-priest, the basileus presided over judicial disputes and the religious ceremonies associated with the community. The growth of power that emerged immediately from the distinction of member from non-member (in the polis) shifted power somewhat away from the precedence of age within the same genetic stream. The various clans were cognate, but the basileus could no longer hold his dignity from being the earliest progenitor; the notion of power became slightly abstracted from the direct genetic line. Consequently the basileus accumulated more civil than religious power, since priestly power would remain rigidly connected to kinship order.

The organization of the basileus was brief and sporadic. Despite the kinship foundation of the basileus, it was not altogether stable. The basileus became labile because the essential organization of the polis was familial, not political; the consent by which clans cohabited depended on broad authority within the subunits of the polity, for, having preexisted the polis in the form of ethne, clans would otherwise never have submitted themselves to an out-of-clan basileus. The _paterfamilias_ had power of life and death, and everything in between, over every family member. Such personal power was entirely immune to civic authority in the early archaic period, and signifies that the clans entering the polis reserved much of their power from the basileus. Prior to the polis, people lived in a purely familial structure; the entire village was composed solely of members of the extended family, the clan; every member of the village was one's blood relative.\(^{303}\) It was probably the cognate relation of all

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302 Colonization was connected with a transition from a negative to a positive balance of trade, with the development of Greek-owned shipping, and with the search for foreign markets by Greek sailors. It was part of the great transformation from which emerged the characteristic features of Greek civilization. The decisive turning point in Greek social history is the development of the military urban particulars which led to the _polis_, in contrast to developments in the Near East where city monarchy existed at first but then developed into bureaucratic territorial monarchy and finally “world monarchy”. The crucial factor which made Near Eastern development so different was the need for irrigation systems, as a result of which the cities were closely connected with building canals and constant regulation of waters and rivers, all of which demanded the existence of a unified bureaucracy. Cf. Weber, Max; _The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations_, Verso, London, 1988, p.157

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the communal inhabitants that originated the prohibition of enslaving a citizen in the classical period. This power of kinship in the early polis subsided as civic gradually supplanted kinship authority. The metamorphosis of civic authority from the monarchic basileus to a form of oligarchy in the mature polis was a reassertion of the relative power of clan elders to a power in the polis equitable with the prestige they previously had in small villages.

The a posteriori aggregation of the *laos* accounts for the failure of theocracy in Greece. The Basileus was king by a certain blood-line, but the blood-line was of one tribe, and the tribes remained separate even when united under one king. The Assembly was composed of all clans, and, because the basileus was native to only one clan, formation of a polis composed of several clans would have been unthinkable if the Assembly did not have precedence over the king. This democratic trend was possible only in Greece, precisely because it was only in Greece that familial society was long antecedent to civic society; the dependence of agriculture on irrigation guaranteed that familial and civic organization in the orient would be roughly simultaneous. The basileus of the archaic polis was ensconced in a council of elders with whom his policies had to concur, and whose conclusions had to meet approval of the assembly of all tribal members. The democratic tangent of the Greek tribes seems to have existed before stationary settlement, whereas the tribes of the orient seem to have had a religious, authoritarian and communal structure from origin. The precedence of the Assembly compensated for the non-blood relation of the basileus to the other tribes, inchoately motivating an orientation to democracy.

303 But in the most ancient times this political organization was weak and loose. The true power in primitive society was the family. When we first meet the Greeks they live together in family communities. Their villages are habitations of a *genos*, that is, of a clan, or family in a wide sense; all the members being descended from a common ancestor and bound together by the tie of blood. Originally the chief of the family had the power of life and death over all who belonged to the family; and it was only as the authority of the state grew and asserted itself against the cooperative independence of the family, that this power gradually passed away. Cf. Bury, J.B., *A History of Greece*, London, 1906, p. 69.

304 More important than either King or Council for the future growth of Greece was the gathering of the people, out of which democracy was to spring. All the freemen of the tribe—all the freemen of the nation, when more tribes had been united—met together, not at stated times, but whenever the king summoned them, to hear and acclaim what he and his councilors proposed. Cf. Bury, J.B., *A History of Greece*, London, 1906, p. 71.
The plurality of clans and ambiguity of blood precedence coerced the basileus constantly to demonstrate unique leadership. Since the lineage of the basileus was not altogether persuasive for clans of which the basileus was not a member, buoyancy depended on a shift to achievement instead of birth. The achieved status of a basileus is trusted on the evidence that his piracy or war parties don't falter. Achieved status was unstable, because others of comparable descent could not avoid challenging the basileus in their effort to sustain even their present prestige. Charisma was needed; force of personality was essential to motivate followers. It was possible that no one would obey the decree of the basileus. The powers and duties of a given basileus remained unarticulated, because obedience followed from admiration of the person of the basileus rather than from obligation to the office of basileus.

Irrigation gave great stability to the oriental king due to the constant and open-ended subjection of the individual to irrigation. Subordination of the individual in Greece ensued from piracy, the benefits of which were sporadic and smaller than those of irrigation. Piracy had built such a strong antipathy to neighboring poleis that aggression against them had become an enduring standard of dignity. Individual subjection in the Orient had necessitated intra-metropolitan cooperation through a hegemony of religion and priesthood, which galvanized the identity of Head Priest and King. In Greece, the anax (wanax, Mycenean origin) was never so much a priest as a king, because the circumvalation of the polis limited its populations, which, consisting of comparatively small numbers, impeded formation of a priest-class. The wanax had been the center of redistribution, while the qu-si-re-u, the original

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305 The Homeric poems show us the King at the head. But he does not govern wholly of his own will; he is guided by a Council of the chief men of the community whom he consults; and the decisions of the council and king deliberating together are brought before the Assembly of the whole people. Cf. Bury, J.B., A History of Greece, London, 1906, p. 69.

306 There were leaders who had religious, military, and judicial responsibilities and therefore acted as priests, war leaders, and arbitrators. Distinguished persons formed councils, and on various occasions the people were convened. Yet all this did not happen regularly, membership and powers were not clearly demarcated, and the people were little more than an audience, a body which applauded rather than decided. Leaders could not simply expect that their orders would be obeyed. Hence there was no rule (Herrschaft) in Max Weber’s sense, and we cannot speak of a state here. Cf. Gehrke, Hans-Joachim; “States,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 396.
word from which *basileus* derived, had been a minor office in the periphery of redistribution. The *wanax* disappeared due to social decentralization at the collapse of Mycenaean civilization, at which moment the *basileus* came to prominence.\textsuperscript{307} Control of the *laos* did not need to dress itself as much in religion because the emolument from piracy was a positive, i.e. non-intimidating inducement to subordination.

It would be very helpful for interpretation of archaic cohesion to understand what kind of land tenure pertained to the community of the *basileus*. A plausible conjecture might be that the ordinary native held land in return for obeisance to the *basileus*.\textsuperscript{308} This seems dubious because the prestige of the *basileus* was not based on wealth, as the Pharaoh's ownership of all land cultivated by the peasants is a false analogy. Banishment, prior to the institution of ostracism, involved confiscation of the individual's land, but banishment was always an instance in which an enemy usurped government from a rival. The fact that ostracism did not comprise confiscation suggests that individual property was immune to eminent domain. Archaic landownership was regulated by the kinship clan, not the *basileus* (civic). It would be importantly informative to know whether the *basileus*, as chief of the marauding group, or as chief priest, could revoke an individual's occupation of land, or whether the individual ownership right was immune to the will of the *basileus*, though subject to kinship.

As late as the 8\textsuperscript{th} and 7\textsuperscript{th} centuries B.C. the Greeks still did not conduct war for territorial acquisition; border forays were for plunder. It is astounding that the Greeks at the time of polis formation still did not regard land acquisition as the principle means to increase power. Why did the *basileus* omit to use territorial expansion to strengthen his prestige? The acquisitive

\textsuperscript{307} The institutionalized position of paramountcy located in the semblance of a political center was called the *basileus*, a vestige of the Mycenaean Age, when the *qu-si-re-u* was a relatively unimportant intermediary situated somewhere between the outermost political periphery and the *wanax* in the center of an elaborate redistributive system. After the Mycenaean collapse, power was decentralized, and *basileus* became the rubric of power. Cf. Tandy, David W.; *Warriors into Traders*, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 91.

\textsuperscript{308} The particular issue we must face is whether or not, in the Homeric world, land was ever held on condition, in the dual sense that retention of the holding required fulfillment of obligations or services, and that the person from home xxx when held retained a right, if only a formal veto power, to control the disposition. Cf. Finley, M. I.; *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece*, Viking Press, New York, 1982, p.217.
aspect of heroic warfare did however prefigure one later idea of finance, the practice of debt slavery, according to which the debtor who defaulted first lost his land, and subsequently became the creditor’s slave. In heroic warfare of the 8th and 7th centuries, the victor of an opponent regarded him as his property, because he had preserved his life. The victor took all the property, and sold the vanquished into slavery. Primitive Greek warfare was motivated by pecuniary, though not territorial, gain. Because land was inalienable, the smallholder could not disencumber himself by selling his land. Partible inheritance however subdivided the kleros into parts below subsistence. Borrowing became necessary, but since land was inalienable, the creditor took control of the entire produce of the debtor. This was the first stage of debt-bondage.

The notion of social equality may have derived from the converse notion that a person who was not one's property was therefore equal to oneself; later investigation into slavery will support this interpretation. One might inquire whether the notion of equal landownership derived from social equality, or whether social equality derived from the notion of equal

309 For the customs which grew up in this ancient warfare, no doubt out of the brigandage which preceded it, secured to the victor the whole property of the vanquished; and we shall have occasion to see later how Greek financial arrangements often depended on the application of these customs. The harder the struggle for existence became for a City State, the more closely did its wars approximate to freebooting expeditions. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; The Greek Commonwealth; The Modern Library, New York, p. 252

310 Before moving on, it is appropriate to mention the analysis of Edouard Will and Marcel Detienne, who argue from the premise that land was not alienable, that is, transferable through sale, and therefore the accumulation of debts led to the loss of control of production. The agrarian crisis, as Detienne called it, originates “in the practice of successive divisions, a practice that was the result of the breakdown of the primitive family.” Sons of a small holder have a choice whether to divide their inherited property or not, but because of the inferiority of the holding (because of population pressure), divided or not, they are on occasion forced to borrow from a neighbor, usually a wealthy one. This is why, according to Will and Detienne, Hesiod advises: “Take good measure from a neighbor and pay it back well, in the same measure, or better if you can.” A series of bad harvests leads to the debtor being “sucked down little by little into even greater misery. From loan to loan, he will finally be forced to ‘sell’ his plot of land.” But, says Will, land is not alienable, and so all the wealthy aristos can accomplish is eventually to gain complete control over the small holder’s production. Although title is not ceded to the aristos, in effect the land no longer belongs to the indebted small holder. Over time, the production on more and more holdings comes under the control of the wealthy families. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 134.
landownership. Since the redistributive system of early agriculture entailed that every farmer give up his yield to the center of the community, and then receive it back in redistribution, it is an ambiguous question. The equality of the Greek citizens originated from the consensual unification of clans into one body. Unlike the circumstances of irrigation, however, this mode of aggregation could not generate large depersonalized units, because aggregation was limited by the mountain borders. Infeudation would have entailed great landholding and would have had to be secular rather than religious, because aggregate land transfers could have been negotiable only if they were secular. Particularly in Greece, great landholding could not have been religiously founded because kinship ordained moral affinity for all clan members; upon settlement this equated with universal land holding.\(^{311}\) There is no evidence that, in the fashion of oriental kings, land at the time of migration was awarded to individuals in order to stabilize alliance and social position. Land grants, either in the ancient orient or in medieval Europe, functioned to bind the grantee, but Greek basileis do not seem to have used this form of obligation. Greece was characterized by smallholding; acquisition of a retinue by land grants would have entailed corruption of smallholding and growth of dependent labor, such as in the exceptional case of the Spartans. Conflict between land grants and smallholding might have originated the Greek revulsion at dependent labor.

Apparently the sovereignty of the basileus did not develop from a power to grant or revoke property; unlike the peasants of the oriental theocracies, the peasant’s ownership was immune to the power of the basileus.\(^{312}\) In archaic Greece all arable land was privately owned; there existed no publicly owned land. Both in the ancient Orient and in medieval Europe, land grants functioned to oblige the grantee; the basileus could not oblige by means of land-grants. Private ownership was an extremely strong element of Greek history precisely because it preempted this form of obligation. Private ownership strongly suppressed

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311 One man could even be king over a number of poleis, like Eumaeus’ father. The mere fact of such power, however, does not of itself warrant the belief that feudal relations were present. Cf. Finley, M. I.; Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, Viking Press, New York, 1982, p.218.
emergence of a concept of socialism, despite the very conspicuous development of class society.\textsuperscript{313} Usually archaic land possession was asserted by conquest, but the Greek religious right to landed property seems to have inhibited military acquisition. A decedent was buried, not cremated, and the deceased had an eternal right to the location where he was buried.\textsuperscript{314} The surviving family lived at the location of the grave, and the family's religious duty to tend the deceased was the basis of the family's possessive right to the surrounding arable land. This was the original ground according to which individual members of the clan, for instance the paterfamilias, never had an absolute right to land. Private property was immune to civic control, but private property still remained conditional upon ultimate ownership by the clan. Land was distributed in allotments to families, never individuals, because the fundamental unit of society was the family. The paterfamilias could not alienate the given property, as it belonged to the clan for the use of his family. There was no civic record of births in the polis; in conformity with the oikos mentality, children remained purely the concern of the family (religious) not of the basileus (civic), until children were capable of military training. "Capable of military training," although anticipated in archaic society, suggests that civic power over the child did not start until the formation of the polis. Marriage, being a private, not a public ritual, lacked a civil register; the polis had no civic record of marriage or birth. If there was no monarchical control over marriage and children, the basileus could not have exercised

\textsuperscript{313} If we adhere to Homer and Hesiod, we find that all ownership is private, so far as arable land is concerned. The estates of Alcinoos, Odysseus, of Perses, are private properties; nowhere is there any mention of cultivated land owned collectively. Cf. Toutain, Jules; The Economic Life of the Ancient World, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.14.

\textsuperscript{314} The importance of the family is most vividly shown in the manner in which the Greeks possessed the lands which they conquered. The soil did not become the private property of individual freemen, nor yet the public property of the whole community. The king of the tribe or tribes marked out the whole territory into parcels, according to the number of families in the community; and the families cast lots for the estates. Each family then possessed its own estate; the head of the family administered it, but had no power of alienating it. The land belonged to the whole kin, but not to any particular member. The right of property in land seems to have been based, not on the right of conquest, but on a religious sentiment. Each family buried their dead within their own domain; and it was held that the dead possessed for ever and ever the soil where they lay, and that the land round about a sepulcher belonged rightfully to their living kinsfolk one of whose highest duties was to protect and tend the tombs of their fathers. Cf. Bury, J.B., A History of Greece, London, 1906, p. 70.
arbitrary power to control inheritance. Children were publicly registered only upon induction for military training.\textsuperscript{315}

The anax, after the collapse of Mycenaean society, did not finance himself through taxation. Revenue transpired through the primitive device of gift-giving, which was originally a religious rite. Usually a king prospers only when there is a priest to legitimize him. The taxes of the basileis, in the archaic era of Greece, consisted of the \textit{themistes}, a regular tax payment connected with the harvest, and the \textit{dotinai}. The harvest tax was collectible because of its regularity and the ease with which the total amount could be assessed. The \textit{dotinai} etymologically derives from the word for gift; this taxation was irregular, and had religious origin. Neither the themistes nor the dotinai was individually adjusted to income levels; a domain was bound to pay a traditionally fixed amount. If there had been a bureaucracy such as a priesthood, taxation would have been calibrated, but because taxation remained unrefined, it failed to become the principal revenue. This manner of taxation, ignoring individual capacity to pay and lacking accurate quantification, was a collective quality of the enduring kinship system.

Without priesthood, the precursor of bureaucracy, tax revenue was chronically inadequate for monarchy.\textsuperscript{316} The basileus embodied the economic mode of redistribution, while an

\textsuperscript{315} The Greek city kept no register of births: it took no account of the young until they were old enough to be trained as soldiers. Marriage was always in Greece, as in Mohammedan lands, a purely domestic ceremony. The State only cared for them when they had earned a public funeral, and even then, as we see from Thucydides, it was careful to allow full scope for the ancestral family ritual. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; \textit{The Greek Commonwealth}; The Modern Library, New York, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{316} The King’s subjects had to pay two kinds of direct tax, themistes, a customary regular payment with which the so-called “King’s harvest” in Israel at harvest time is to be connected also; and dotinai which again were not only found in Greece alone, but correspond to Latin and Hebrew terms “gifts”. The latter tax consisted in fact of occasional payments to the Kings, which are mentioned in the Bible. Both taxes were much more primitive than the direct taxes of the Ancient Orient. For they had not been adjusted to the changing individual income, but were paid by whole areas and clans in traditional amounts. Solomon was the first King in Israel to go over to the Ancient Oriental system of tithe, centrally planned royal granaries, storage houses, and villeinage, the change bringing no benefit to people or state in the long run. The market tax was one of the indirect taxes in Homeric Greece, levied in Israel from before the time of King Solomon also. That is to say, foreign merchants bought here the King’s permission to trade within the state by offering him valuable gifts of a traditionally fixed amount. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; \textit{An Ancient Economic History}, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.276.
adequate taxation system presupposes a market economy. The people regularly gifted surplus to the basileus, who served as the center of society, but he was then obligated to redistribute it. This was the most efficient distribution of wealth in a primitive society the egalitarianism of which was due to severe scarcity; society sustained itself as a cohesive whole by centripetal flow of surplus to the basileus and centrifugal flow of the same surplus from the king out to the people. When growth allowed the emergence of surplus, aristocracy collected it for redistribution. However, population growth excited internal stress because the offices for distribution of goods grew half as quickly as those qualified for office. As population grew, the surplus accumulating in the center grew geometrically.\textsuperscript{317}

The egalitarianism of the primitive community is reflected in the contingency of the basileus. He was supposedly a progeny of the gods, but the basileus all the same had to prove his excellence by providing wealth, for instance through piracy, and by demonstrating generosity, by sharing his accumulation freely with the laos (people).\textsuperscript{318} Gift-giving, even when it is to a God or the son of a God, tends towards parsimony. Since irrigation could not be cut off from a recalcitrant region, the ultimate means of persuasion was military violence. The basileus held his authority by his utility to the demos; although duly sanctioned by religious ceremony, it was primarily piracy and brigandage rather than religious authority that sustained him; the people coagulated around the basileus if his acquisitive assaults succeeded. This may

\textsuperscript{317} Knowing about the later stage in this evolution, we may assume that the leaders of the communities soon had the responsibility and power to collect, safeguard, and redistribute subsistence goods on behalf of their communities. As the communities grew, ranking became more strict and qualified persons began to outnumber even more than before the leadership positions available. As ranking became more strict, the increased density began to swell the communities’ reserves. Cf. Tandy, David W.; \textit{Warriors into Traders}, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{318} Others, focusing on the poverty of the remains of the so-called “Dark Age,” believe that society of at least the early Dark Age was essentially egalitarian and meritocratic. Relying on comparative anthropology, they offer a model of social organization in which “big men” or “chiefs,” who have to demonstrate regularly their abilities in battle and in effecting relative economic security and social harmony for their fellows, arrogate to themselves some of the meager social surplus but function primarily as a means of redistribution of social wealth in bad years or in good times through generous public feasts, presumably with a religious component. Cf. Rose, Peter W.; “Class,” in \textit{A Companion to Archaic Greece}, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 471.
perhaps explain the tendency of the Greek heroes and gods in the *Iliad* to boast about their abilities.

It would have been inconvenient for the anax to direct his retinue to slaughter subjects as retaliation for not having paid taxes. This differed from the oriental polities, in which centralization made it possible to inflict royal violence on his subjects anonymously and impersonally (irrigation) without thereby setting the soldiers against their own people. The dilemma in setting soldiers against their own kin derived from the traditional precept, that a kinsman should never mistreat or enslave another kinsman. The only solution was to vent raw violence against people outside his community. This intimation of Machiavelli would be cardinal centuries later in the Peloponnesian War. Piracy was the king’s most reliable source of revenue; his subjects plundered, and the king disposed over their plunder.\(^{319}\) The anax attained his prestige by organizing successful piracy, and, by virtue of venting popular violence outwards, the anax could acquire revenue without internal taxation of his subjects.

The anax achieved cooperation by benefitting the people, not, as in oriental society, by intimidating them; he had claim to the plunder, but kept his prestige by distributing it to his retinue. This was perhaps another small step towards the Greek idea of democracy. Because a basileus persisted only if he retained his popularity, he was prone to abandon piracy for commerce in the case that commerce would be more remunerative to his demos.\(^{320}\) The basileus was primarily interested in the prestige of piracy because of the satisfaction it gave to

\(^{319}\) To support his establishment the King does not levy taxes; he receives, now and then, “gifts” from his subjects. But he would be a poor king if he depended upon such presents. His chief income is derived, presumably, from tolls on the plunder that his soldiers and his ships gather on land or sea. Perhaps that is why, only in the 13th century B.C. xxx, the Achaeans are found in Egypt and Crete; in Egypt as unsuccessful buccaneers, in Crete as passing conquerors. Then, suddenly, we hear of them inflaming their people with a tale of humiliating rape, collecting all the forces of all the tribes, equipping 100,000 men, and sailing in a vast and unparalleled armada of a thousand ships to try their fortunes against the spearhead of Asia on the plains and hill of Troy. Cf. Durant, Will; *The Life of Greece*, MJF Books, New York, 1966, p. 54.

\(^{320}\) And the economic well-being of the community was certainly amongst the rulers’ concerns. For Homer and Hesiod, agricultural prosperity depended on how the “lords” exercised their power: if they ruled justly, land and animals would flourish; if they ruled unjustly, barrenness, plague and famine would ensue. Cf. Van Wees, Hans; “The Economy,” in *A Companion to Archaic Greece*, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 461.
the demos, rather than because of the prestige from personal wealth that would distinguish him from the commoner. If commerce had been able to accomplish greater well-being than piracy, the basileus would have preferred commerce.

The Greek polis originated from military organization. Whereas irrigation entailed systematic union with neighboring poleis, piracy exacerbated hostility. The earliest wars were raids or piracies, informally organized by basileis. Such fighting served to reinforce the prestige of the basileus and to gratify the followers with spoils, but it also aggravated the hostile distinction between member and non-member, whereas consolidation from irrigation did not depend on a hostile distinction. A subsequent type of conflict was formally organized, and fought by chosen soldiers, to dispute possession of a border area by one community or another; this was a consequence of identity formed on the distinction of member and non-member. Finally, there were total wars, on which the survival of the community was at stake, in which every member in the community would join in defense.³²¹ The best examples of total war are episodes in the Peloponnesian War, not in the archaic period.

Predation unified civic organization. Even the laws of Solon condoned piracy as an honorable occupation; it was practiced before commercial exchange.³²² The earliest record

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³²¹ There were at least three different types of war or collective violence. First, booty-raids were usually undertaken not by a community as a whole but by one or a few of its leading men with their personal followers. Secondly, public wars with limited goals, often border conflicts, were waged on behalf of the community but nevertheless involved only a portion of the community’s warriors. Finally, wars in which the very existence of the community was at stake naturally involved all those who could be of any help with whatever weapons they had. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 586.

³²² Private raiding for booty was regarded as a legitimate practice, explicitly recognized as such in for example the laws of Solon. The Greeks make their first appearance in Assyrian records in the late eighth century as sea-raiders, and two centuries later relentless raiding provoked major military action by Etruscans and Carthaginians against the Phocaeans on Corsica in 535 and by Sparta against the Samians in 525 B.B. Private plundering expeditions brought wealth and fame to the rich men who provided the ships and much-needed supplementary income for the poor men who formed the crews. The main forms of booty were livestock and slaves, and since raiders regularly sold off their plunder, rather than bringing it home, slave trade was an important economic activity in archaic Greece. Cf. Van Wees, Hans; “The Economy,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 458.
in the 8th century BC of Greeks by oriental societies concerned their piracy. Basileis maintained their prestige by organizing piracy; the laos supplemented their livelihood by constituting the crew of the piracy. Plunder was of people, who were sold off as slaves, or livestock, also sold off; it was sold off before returning home. It is interesting 1) that pirates apparently preferred money to barter goods, 2) did not need to bring plunder home in order to exhibit their valor, and 3) had sufficiently amicable relations with other Greek poleis, presumably, to vend their plunder. There is no prominent record of Greek slave-trade in oriental societies, although for the exception of ransom it would have been importunate to ransom or sell Greek captives to Greek poleis.

Territorial warfare did not arise from agricultural inadequacy. Sparta had conquered Messenia, but such an exploit was never successfully repeated. Land scarcity and alimentary insufficiency did not make border war evolve into formation of a nation-state. What explains forbearance from large-scale land seizure by war? The Greeks colonized islands, but, in the colonial locations, again refrained from inland territorial expansion. The earliest military invasions were limited to interests of revenue, perhaps because the division by mountains obstructed land occupation or enforcement of tribute arrangements. The mentality for extensive social organization was lacking. Confinement of poleis to rather equal sizes due to mountains made it uneconomical to attempt conquest of a neighboring polis, and provided so much natural security that enlargement of the polis could not be motivated by defense. Greek diplomacy also refrained from organization into units larger than a polis. Natural confinement impeded the Greeks from conceiving themselves as Greeks; their primary identity was membership in a self-contained polis. It was not a Greek polis that finally succeeded in amalgamating the Greeks, but an adulterated Greek culture that had never developed from the

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323 Herodotus 1.70, 166; 3.47.
324 Here we see clearly both the objects and the methods of this old Greek warfare. Its object was to secure “revenue and dominion,” in other words, land and supplies. Its methods by sea were to reach and to occupy all livable islands, driving out or imposing tribute on the existing population; by land, across the range, where annexation was impossible and tribute could not be exported, to make raids over the border and carry off what could be found. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; The Greek Commonwealth; The Modern Library, New York, p.251
polis mentality: the Macedonians. 325

**POLIS**

In the Homeric age, terms such as *demos*, *gaia*, and *patris*, contemporary with the word *polis*, signify territoriality; the Greek temples, however, were built centuries prior to the first polis, and were not used to assert territoriality. The religious shrines were indiscriminate. Greek religion seems to have given a common identity to all Greeks in that they did not practice ethnic discrimination. It is astonishing that religion did not exhibit the same exclusivity found in the other elements of Greek culture. 326 The polis had its origins in the second half of the 8th century BC; the social life in the Iliad which is presumably about a time three centuries earlier in fact reflects society of the later 8th century. 327 Inhabitants from the

325 They were the means by which the islands were reached and reduced, especially by states that had not sufficient land of their own. Wars by land there were none, none at least by which dominion was acquired. They were all simply border contests between neighbors, but of distant expeditions with conquest for objects we hear nothing among the Hellenes. What fighting there was consisted merely of local warfare between rivals.” [Thucydides i. 15] Cf. Zimmerm, Alfred Eckard; The Greek Commonwealth; The Modern Library, New York, p.251.

326 I have argued elsewhere that the sanctuary of Hera, 8km to the northeast of Argos, was almost certainly a common sanctuary on the Korinthian isthmus. Cult activity is attested from around the middle of the eleventh century, almost three centuries before any urban settlement springs up at Korinth (though the emergence of Korinth does appear to coincide with an increase of activity at Isthmia). The sanctuary of Hera Akraia at Perachora displays all the characteristics of an “international” sanctuary rather than a shrine belonging to the Korinthian polis, and the same is true of the Samian Heraion. In short, although the continued references in the Homeric epics to terms such as *demos*, *gaia* (‘land’), and *patris* indicate that notions of territoriality were roughly contemporary with the emergence of urban centers, it is not yet entirely clear what role- if any- sanctuaries played in establishing either territorial boundaries or a sense of political community. Cf. Hall, Jonathan F.; “Polis, Community, and Ethnic Identity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, Ed. Shapiro, H.A., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 44.

327 The strong sense of community which the epic conveys in its images of local ruler, elders and people indicates the presence already in Homer of the type of political life which we associate with the polis, and the archaeological record confirms that the city-state was beginning to emerge in the second half of the eighth century. The number of poleis known to us from the archaic and classical ages runs into the hundreds and most have been very small indeed. All these countless petty states actively engaged in war and diplomacy. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raafflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 585.
original tribes tended to cluster into concentrated settlements which were likely to turn into miniature, village-sized poleis. Unlike the shrines, however, the polis exhorted division and separation. The people of Athens had been a migratory tribe that took stationary settlement: an ethne turned into a polity. Most polities on the contrary evolve from prior polities. Although the previous Mycenaean civilization had fortifications, the laos in the post-Mycenaean period clustered in settlements near the basileus. The society of the basileus was decentralized, and there were very many basileis. The ethne, the rural tribal settlement before emergence of the polis, were diffuse, covered much greater territory, and had low social cohesion; a much smaller area would concentrate into an urban center with a very defined hinterland small enough to be explicitly controlled by the center.  

The aristocracy of the early polis was an unpremeditated organization of power over the demos achieved by centralization. Accumulation of private wealth from external commerce in the 8th and 7th centuries was unencumbered with obligations of redistribution. In acquiring profit outside of jurisdiction the aristocracy prefigured financial criminality of subsequent history. Centralization in aristocracy depended on land ownership, by which non-elite citizens would become dependent on aristocrats; this culminated in the episode of debt-bondage. Urbanization might have attenuated the value of children and of inheritance, by presenting opportunities for employment independent of family inheritance. The mortality rate of the polis was however considerably higher than that of the country; the polis could not

328 Whereas poleis were typically focused on a single urban center with a relatively small hinterland— the territory of Argos, for example, is unlikely to have exceeded 100 sq km prior to the middle of the fifth century – consolidated ethne normally occupied vastly greater expanses of land in which several settlements might coexist. Some of these settlements were fairly large (e.g. Pheraï in Thessaly; Aigai and Aigeira in Achaia; Thessalonike-Therme and Kastanas in Macedonia) and most would urban eventually emerge as poleis. Cf. Hall, Jonathan F.; “Polis, Community, and Ethnic Identity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, Ed. Shapiro, H.A., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 51.

329 Why are the firedogs ship-shaped? I believe that it is reasonable to conclude that the shape is testimony to the movements of goods by nautical means, testimony even to how the firedogs reached their destinations. Thus the firedogs are a reflection of not only how status is asserted but also how it is garnered and maintained – through the acquisition of unencumbered wealth, wealth that stands independent of the community. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 164.
have persisted without constant immigration. Since the polis thus became a vent for rural population pressure, it may have fostered the persistence of the oikos-economy of kinship.

Taxation was first introduced for the needs of war. Germination of basileus government had developed from organization of piracy; therefore the earliest poleis had originated as fortress settlements on the sea coast. The positions of the war-lords blended into public office. The primitive Attica of the naukraroi was composed of four original kinship tribes. The origin of the archaic word for governors, from a nautical term, naukraroi, reveals the tight connection between piracy and the origin of the polis. The four kinship tribes constituted the original organization of the army regiments. The earliest form of the Athenian polity was governed by naukrarai; there were 12 naukrarai from each of the four tribes. This suggests, first, that the earliest Athenian government was an uninterrupted extension of government by

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330 Stratification involves the permanent, institutionalized power of some over the material life chances of others. Its power may be physical force or the ability to deprive others of the necessities of life. In the literatures on origins it is usually a synonym for private property differentials and for economic classes, and so treated as a decentralized form of power, separate from the centralized state. Cf. Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social Power, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.38.


332 The Greco-Roman world conforms best to the ideal type of a relatively undifferentiated economy of family farms and rural crafts in which economic activity is largely a family affair, labor is applied to capital in the family’s control, and inheritance is the principal means of access to the means of production, so that the level of nuptiality is a function of mortality in the previous generation, and the young tend to fill existing niches. It is only when a significant proportion of the population sells their labor that intergenerational links weaken and both inheritance and children lose value, and growing markets in goods and labor begin to serve as a preventive check on fertility. No comparable changes in intergenerational wealth flows are visible in antiquity. Although urbanization may have been conducive to such changes, lower urban fertility would merely have reinforced the cities’ demographic function as “population sinks” that helped regulate rural population growth. Without a concurrent mortality decline, migration to the cities and the resultant increase in the specialization of labor might even have raised rather than depressed the fertility of rural households. Cf. Salares, Robert, Ecology, Ch.2, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 72.

333 Economically this domination was sustained here by the participation of the rulers-in their public capacities-in overseas trade. Hence the creation of dominant fortress states started on the coasts and then moved inland. Cf. Weber, Max; The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, Verso, London, 1988, p. 155.

334 Herodotus, V. 66.2.
kinship, and second, that government originated from military adventure. Taxes were based upon the expenses for building a ship; hence the literal meaning of the term *naukrarous*, conventionally meaning tax-collector, was ship-captain.\(^\text{337}\)

Prior to 700 Greek settlement was based on *ethnos*, i.e. determined from kinship structure. The polis, beginning to form after 700, already constituted a deviation from government embodied in kinship. From 508 BC citizenship in a polis was determined exclusively from membership in a phratry. Such membership was exclusively a determination of consanguinity; kinship determined the citizenship of a polis. Thus, the Apaturia, a religious ritual introducing a child to the phratry, simultaneously determined his status as a citizen; religion seemed to be in control of polis government.\(^\text{338}\) The religious ceremonies such as introduction to adulthood served to delineate class boundaries between demos and aristocracy.\(^\text{339}\)

The polis integrated what had been randomly dispersed villages. Concentration in the polis was not economically motivated, but from need for centralized communication. Activity

\(^{335}\) The whole population was organized in four tribes (phylai); Geleontes, Aigikoreis, Argades, Hopletes, supposedly names after sons of Ion. Replaced by the ten local tribes of Cleisthenes in 507, these older kinship tribes are shadows to us, though we may guess that, like the three Dorian tribes of Sparta, they had formed the basis for the regiments of the army. Cf. Andrews, A.; *The Growth of the Athenian State*, in *The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C.*, edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.366.

\(^{336}\) *Athenaion Polliteia*, 8.3.

\(^{337}\) Of the administration of the early state we know hardly anything but the name of the units called naukrarai. There were said to be forty-eight of them, twelve to a tribe, and for their general court for the income and expenditure of the state reference was made to laws of Solon obsolete in the Classical period. The root-word naukrarous probably means ‘ship-captain’, and this may at first have been the literal function of the officer with that title. The naucraries, which in Solon’s time controlled the finances generally, may well have begun, as ancient and modern conjectures have it, as a system for financing a fleet. Cf. Andrews, A.; *The Growth of the Athenian State*, in *The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C.*, edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.365.

\(^{338}\) Since 508 there was no other criterion for membership of the polis save membership of a phratry, the rituals of the Apaturia were simultaneously family *rites de passage* and decisions of public importance. Cf. Davies, J. K.; ‘*Religion and the State,*’ in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, second edition, volume IV: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C., EDS. Boatman, John, Hammond, N.G.I., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 380.
and communication could remain fragmented for as long as each estate was under the control of an aristocrat, but wider communication required condensation of plural estates in a polis. As population aggregated around the basileus, walls were erected around the settlement, and monarchic rule of the basileus changed into small polities governed by "aristoi". The terminology, from monarchy to pluralistic aristocracy, suggests decentralization, but the transformation from monarchy to aristocracy was greater centralization. The original distinction of aristoi (or agathoi) from kakoi was a measure of the size of landholdings; this suggests that social inequality was a derivative of land inequality. Government of communities situated in development between oikos and polis naturally concentrated in the aristocrats, i.e. the largest landholders, still organized in kinship, but government changed from a monarchic to a pluralistic structure after emergence of the polis. It is peculiar that serfdom or debt-bondage was not the force that effected transfer of government to the aristoi; something further is necessary to explain how royal power over the laos could move to the aristoi.

339 At crucial moments of life, transition from one status to another was mediated by religious observance, initiation rites. By such observances individuals are assimilated to society and status-boundaries articulated. Cf. Ogden, Daniel; A Companion to Greek Religion, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007, Cf. Hedrick, Jr., Charles W.; “Religion and Society in Classical Greece,” p. 290.

340 The major Greek communities shifted from the loose structure of the ethnos to the far more tightly integrated polis system before 700, but a polis was not in itself a city, even if the concentration of all significant activity at one point was an important encouragement to urbanization. Athens, for example, did not change from a group of villages into an urban agglomeration with its focus in the agora until the last part of the seventh century; embellishment of its public and religious centres came only under the Pisistratids. Cf. Starr, C.G.; Economic and Social Conditions in the Greek World, in The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C., edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.429.

341 At some time between the destruction of the Mycenaean world of centralized fortifications surrounded by peasant settlements and the appearance of substantial stone temples, communal stone altars, and walls encompassing a whole community, a majority of Greek communities organized themselves into something generally called poleis. Associated with this process was the widespread replacement of monarchic forms of political organization by the collective control of political life by the largest landowners who styled themselves as the aristoi or by the plural use of the word basileus, which seems to have been the most common designation for big men, chiefs, or monarchic rulers in the post-mycenaean period. Instead of one-man rule, authority was dispersed among a number of annually rotated offices. Cf. Rose, Peter W.; “Class,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 472.
Under aristocratic control the polis legislated factors that aggravated the dependency of the demos. Smallholders retained their status, for the meantime, as citizens, but they paid their agricultural surplus to the eupatrid or the polis. The stigma placed on dependent labor and commerce severely inhibited economic development, because those who were most interested did not labor, and those who labored were uninterested; citizens occupied themselves with political activity, while slaves and metics performed non-remunerative production. A consequence of this distortion was the "consumer city"; the citizens inhabited cities, but the financial support of the city was purely from the rents and taxes of the country. Since it was dishonorable to manufacture or trade, capital was invested mainly in land, and the city did not support itself by urban manufacture sold in the hinterland. All surplus was extracted as rent from the country; all investment originated solely from the city. The dearth of urban manufacture impeded foreign trade as a source of wealth, so that commerce, as a benefit from neighboring poleis, did not dissuade recourse to war. Tribute, extracted from foreign countries in the manner of rent extraction, became the basic relation between poleis, and hence promoted war. The polis was, in Weber's words, a center of consumption rather than production; the urban population was composed of rural rentiers.

Max Weber introduced the distinction between consumer and producer cities. The medieval "producer cities" conducted manufacture, from their earliest phase exchanging urban manufacture for agricultural produce from the hinterland. Greeks had not promoted manufacture. Greeks located manufacture in the oikos, similar to manorial manufacture,

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342 Varied procedures, both public and private, could be used to reduce weaker farmers to a dependent position so that they had to yield their tiny surpluses, and the results in the many states of Greece were equally varied. In Thessaly, Sparta, and Crete, the rural population as a whole was legally bound to the soil. In remote mountain districts farmers remained independent; but the rural elements in more open and accessible districts seem commonly to have become peasants in the anthropological sense, yielding food to greater landowners, to the market, or to the religious and secular machinery of the polis. Even so, the dynamic character of progress prevented the small farmers in the more advanced areas from being formally depressed into helotry. If many Athenians in 500 could economically be termed peasants, they still were citizens of the polis and could exhibit the attitudes of the chorus in Aristophanes’ Acharnians. Cf. Starr, C.G.; Economic and Social Conditions in the Greek World, in The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C., edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.425.
rather than to purchase manufacture from urban artisans. This is queer, because the material
conditions for urban manufacture obtained, and it would have been economical if such a
symbiosis had taken place; what inhibited such a development? The agora had been off limits
to slaves and metics; urban denizens were constituted of wealthy landholders, retainers,
and commercial groups. Only the wealthy were citizens; the polis, i.e. the "consumer city"
financially depended upon rents taken from the countryside; the polis did not make significant
economic returns to the country. The dependence on agricultural rents guaranteed that the
urban part of the polis would remain small; apart from food importation, the size of the
urban polis was directly relative to the carrying capacity of the hinterland.345 In the classical
Greek period the aristocracy depended on this circumstance for its ascendancy; the georgoi
(smallholders) living in the periphery could not afford the cost of travel in and out of the polis
to attend assemblies. Possibly prestige was entwined in being an urban resident, and since
manufacture and commerce were dishonorable for a mesos (middle-class citizen), there was
no possibility for the urban demos to counteract the aristocratic preferences.346 The "consumer
city" of course crippled economic development, but it advantaged the traditional aristocratic
structure in the newly emergent conditions of the polis.

For as long as the economic flow was exclusively from the hinterland into the city,

343 As Finley saw it, concern for citizen status acted as a brake on the development of markets in land,
labor, and capital, and therefore on technology and trade. This severely limited the ability of the rich to
buy the labor of their poorer fellow citizens, forcing them to alienate labor outside the citizen community,
above all on to chattel slaves. The bonds of egalitarian male citizenship made even profitable practices
like lending, trade, and financial services seem morally dubious. According to the literary texts they
wrote, classical Athenian citizens relegated these activities to the margins of legitimate society, where
foreigners, women, freedmen, and slaves dominated them, and in Republican Rome senators generally
left them to the equestrians. Living off rents was idealized as morally superior to market activity: Greek
and Roman cities were consumer cities, exploiting the countryside through tax, tribute, and rent rather
than by selling urban goods to rural consumers. War and imperialism rather than trade policies dominated
344 The ancient cities were all much more centers of consumption than production, whereas the
opposite is true of medieval cities. Cf. Weber, Max; The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations,
345 Finley, M. I.; Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, eds. B. D. Shaw and R. P. Saller, London,
reprinted Hammondsworth 1983, pp. 3-23.
archaic aristocracy could dominate. Similarly to the decay of feudalism in the European Middle Ages, the first impulse towards commercial activity stemmed from the avidity of the nobility for imported oriental luxury items. This first commercial activity was not capitalistic; it was not trade in necessities, nor was it oriented to profit. Aristocratic control of early polis government ratified legislation that opened possibility for exploitation of the demos.\footnote{347} The first repositories of "capital" were the temples; since the stored wealth was not used for investment, it was not yet capital. Wealth accumulated from pious donation, from land rent, and from sale of animals bred for or by the temple for sacrifice.\footnote{348} Midway in its career the temple began to lend money at interest, but such lending was confined to war expenditure, that is, was confined to the aristocracy. Restriction to belligerent purposes justified temple lending because war, as protection of the polis and patron deity, was a holy purpose. Otherwise the temple treasury did not function as a bank. The dedication of the temple to the gods precluded further disposition of its wealth to constructive purposes.\footnote{349}

Aristocracy could keep demotic compliance by giving laws the appearance of impartiality

\footnote{346} Much debate has revolved around the distinction between Sombart’s and Weber’s concepts of the “consumer city” (in which a rentier class of landowners or officials towards wealth generated in the countryside in the form of produce from their own holdings, rents, and taxes, and by spending this income on retainers and artisans in the city creates an urban market for food and labor) and the “producer city” (supported by the production of goods that are exchanged for food and raw materials), and the application of these ideal types to the study of ancient economies. For Finley, Greek and Roman cities typically—though not exclusively—belonged in the former category because they relied much more on non-reciprocal rents than on trading or manufacturing for external markets, whereas critics are at pains to demonstrate the supposed significance—yet de facto often just the mere existence—of urban commercial activities. Cf. Salares, Robert; 


\footnote{347} The most conscious force toward changing the position of the smaller farmers was the incessant pressure of the upper classes, as they grew more eager to gain chremata for their own consumption and for the acquisition of foreign products. Already in Hesiod’s bitter epithet ‘bribe-swallowing basileis’ (Op. 38) and his fable of the hawk and nightingale (202-12) the abuse of political power for private economic gain is apparent; the rise of the polis, dominated by the upper classes, made exploitation even easier, as Solon’s comments attest a century later. Cf. Starr, C.G.; \textit{Economic and Social Conditions in the Greek World}, in \textit{The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C.}, edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.424.

and impersonality; it was important that such norms of society not appear self-serving. The side-effect of aristocratic partiality could be made inconspicuous if a highly plausible collective goal were presented.\textsuperscript{350} The original kinship organization divided families and clans according to a common ancestor or god, whom all members of the clan worshiped.\textsuperscript{351} The aristocrats, originally the only archons, could subsume any scheme under piety to the gods and ancestors. Although this reinforced priority of the aristocracy, it was sincere, inasmuch as the aristocratic order did preserve kinship organization. Military emergency was the essential material factor that lent dominance to the aristocracy, for the collective goal in the war justified subordination under the aristocracy. The social order of the earliest kinship-polis was based on the same unit as the military organization: the \textit{phratry}, which, being a blood relation, clearly precluded the non-elites. If the war were presented as a vindication of Athena, for instance, the

\textsuperscript{349} By 428 B.C., too, the main components of at least three monetized subsystems of capital circulation are reflected in our fragmentary evidence. The first and most straightforward concerned temples, sanctuaries, and local cult-groups which might come to possess substantial capital accumulations from the rents of land or urban property, from donations or dedications made by the pious, from fees charged in coin for access, or for the sale or sacrifice of animals reared by the shrine. In various ways, with all due piety and caution, and in orders of magnitude which range from 200 minas to the gigantic sums which Athena lent the Athenian state in the fifth century, it came to be deemed proper to lend such moneys out at interest, beginning the long and complex history of the Temple as quasi-Bank. The largest known loans, those from Athena, were exclusively for military purposes, but the purposes of the smaller loans to states such as those from Apollo on Delos, or two individuals remain unknown. Cf. Davies, John K.; \textit{Classical Greece: Production}, Ch.12. in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; \textit{The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World}, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.358.

\textsuperscript{350} The few at the top can keep the masses at the bottom compliant, provided their control is institutionalized in the laws and the norms of the social group in which both operate. Institutionalization is necessary to achieve routine collective goals; thus distributive power, that is, social stratification, also becomes an institutionalized feature of social life. Cf. Mann, Michael, \textit{The Sources of Social Power}, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.7

\textsuperscript{351} We can see the class organization at Athens better than elsewhere. The families of each clan derived themselves from a common ancestor, and most of the clan names are patronymics. The worship of this ancestor was the chief end of the society. Athenian clans alike worshipped Zeus Herkeios and Apollo Patroos; many of them had a special connexion with other public cults. Each had a regular administration and officers, at the head of whom was an “archon.” To these clans only members of the noble families belonged; but the other classes, the peasants and the craftsmen, formed similar organizations founded on the worship not of a common ancestor, or they could point to none, but some deity whom they chose. The members of these were called orgeones. This innovation heralds the advance of the lower classes to political importance. Cf. Bury, J.B., \textit{A History of Greece}, London, 1906, p. 170.
demos would identify with the project. The fixed territorial boundaries that were the interest of every citizen to protect were therefore preserved for the honor of Athena.\textsuperscript{352}

But emergence of the polis grew against the kinship organization ab ovo. The aristocratic clan-structure that derived from kinship presupposed rural economy. Both the tyrants and the democratic movements brought the urban society and the rural peasants into alliance against aristocratic structure, by gradually dissociating positive law from its kinship antecedents, which had given priority to the clan leaders.\textsuperscript{353} \textit{Georgoi} and artisans adopted the same kinship structure from which they had been excluded, thus improvising some legitimacy for themselves; they united according to profession rather than bloodline, and invented patron deities for their aegis. The invention of a patron god was entirely artificial, but it was an imitation of the aristocratic bloodline. This invention of brotherhood by occupation rather than bloodline was the first emergence of social classes as opposed to kinship.

Invention of professional in addition to kinship phratries was the essential means to a social organization oriented to civil society instead of tribe; the expansion of phratries made it possible to organize every non-elite individual into a phratry.\textsuperscript{354} A child achieved legitimacy either naturally, by bloodline, or artificially, by profession. In imitation of the original kinship,

\textsuperscript{352} The growth of military power reinforced the caging of social life. Thus the evolutionary story tends to center on certain economic power relations and on military power in general. These culminate in the emergence of the state, the fourth source of social power. As I have defined it, as centralized, territorialized, permanent, and coercive, the state was not original. It is not found among gatherer-hunters. The state’s component elements are encouraged by social and territorial fixed investment, economic and military. This would complete the evolutionary story, linking together prehistory and history in one sequence of development. From gathering-hunting to the permanent civilized state a continuous series of stages embody greater social and territorial fixity as the “price” of an increase in human powers over nature. Cf. Mann, Michael, \textit{The Sources of Social Power}, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.49.

\textsuperscript{353} The most important innovations of the tyrants share certain characteristics with those of the great lawgivers. Both represented the city economy and its interests as against the monopoly of political power by the ancient aristocratic clans, and also against the monopoly of economic power by the old and new classes which controlled men and money. Both were allied with the peasants. One expression of this alliance was the principle that “all Attica is one city”. Both aimed to secure guaranteed legal rights and the independence of the law from the traditions and class interests of the matrimonial-sacral courts of the aristocracy, and legal codification was carried out to that end. Cf. Weber, Max; \textit{The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations}, Verso, London, 1988, p. 176.
a child who did not join a phratry remained illegitimate; he was disqualified from patrilineal inheritance, although political rights were reserved to him. This legislation in the phratry was, against appearance, anti-aristocratic; by creating an exclusive criterion based not on birth but profession it consolidated the power of the mesos, the non-landowning citizen. Exclusion due to non-membership in a phratry imitated exclusion by non-membership in a clan, but this undermined the ancient kinship system because it was no longer exclusion on the basis of blood-relationship, but on the basis of civic non-conformity.

An essential difference between the polis and the intermediate congregation from which it originated was written law. In the prior monarchic kinship society, the rules of social life transpired orally through the religious institution; the basileus and priest were not yet distinguished, the priest was still prominent, and rules could change by pronouncement of the priest, who arbitrated over the concepts through which sense perception should be configured. Religion disposed over the formation of law because it was religion that assigned meanings to empirical experience. Social practices that have proved valuable in archaic society are hypostasized in religion as transcendent, absolute values; the process creates social hierarchies that persist only as long as the religious belief does.\textsuperscript{355} Social organization of knowledge enabled social organization \textit{tout simple}; if the priest monopolized what meanings could be attributed to experience, all social powers would originate from the priest. Insofar as society enjoyed greater stability from shared perception and behavior, the priest would be credited with having revealed "the truth".\textsuperscript{356}

Written law supplanted oral tradition at the emergence of the polis, thus displacing

\textsuperscript{354} The organization was then used for the purposes of census. Every child whose parents were citizens must be admitted into a brotherhood; and, if this rite is neglected, he is regarded as illegitimate. It should be observed that illegitimacy at Athens did not deprive a man of political rights, but he could not lay claim by right of birth to his father’s inheritance. Cf. Bury, J.B., \textit{A History of Greece}, London, 1906, p. 171.\textsuperscript{355} In religion convenient social values and practices are hypostasized. Religious beliefs, as manifested in myth and ritual, are then re-presented to society as transcendental, authoritative. By “justifying God’s ways to man” religion reconciles society to its own ways and hierarchies: religion is society’s worship of itself. Because it is thought to represent the absolute, religion has always been closely identified with acculturation, the inculcation of fundamental social values. Cf. Hedrick, Jr., Charles W.; “Religion and Society in Classical Greece,” p.283.
the oral authority of religion. In oriental society religion was coeval with writing, so that the introduction of writing did not disrupt religion; writing had always been incorporated in religion. In Greece writing appeared long after religion, originating from commerce unencumbered with religious obligation, and could therefore constitute an alien influence. The greater complication in the polis necessitated formulation of written law. A primitive agrarian society did not require a high degree of interdependence. In as much as every farmer, for example, did exactly the same things, intense cooperation was never essential. In an urban society, in which the product of no individual was sufficient to support his existence, the interconnection of roles from one individual to the next was an essential element to form a collective product that would satisfy the needs of all. The exigency of cooperation prompted written law in the place of oral transmission.

Kinship law supposed that a near relative should avenge a murder by murdering the murderer, or a victim of theft or debt should annul the harm by seizure of the perpetrator's property, etc. The origin of debt-bondage derived from the kinship law that a person may directly avenge himself of a theft by forcibly taking possession of the thief's property. The increasing social interdependence during the development of the polis destroyed the feasibility

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356 First, we cannot understand (and so act upon) the world merely by direct sense perception. We require concepts and categories of meaning imposed upon sense perceptions. The social organization of ultimate knowledge and meaning is necessary to social life, as Weber argued. Thus collective and distributive power can be wielded by those who monopolize a claim to meaning. Second, Norms, shared understanding of how people should act morally in their relations with each other, are necessary for sustained social cooperation. Durkheim demonstrated that shared normative understandings are required for stable, efficient social cooperation, and that ideological movements like religions are often the bearers of these. An ideological movement that increases the mutual trust and collective morale of a group may enhance their collective powers and be rewarded with more zealous adherence. To monopolize norms is thus a route to power. Cf. Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social Power, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.22.

357 If we wish to distinguish the Greek states historically- that is, from comparable forms of state – we have to define the specifics of this kind of statehood. They lie above all in the type and character of rules that determined social life. Previously, this had been the function of social norms that were handed down orally. In essentially agrarian communities, cooperative values were emphasized above all, and they were enforced by clear sanctions, so-called “shaming punishments. Cf. Gehrke, Hans-Joachim; “States,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raafflub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 395.
of what had once been common sense; too many third parties were directly dependent on a
given individual to permit his destruction without communal process. Written law obliged
the victim to abandon direct vengeance; the community took over from the victim the right of
judgment.

The Draconian law concerning murder conflicted with the duty imposed by kinship
to avenge the murder of a member of one’s clan: the emergent polis detracted from kinship
traditions. Internecine feud did little structural harm to an ethne, but it could dangerously
vitiates a polis. In order to prevent internecine feuds that might arise from murder, the relative
of the victim was forbidden to take direct vengeance, even though at the same time that relative
was under an explicit duty, by the traditions of kinship, to take direct revenge. The perpetrator
was to be judged through a public trial in the agora, by neutral civic authorities rather than
the offended party. The perpetrator was required to go in exile outside of Attica, during the
preparation of the judicial process. During this time of exile the offended family was forbidden
to murder him; a person who took vengeance on the defendant was himself guilty of murder.

The plea of vengeance did not exculpate a retaliatory murder. The requirement of exile seems
to have intended that the vindictive relatives of the victim would have no circumstantial
extenuation for murder. The innovation minimized the incidence of feuds. On the other hand,
the new arrangement respected one component of the kinship right of vengeance. Government
had no obligation to implement the judgement; the plaintiff was now legally empowered to kill

358 It was decisive for the process of state-formation that specific communal institutions were involved
in dealing with such offenses. Those seeking revenge were no longer entitled to strike immediately but
compelled to submit to a fixed procedure. By leaving Attica, a person guilty of unpremeditated murder
created time and opportunity for this procedure which, importantly, took place in public in the Agora. Cf.
Stahl, Michael, and Walter, Uwe; “Athens,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A.,

359 As long as the murderer remained in exile, he was protected by the law; duty of vengeance did not
justify his killing. Clearly, this passage responded to a central problem of the Cylonian affair: the exile
was explicitly prohibited from staying in places that were visited by many people. This may suggest an
attempt to prevent killers from abusing places of asylum where violent revenge caused especially big
problems, and to protect from desecration places and events (such as festivals) that were sacred for the
entire polis and thus especially attractive for those who sought sanctuary. Cf. Stahl, Michael, and Walter,
Uwe; “Athens,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-
the murderer, seize stolen goods, etc., but by his own efforts.\textsuperscript{360} The hybrid formulation saved the polis the expense of enforcing judgment, preserved traditional consistency, and reduced litigation in the case of obvious futility, but probably did not adequately reduce the incidence of feud.

In oriental society, writing originated within the priesthood, and the priesthood conducted commerce; in Greece writing originated from commerce, and the priesthood did not conduct commerce. Writing commenced from merchants, a despised class. Writing was detrimental to priestly authority by stabilizing religious ideas that had, in the oral culture, been liquid. Inscription of religious practice limited the power of the priest to alter social practices opportunistically. Diminution of oracular religion was one reason for the failure of religion to dominate the government; reference to the priest in the aristocratic structure waned in consequence of writing.\textsuperscript{361} Religion was the core of kinship, and it might be interpreted that philosophy secularized religion much as democracy secularized government. If philosophy had not developed, it is plausible that Greece might have bequeathed another theocratic tradition to western civilization.\textsuperscript{362}

Prior to the polis, laws, being tribal customs, had been oral. Aristocrats

\textsuperscript{360} The judge handed down a ruling, but was not responsible for carrying it out. Modern states have specific agencies that deal with such tasks. It is therefore possible to act immediately upon the judge’s decision. In the early Greek poleis, however, after the ruling was made it was once again the turn of the contending parties. Whoever won the case had to carry the ruling out himself. He had no more than a legal claim, but at least he was now entitled to realize it by means of “permitted self-help”. Cf. Gehrke, Hans-Joachim; “States,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 402.

\textsuperscript{361} One form was the growing transference of custom in cult matters to written form. As with the transformation of custom into law in other spheres of public life, the effect, if not the intention, was to fix in permanent form what had previously been susceptible to change. Besides posing the question, in a new and acute form, where change was legitimate at all and if so by whose sanction, this transference limited the power of priests to alter rituals or offerings and thereby subjected cult practice to community-made law much more obviously and explicitly. Cf. Davies, J. K.; “Religion and the State,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, second edition, volume IV: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C., EDS. Boatman, John, Hammond, N.G.I., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 378.

\textsuperscript{362} Europe is deeply indebted to Ionia for having founded philosophy; but that debt is enhanced by the fact that she thereby rescued Greece from the tyranny of a religion interpreted by priests. Cf. Bury, J.B., A History of Greece, London, 1906, p. 319.
and non-elites did the same work and equally lacked large property. As as categories of wealth appeared, aristocracy could reserve more privileges. An oral law under aristocratic government would produce confused applications of the law to favor the aristocracy.\textsuperscript{363} The \textit{laos}, not aristocracy, was first to demand written law in order to assure univocal interpretation of law.

The Greeks were the first race to formulate that the law, dictatorial, preserved freedom.\textsuperscript{364} Oriental society justified law as command from God. By the time of Peisistratos, Orphism had become a prevalent religion; if philosophy had not developed it is plausible that religious oracle might have reestablished aristocratic or tyrannical government.\textsuperscript{365} Religion, based as it

\textsuperscript{363} It is clear that there is no security that equal justice will be meted out to all, so long as the laws by which the judge is supposed to act are not accessible to all. A written code of laws is a condition of just judgment, however just the laws themselves may be. It was therefore natural that one of the first demands the people in Greek cities pressed upon their aristocratic governments, and one of the first concessions those governments were found to make, was a written law. Cf. Bury, J.B., \textit{A History of Greece}, London, 1906, p. 144.

\textsuperscript{364} The response of many communities to these critical developments was to have recourse to legal refutation through laws recorded in writing and sanctioned by religion. These new laws partially confirmed old social norms and partially transformed them. This trend towards “legalization,” however, did not result in comprehensive regulation - especially when compared with the situation in the modern world- and many areas of life in any case continued to be governed by tradition and customary norms. But the areas which caused problems for the community were extensively regulated by means of the new methods and new media. The recording of law was neither systematic nor based on first principles, but everything which was or seemed problematic could be covered by legislation. Since its purpose was primarily to establish secure foundations for peaceful cohabitation - a crucial issue for the community - this order based on law became the specific characteristic. The Greeks had a clear sense that the law ruled and at the same time guaranteed their freedom. Cf. Gehrke, Hans-Joachim; “States,” in \textit{A Companion to Archaic Greece}, Eds. Raaffaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 396.

\textsuperscript{365} With Parmenides and Heraclitus, philosophy in the strict sense, metaphysics as we call it, was fully founded. We have not to pursue the development here; but we have to realize that the establishment of the study of philosophy was one of the most momentous facts in the history of the Greeks. It meant the triumph of reason over mystery; it led to the discrediting of the Orphic movement; it ensured the free political and social progress of Hellas. A danger averted without noise or bloodshed, not at a single crisis but in the course of many years, is a danger which soon ceased to be realized; and it is perhaps hard to imagine that in the days of Pisistratus the religion which was then moving Greece, and especially Attica, bid fair to gain a dominant influence and secure a fatal power for the priests. The Delphic priesthood had, doubtless, an instinct that the propagation of the orphic doctrines might ultimately redound to its own advantage. Although the new religion had arisen when the aristocracies were passing away and had addressed itself to the masses, it is certain that, if it had gained the upper hand, it would have lent itself to the support of aristocracy and tyranny. Cf. Bury, J.B., \textit{A History of Greece}, London, 1906, p. 320.
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was on revelation and authority, always favored aristocracy; philosophy on the contrary was in essence democratic, in that it depended on the cogency of thought rather than on the authority of its speaker. This paradox, law creates freedom, could arise only from a society in which law was conceived to be contingent on communal welfare. Oriental societies could never have conceived law to be the foundation of freedom. The paradox solidified in the transition from oral to written law. Conception of the divine origin of law would not have allowed the public good to be the decisive principle in the formulation of law. Theocratic laws were absolute because they derived from a first principle, orienting themselves to obedience to the Godhead. The oral law of Greece would have accommodated a similar principle. But oriental written law was continuously oriented to God, whereas Greek written law intervened during the shift from aristocratic to popular power. The written law of Greece, unlike the prior oral law, was preoccupied with local cohabitation, rather than with the cosmic adjustment of human existence to God.

The precept of self-sufficiency per se generated social deficits. The oikos could not produce certain indispensable products such as salt. Self-sufficiency inhibited production of commodities because the labor needed to produce the totality of needs of the oikos displaced the time needed for commodity production. Interdependence would have achieved economy by labor division, but the inveterate ideal of self-sufficiency militated against the concept of employment, which division of labor would have entailed. Oikos production was expensive, because it could not delegate labor time to those parties who performed a function more easily.

366 By the time of Solon in the early sixth century, polis could certainly be used to describe a political community: the Athenian statesman argues that it is not the gods but foolish, slavish citizens, guided by unjust leaders, who run the risk of destroying the polis. Cf. Hall, Jonathan F., “Polis, Community, and Ethnic Identity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, Ed. Shapiro, H.A., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 41.

367 Others, lastly, emerged from the limitations of self-sufficiency. Since few oikoi could produce salt or fish on their own, let alone pottery, cut stone, spices, metal weaponry or jewelry, acquisition and exchange of some sort was essential. Cf. Davies, J.K., Greece after the Persian Wars, in The Fifth Century B.C., The Cambridge Ancient History, The Cambridge Ancient History, eds. Lewis, D.M., Boardman, John, Davies, J.K., and Ostwald, M., Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.21.
In this context it is very intriguing that subsoil rights never belonged to the land owner, but to the polis; this law had to have originated from civic society rather than from kinship. Since the law originated during the aristocratic predominance prior to democratic development, it suggests that public subsoil rights were established to the advantage of aristocracy. On the contrary, kinship had authorized the distribution of kleroi to individual families, and retained ultimate ownership of that land; this suggests that public possession of subsoil rights preceded the formation of aristocratic polis government. In the case of public construction, the polis opted not to organize the labor force and material for mining; it was delegated to individual enterprise. Those who undertook the mining lease for private profit were not aristocrats, but metics, who used slave labor. Prevailing thought deprecated expansion of government faculties, preferring delegation of operations to private enterprise. But this is inconsistent; why were public subsoil rights first asserted, and then virtually yielded? It seems that subsoil rights of the polis ought to have served social equality, similarly to the idea of land allotment. However, mining allotment to metics and slave labor would directly profit neither aristocrats nor demos. For instance, the windfall from the Laurion mines ought to have been equally distributed to each of the citizens, according to custom. However, Themistocles' counterexample occurred during the democratization of Athens; during the prior aristocratic phase, public subsoil rights ought to have strengthened the aristocracy. There was no compulsory need to privatize the profits of mining. Despite the prior right of the polis to subterranean goods, mining was contracted out in such a way that the polis, the landowner, the lessee, the smelter, and the slave-owner divided the profits.\(^{368}\) Although the profits of mining entered private rather than public accounts, the inefficient diffusion of money exacerbated class differences.\(^{369}\) The decisive point of this confusion is that although equality had been coined to oppose aristocratic prevalence, the unequal distribution of profits did not enhance aristocracy.

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The heroic fighting of the *promachoi* was a privative consequence of subsistence economy; the *laos* could not afford the requisite weapons. The heroic style of battle solidified the prestige of the *aristoi*, but heroism was a deficient means of combat. The land redistribution of the 7th century BC, together with the introduction of iron, expanded the affordability of weapons. The consequent formation of the *phalanx*, made up smallholders, made militancy far more effective. Military technology changed the social structure, because an individual's prestige depended on his position in the military organization. Aristocracy was fatally weakened by the invention of the hoplite soldiers; the hoplites forthwith proved to be the decisive strength of the army.

Despite transition to land scarcity and population growth, the surplus over which the aristocracy had increased, and counterbalanced the lost prestige of the *promachoi*. Although obligation of redistribution persisted, the freedom of disposability had increased. Power accruing therefrom enabled aristocracy to reserve the best land for themselves, but also incited

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369 The older pattern had been that the community claimed either a tithe of produce (as at Siphnos) or even the right to distribute all produce to its citizens (the presumption of Themistocles' expedients in Attica in 483/2), but that did not prevent profitable rights of working from falling into private hands. By the fourth century, if not earlier, at least in Attica, an elaborate leasing pattern enabled the state, the landowner, the lessee, the owner of smelting premises, and the owner of the (slave) labor force all to benefit from the workings, even if the precise routes by which silver bullion leached into private hands remain obscure. Cf. Davies, John K.; *Classical Greece: Production*, Ch.12. in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.357.

370 In the course of the seventh century, hoplite armor and tactics spread. It has been suggested that from an early stage a broad segment of the population must have been enrolled as hoplites. It is supposed to have been a military necessity for any polis to maximize their hoplite levies, since these were the new decisive force on the battlefield, and this is thought to have become economically possible by a spread of landed property that provided a larger percentage of the population with the means to equip themselves than was possible later. P. Cf. Singor, Henk; "War and International Relations," in *A Companion to Archaic Greece*, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 591.

371 At the same time military technology shaped developments. In the Greek states, as everywhere else, the legal position of an individual depended upon his role in the army. Cf. Weber, Max; *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, Verso, London, 1988, p. 154.
factional dissension over land. The demos, objecting to the use of the most arable land for pasture, used their formation as hoplites to press for greater self-determination.  

As the preeminence of the promachoi waned, the criterion for social rank changed. Whereas previously lineage alone determined rank, the criterion of the hoplite formations was economic; soldiers were categorized according to the annual volume of their agricultural produce. The *zeugitai*, the lowest economic category for soldiers, produced 200 bushels of barley; the soldiers were thus of a wholly wealthy class, as eligibility encompassed only a small part of the total population. There was aristocratic resentment at the preeminence of the phalanx, but each Greek community had to institute hoplite phalanxes in order to prevail against other communities that had already done so. The heroic form of battle vanished; aristocrats lost the basis of their prestige, and the smallholders gained political power due to their crucial importance in battle.

*Thetes* were excluded from the phalanx because they could not afford armaments.

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372 How did the transformation occur? First, population affected social processes. The increase in population density without question had an important effect on the nature of life in Old Greece. In the beginning there was little pressure on the land because population had been so sparse for so many years. But over the course of a couple of generations of growing population, a land shortage was bound to present itself. The population increase had an even greater impact, however. It affected the distribution of wealth. As we saw above, an increase in population predictably exceeds an increase in leadership positions. The result—which we must conclude was the case in eighth-century Greece—is a substantial increase in the amount of goods available per leader. These goods are of course still obligated to whence they came, and the leaders, wealthier than before, are still required to be generous, now to a larger number of people; but the increase in goods is a sign that things have changed, and such situation may make easier the task of perceiving and naming a surplus. *The economy can now have a surplus…* Another inevitable result of population increase is conflict over land use. The nobility were using the rich bottomlands for grazing their herds, which served mostly a display function, at a time when the population had increased sufficiently to force people to seek out more land for growing grains. This tension over land use led to the rise of the hoplites and to the broader availability of individual freedom. Cf. Donlan, Walter, *Economy and Society in the Greek Dark Age*, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1986.

373 In classical Athens, only the three highest property classes served as hoplites, and if the minimum income for even the lowest of these classes (the *zeugitai*, with harvest of at least 200 bushels of barley) is anything to go by, they were very wealthy and represented only a small minority of the population. In any case, these property classes may not originally have had a military dimension at all. Cf. Singor, Henk; “War and International Relations,” in *A Companion to Archaic Greece*, Eds. Raafflauub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 591.
Aristocrats perforce had to ingratiate themselves with the smallholders, but could do so only to the disadvantage of the thetes. The polis invented the idea of civic equality, i.e. citizenship, by economizing against the rights of unpropertied kinsmen (thetes), thus constructing a gratifying contrast between those who had "equality", aristoi and georgoi, against the thetes, unpropertied clansmen. The union of aristocrats and smallholders degraded the thetes and progressively marginalized the basileus. The thetes, i.e. kinsmen without land, became the labor force of the aristocrat. Partible inheritance morsellized agricultural land, eventually dispossessing some of the georgoi. Wealth determined military participation in the phalanx, and those disqualified from military participation could not be citizens; such would become thetes. An individual could own land only if he were a citizen, and he could be a citizen only if he owned land. Consequently the most unfortunate of the clansmen, though by kinship perspective entitled to some form of equality, were destined for serfdom or slavery, although subsequent events rescued them from this trajectory.374

The emergence of hoplite and phalanx also effected the final adjustment of female population to the patriarchal structure of the classical age. Though bona fide citizens, women were excluded from citizen participation. What could this mean, if it were not nonsense? Women in clan membership had to be distinguished from non-members to abet the functionality of inheritance, which would not function to conserve wealth if male citizens could indifferently marry women from indiscriminate social classes. Polygamy would likewise have disrupted the system of inheritance.

Although the fundamental problem, inheritance, had been resolved centuries before the idea of citizenship, an anxious liability persisted as to whether the use of marriage as the lynch-pin of inheritance might wholly transfer inheritance to matrilineality. The epikleros had made women into nominal heiresses, while keeping the real power over wealth in male hands. The subsequent idea of citizenship derived from the idea of equality; however, equality

374 Those people who did not belong to a numerous and economically established clan, who were in short without land, found themselves forced to enter the clientele of one or another aristocrat. This was a later development, as the supply of new land declined and differences in wealth developed; originally membership of the community and ownership of land each presuppose the other. Cf. Weber, Max; The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, Verso, London, 1988, p. 149.
within citizenship was internally complex. A citizen was "equal" with other citizens only because he was better, i.e. unequal with non-citizens; the concept of equality is conspicuously exemplified in the Spartan homoioi, the "equals," who were designated as such because they were the aristocrats of Spartan society. Similarly the Athenian citizens, as "equals," were the ruling class. Women, to be distinguished from women who would not bear rights of inheritance, would need to be citizens, (equal), and, as "equal," better than unprivileged women. Inheritance necessitated strong class distinctions. Ingredient in this construction of social classes was the prohibition of marriage between citizens and metics, in order to prevent metics from entering the gene pool and the government. A corollary law established that if a female citizen did marry a metic, she lost her rights of inheritance and her children would be excluded from citizenship. On the other hand, women, though "equal" as citizens, had nevertheless to be unequal to male citizens. As legitimate mothers they were citizens, but their inferiority to male citizens had to be rigorously maintained, in order to preserve the unnatural and labile construction of patrilineality. A female citizen, qua equal, might be expected to participate in political deliberation: exclusion would belie the connotation of equality in citizenship. Politically active women would undermine the nominality of women's inheritance rights; precisely this confusion ensued in the case of Roman women. Inheritance carried more weight in the Greek quandary; to protect patrilineality, the wife of a citizen was a citizen, but her citizenship functioned in nothing more than to distinguish her inheritance rights from conditions of non-citizens. The political exclusion of female citizens was foundational for women's position in the patriarchal social structure, buttressing the elite class of male citizens in the classical age.\textsuperscript{375}

Exclusion of women from commerce had been a secondary result of this curtailment, but even the merely political equality of free, landholding citizens would decompose if they conducted commerce. Subsequently a fateful resolution was established; commercial activity was prohibited to males as well as females.\textsuperscript{376} Citizens were displaced from commerce by reserving commercial activity for resident foreigners; as long as foreigners were sequestered

\textsuperscript{375} Schaps D.M.; Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece; Edinburgh; 1979.
\textsuperscript{376} Reed C.; Maritime Traders in the Ancient Greek World; Cambridge;2003 pp.62-74
from law-making activity, it was supposed that commercial wealth could not damage the equality holding between *aristoi* and smallholders. By the 6th century this alternative hardened into the status of metic.\(^{377}\)

The idea of equality seems to have been an inveterate Greek value; all families in kinship composing a polis were regarded as equal, and land was distributed in equal lots. Perhaps ideas of legal and substantive equality had not yet been distinguished. It is peculiar that the Greeks supposed that all wealth should be devoted to the common good of the polis, not to personal good, but that they consistently turned away from socializing property; not even the Spartans, with their *sissitia*, military regimentation, and so forth, ever abolished private property. This may have had an origin in historical time. Redistribution accounted for this lapse; the earliest private property was nominally in the ownership of the paterfamilias, but his ownership was contingent on the will of the clan. Prior to the polis, aristocrats claimed the best land on the basis of religious ideology, involving descent from the gods.\(^{378}\) Polis organization could discourage unequal personal property only by a countervailing religious idea; wealth was concentrated in public property by using the surplus to build temples to the gods who presumably protected the polis.

The idea of equality moderated the new idea of private ownership with the communistic

\(^{377}\) Those poleis that pushed male equality furthest also erected strong barriers to women’s economic activity and fostered a belief that commercial exchange violated the reciprocity that should prevail among citizens. However, we do not know how pronounced these attitudes were in the eighth century; and classical Greeks found ways around them. One was to use agents; another was to deal in city-states other than their own (a practice formalized by the late sixth century in the status of the metoikos, or “co-resident”). Cf. Morris, Ian; Early Iron Age Greece, in The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, & Saller, Richard, editors; Cambridge University Press, p.239.

\(^{378}\) With these new mainland and eastern Greek communities legitimation of control of all the best land by so few required a major ideological offensive that set the terms of ideological struggle throughout the entire archaic period. We see this most clearly perhaps in the archaeological evidence. I have already alluded to the evidence of burials, but more dramatic evidence of the new social formation is a new heavy emphasis on the religion of polis-protecting divinities manifested in temples of sufficient size and impressiveness of materials to imply a radical redivision of the social surplus in the direction of common values. Cf. Rose, Peter W.; “Class,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 473.
elements of ownership-in-kinship. As in the previous ethne structure, a father was not allowed to bequeath his land to anyone else if he had a son. Private property was instituted, but the individual had no rights against the polis in regard to his land ownership. In archaic society the ultimate clan-ownership of the holder's land was inviolable, but with the emergence of the polis, the land-holder acquired some autonomy in bequeathal. It should be inquired why this amendment was thought to be necessary. Private ownership had not yet solidified; it was rather a communal ownership, based on the premise that an individual could own so much as he could personally cultivate, but no more: private ownership, in which a person was entitled to ownership regardless of his use of property, had not yet been articulated. The Athenians did not accumulate land in the early classical period; individual possessions of exorbitant landholdings would stimulate popular demands for redivision of land and the emergence of a tyrant. Great landowners in Athens were at risk of redistribution; land was predominantly divided in small holdings under cultivation directly by the owners. Society could redivide great landholdings without making compensation to the holders who lost land. Greece insisted on distribution of private property, but cherished a latent communistic idea, that private property in land was not inviolable. The right of every citizen to own land was not contingent on whether he had paid for the land, inherited it, or in some other way had personal entitlement. Property in land was however contingent on the individual's productivity. Land aggrandizement recommenced only in the hellenistic period.

The hypervigilance of social equality made every great landowner liable to loss of land from redivision, the inveterate demand of the demos, but a wealthy merchant was not similarly subject to redivision of his assets. Wealthy merchants or artisans were metics; their wealth was irrelevant because of exclusion from political participation. Land aggrandizement was discouraged because it upset the stability of land as a form of wealth. Since land owners were politically active, it was imperative to maintain their economic stability. The stability sought for the citizen class sometimes preserved inequality, just when the stability normally implemented by equality would be achieved better by inequality. Redivisions were in practice avoided, to avert aristocratic backlash. Prior to the institution of ostracism, the land of a person who was banished had been immediately redistributed. In the classical period, a person who
was ostracized for a ten-year period did not lose his land, despite neglect; the polis preserved his ownership, and thereby avoided civil war that might have resulted from ostracism. Other forces eroded the basic principle of citizen equality. Community surplus came into private ownership. Engagement in land transfer, gifts, and transference of subsistence goods resulted in capital accumulation instead of balancing of debts. Accumulation of debt and virtual land confiscation overwhelmed the resilience of smallholders.  

Exactly in what had archaic property consisted? The smallholder was contingently the owner of his land, he directly cultivated his soil, and the practice of land tenancy, i.e. debt bondage, had not yet prevailed. Land was not held by two individuals in such a way that the cultivator retained land on condition that he would provide labor or agricultural produce to the owner, and such that the land owner could control the cultivator's use of the land. The absence of this arrangement is extremely interesting because, in most periods of subsequent European history, land tenancy was a fundamental social force. Land tenancy was usually the source

379 If a Greek citizen owned what seemed a disproportionately large amount of the land of the community, the public opinion of the market place clamored that it should be taken away from him and “redivided.” If a trader or a craftsman was over-wealthy nobody complained, and perhaps nobody knew. At any rate his being rich did not appear to make others poorer. But in a small City State, where land was visibly limited in amount, every additional acre to the large proprietor seemed clearly to mean an acre less for the small men. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; The Greek Commonwealth; The Modern Library, New York, p.234.

380 What formerly belonged to the community at large now belongs to individual members of the community, and the movement of prestige gifts and land, and of some subsistence items, is controlled by a small group located at what appears to be the old redistributive center. Often the persons outside the center fail to realize that the activity of the center and their relationship to the center have changed, and this failure simply exacerbates the related problems of debt and involuntary land transfer. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 126.

381 To whom did the land belong and by what tenure was it held? Nearly all of it in the normal Greek State was in the hands of small proprietors, who worked the soil themselves. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; The Greek Commonwealth; The Modern Library, New York, p.237.

382 The particular issue we must face is whether or not, in the Homeric world, land was ever held on condition, in the dual sense that retention of the holding required fulfillment of obligations or services, and that the person from whom it was withheld retained a right, if only a formal veto power, to control the disposition. Cf. Finley, M. I.; Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, Viking Press, New York,1982, p.217.
of military formation, and of political factions; how is it possible that archaic Greece could have foregone this device?\textsuperscript{383} One principle seems to have unified the forces of 1) land tenure, 2) private ownership, and 3) great landholding: private occupancy emerged from an atavistic concept of common ownership because small private property rather abetted the common good more than communistic ownership. How could private ownership have predominated over tenancy, great landholding, and communistic property?

The principle of private ownership propounded that land should be sufficiently extensive to provide for the oikos, but should not be so large that the smallholder could not cultivate it alone. When land occupancy reached saturation this principle posed a quandary. Partible inheritance provided a desideratum; it promoted population expansion because male sibling would have economic foundations to create a family, whereas the same sibling would not reproduce as much under primogeniture. On the other hand partible inheritance would quickly morsellize the land available for distribution. Because smallholders practiced partible inheritance through male progeny, they limited their family size and in consequence the population as a whole so that the partibly inherited land would provide a living. However, the value of partible inheritance was, precisely, to create a maximum population for the sake of a large army. Restraint on progeny would maintain a population small enough to be supplied by the polis, but the partible Greek family structure was designed for population growth.\textsuperscript{384}

Furthermore, the polis did not allow commodification of land; Athenians could not buy and sell land in a real estate market to adjust their needs. Tenancy was disfavored because it promoted great landholding. Either slavery or tenancy would have enormously expanded the amount of land the smallholder could have profitably cultivated. However, either tenancy or


\textsuperscript{384} The overwhelming majority of the Greek States, like Athens from Solon’s day onwards, were cultivated by freeholders. They worked the land with their households, dividing up the estate at death among their sons. This acted, as it does in France, as a check on the population, at any rate until new outlets were provided for a livelihood. Nearly every citizen in an ordinary Greek State was a landowner, whether the piece he owned was large or small, enough to live on or only to starve on. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; \textit{The Greek Commonwealth}; The Modern Library, New York, p.237
slavery would have increased the population beyond the capacity of the polis, and would have
deranged the class equilibrium of agriculture. The Romans did adopt tenancy. Tenancy would
have polarized class society, with which the prevalent ideal of equality was bound to collide.
The Greeks typically avoided contract relations between citizens, because contracts, of which
tenancy is an example, tended to foment clientage.\textsuperscript{385}

\textbf{ARCHONSHIP}

Priesthood had previously subsided because the nobility could maintain their prerogatives
better as warlords. An amorphous body of unassociated equals developed in the Greek priestly
structure, whereas the Egyptian priesthood had unified into a bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{386} Upon the death
of King Codrus, the Athenians proclaimed that no king would be “good enough to succeed
him,” and replaced the office of the king with an innovation, the \textit{archon}. The archaic poleis
restricted religious rites according to social class; at puberty the male child was incorporated
into the adult community by religious ceremony, but this ceremony was practiced only by the
archon. The expression suggests ingratiation, but to whom?

Religion and government remained fused in most of the oriental civilizations; Greece
uniquely split what had pertained to the basileus into separate roles, governor and chief
priest. The essence of this split seems not to have been isolation of the religious role, but the
transference of secular authority from basileus to archon.\textsuperscript{387} Deprivation of secular instead of
religious powers preserved the illusory primacy of the basileus, who henceforth became the
crazy woman in the attic. The archon exercised governmental powers, and the polemarch, later\textsuperscript{385} Tenancy, in our sense of the word, was therefore practically unknown in Greece. Out of the
numerous inscriptions preserved which deal, in one way or another, with land, there are only “a very
small number of contracts made between individuals.” Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; \textit{The Greek
\textsuperscript{386} Henceforth the Greek king shared power not only with his lieges but also with members of great
clans, like himself owning castles and lands, living in the same city, and serving in war at their own costs.
These clans therefore had the right to advise the King and Council, share in the booty, and participate
in the exercise of political authority over the masses. Hence the ancient aristocracy of the royal council
became more important in Greece, whereas in the Near East it disappeared and was replaced by
bureaucrats and priests. Cf. Weber, Max; \textit{The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations}, Verso,
London, 1988, p.160
to become one of the nine archons, commanded the army. The presumably highest function was relegated to the basileus, in that the new archons, supplanting the basileus, never acquired religious functions.

The archon ca. 752 B.C. had been only one, limited to ten years; the replacement of a basileus with one archon suggests that the advantage was in the ability to terminate the given sovereign's power in ten years, and to rotate the office between rival clans. The abolition of royalty was carried out in the most flattering terms; what motivated this delicacy? It was not a democratic drift insofar as the archons represented only the nobility rather than the demos; but, if its motivation was not democratic, why was the archonship expanded from one to nine? The polis was composed of several clans; a monarch might have had the favor of one or two clans which his regency directly benefited, but other clans would resent degradations of their power. The idea of republican government, although conducive to democracy, was not democratic; it developed from the rivalry of a plurality of aristocratic families; republican government was a means to accommodate the demand of each aristocratic family to a share of power.

The Medontid family created a chief archonship, which exercised most of the powers of the previous basileus, and reserved the chief archonship exclusively for the members of the Medontid family.\footnote{The archonship was a later institution than that of polemarch, as is shown by the fact that no old religious ceremonies were performed by the archon, such as devolved upon the polemarch as well as upon the king. But the conduct of festivals instituted at later times was entrusted to him. Cf. Bury, J.B., \textit{A History of Greece}, London, 1906, p. 171.} The "regency," i.e. the chief archon, was held for life, and afterwards was succeeded by another Medontid. The chief archon was elected, by the people, but the candidate had to be of the Medontid family. The basileus was preserved, but the Medontidae

\footnote{We know that he was an historical person; the archons of later days always swore that they would be true to their oath even as Acaustus. He held the post for life, and his successors after him; and thus the Medontids resembled kings, though they did not bear the kingly name. But they fell short of royalty in another way too; for each regent was elected, but the community was bound to elect a member of the Medontid family. The next step in weakening the power of this kingly magistrate was the change of the regency from a life of office to an office of ten years. This reform is said to have been effected about the middle of the eighth century. It is uncertain at what time the Medontids were deprived of their prerogative and the regency was thrown open to all the nobles. With the next step we reach firmer ground. The regency became a yearly office, and from this time onward an official list of the archons seems to have been preserved. Cf. Bury, J.B., \textit{A History of Greece}, London, 1906, p. 169.}
never occupied the office. Eventually in the eighth century BC, the "chief archonship" that had effectively substituted for the basileus kept its lifelong tenure, whereas the office of basileus was given a ten year term, and the constitutional revision made any aristocrat became eligible for the office. Finally the ten year term was reduced to a one-year term, at which point the list of the nine archons was preserved in writing.

The replacement of monarchy with nine archons was not emblematic of a conflict between demos and basileus, but of one between basileus and nobility. The title basileus was retained until the expiration of Athens, although the content of the title was changed from the pretension of monarchical authority to an insignificant religious function. The basileus persisted throughout the classical period; although deprived of his former powers, the basileus was one of the nine archons. It is odd that the basileus altered into a priestly function, considering that even in its prior strength the basileus manifested the submergence of religious under civic authority (Kreon). Apparently to preempt reprisal, the office, though impotent, was never formally abolished.\textsuperscript{389} Reprisal- from whom? The aristocracy? The merchants? The demos?

If land ownership did not depend on the basileus, it remains mysterious how the prestige of any social sector depended on the basileus. Strife between smallholding and land grants seems to have persisted, without resolution, throughout Greek history. The power balance between the aristocratic and popular elements was too treacherous to eliminate the basileus.

\textsuperscript{389} After King Codrus had died in heroic self-sacrifice against the invading Dorians, they announced that no one was good enough to succeed him, and replaced the King with an archon chosen for life. In 752, they limited the tenure of the archonship to 10 years, and in 683 to one. On the latter occasion they divided the powers of the office among nine archons: an archon eponymos, who gave his name to the year as a means of dating events; an archon basileus, who bore the name of King but was merely head of the state religion; a polemarchos, or military commander; and six thesmothetai, or lawmakers. As in Sparta and Rome, so in Athens the overthrow of the monarchy represented not a victory for the Commons, or any intentional advance towards democracy, but a recapture of mastery by a feudal aristocracy -one more swing of the pendulum in the historical alternation between localized and centralized authority. By this piecemeal revolution, the royal office was shorn of all its powers, and its holder was confined to the functions of a priest. The word King remained in the Athenian Constitution to the end of its ancient history, but the reality was never restored. Institutions may with impunity be altered or destroyed from above if their names are left unchanged. Cf. Durant, Will; \textit{The Life of Greece}, MJF Books, New York, 1966, p. 109
obstreperously. Possibly the overthow had been made to appear to be what it was not, a
democratic advance. The retention of the office, without its content, served to mollify anger
from the subversion of the smallholders. The abolition of the basileus might have signified a
step in the demolition of smallholding allotment.

Reprisal from the merchant class seems highly unlikely, because the conditions for
subversion of monarchy for commercial interests appear only in modernity. Neither demotion
of the basileus nor its concealment could have originated from the mercantile interest. More
likely, usurpation of the basileus signifies vacillation within aristocracy, between central and
provincial authority. The basileus had never enjoyed pharaonic control over aristocrats; in
this scrimmage he represented, unconsciously, the advantages of centralization, against the
aristocrats' innate preference for decentralization. The atomization of Greek provinces enabled
aristocrats successfully to resist absorption, and without systematic unification the need for a
strong priesthood vanished.

The usurpation of government by the Medontidae at the cost of the basileus was in
essence the supervention of aristocracy over the basileus. The conversion to the polis-
society exceeded the capacity of the basileus, a form originally adapted to ethne society; in
addition to the immediate need of the Medontidae to cajole the cooperation of the aristocracy,
conversion from monarchy to the nine archons reflected the necessity of polis society for
institutions of a pluralistic government. The reform of 683 B.C. provided nine archons, with
different functions. Expansion from one to nine archons strengthened the polis in that nine
leading families would be heavily invested in the success of the polis. The will of one monarch
was likely to produce conflict within the aristocratic retinue, whereas the mutual conflict of
nine archons might have functioned to achieve better consensus within the nobility; this sort of
thinking was operative in the later formation of the Boule and Ekklesia.

In Sparta the hereditary kingship, "basileus," persisted, although, as in most poleis, a
constitution eclipsed him with another executive officer, by which the basileus' traditional

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390 One is that the fall of royalty, which does not imply the abolition of the royal name, happened in
Athens at an earlier period than in Greece generally. The other is that the Medontids were not kings, but
powers were divided among the aristocracy: the nine ephors. The aristocratic stream of all poleis tended to change from a plenary basileus to some form of oligarchy, while the *ethne*, those simpler communities that did not evolve into poleis, retained the form of the basileus. The Athenian “basileus” was preserved as one of the nine archons, but the office ceased to be hereditary, and the calendar was organized after the name of the first archon rather than the king. The heritable character of the basileus would have maintained too much potential for the resurgence of prepotent power in the basileus; protection of royal power is one of the main interests that compel the heritability of monarchy. Command of the army was removed from the basileus and awarded to another archon, the “polemarch”. The basileus presided over the Areopagus in the case of capital crime.  

If aristocracy eliminated the basileus, how could there have been apprehension of retaliation? Demotion of the basileus was a general benefit to the whole of the aristocracy. Why should abolition of the basileus have needed to be done discretely? Military command was taken from the basileus and vested in the polemarch; the basileus was assigned religious ceremony. The military office was the more prestigious; the religious office, though once powerful and compatible with military leadership, had become inconsequential. Although

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391 The creation of an alternative executive officer, coexisting with the king or replacing him, seems to be a regular development in Greek constitutions; even at Sparta, where hereditary kingship survived, most of the king’s functions, priestly, judicial and political, were put in commission among the aristocracy. At Athens we find a group entitled “the nine archons”. One of them still had the official title Basileus, though by now he had become an annual official; the continuity suggests that here had been no traumatic revolution. He performed many of the older rituals, and later continued to preside over the Aeropagus when it sat as a murder court. But the chief executive, by the time the historical record begins, was “the” archon, who gave his name to the year and was in effect the head of the state. The army was commanded by a third annual official, the polemarch. Cf. Andrews, A.; *The Growth of the Athenian State*, in *The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C.*, edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.365.

392 The first limitation of the royal power effected by the aristocracy was the institution of a polemarch or military commander. The supreme command of the army, which had belonged to the king, was transferred to him and he was elected from and by the nobles. The next step seems to have been the overthrow of the royal house by the powerful family of the Medontids. The Medontids did not themselves assume the royal title, nor did they abolish it. They instituted the office of archon or regent, and this office usurped the most important functions of the king. Acanthus, the Medontid, was the first regent. Cf. Bury, J.B., *A History of Greece*, London, 1906, p. 169.
the tenure of polemarch was limited, the same person could be re-elected by the Assembly to polemarch, indefinitely; Themistocles and Pericles were polemarchs. The Medontidae had abolished the institution of the "royal family", which means that the hereditary character of the basileus was abolished; the Medontids neither abolished the office of basileus, nor did they assume the office for themselves. If they did not want the office, why didn't they abolish it, or, if they thought it had enough value to retain, why didn't they assume the office for themselves?

If the office of basileus was not abolished in order to elude stasis, from where could stasis have developed?\textsuperscript{393} The basileus and the chief archonship had lifelong tenure. The two offices were compatible for as long as one office was absolutely vacuous. The omnipotence and hereditary power of the basileus was broken, by eliminating inheritance and abbreviating the tenure to one year. Although royal omnipotence was dissolved, it was covertly resurrected, in the lifelong tenure of the first archon and in the unlimited reiteration of the polemarch. If the basileus had been extinguished, it might have stimulated civil war between advocates of the archonship and those of the basileus. The gradual depotentiation from the plenary basileus in charge of the army to a ceremonial religious basileus, from a life-long hereditary basileus to a ten-year elective office, and ultimately reduction from ten-year term to annual term, available to any aristocrat, humiliated the basileus so gently that the Medontids eluded revolt. At the time when the plenary basileus disappeared from history, kinship persisted, and clan rivalry, embodied in the families of the nobility, persisted. Rotation of office foreclose clan rivalry over the office of basileus; in consequence kinship friction did not eventuate in a centralized state, as it normally would have; disappearance of the priests deprived basileis of centralization, with the consequence that Greek territory remained atomized in poleis.

The insidious demotion of the basileus to an inconsequential figure is cognate with a later

\textsuperscript{393} But meanwhile there were still kings at Athens. The Medontids had robbed the kings of their royal power, but they had not done away with the kings; there was to be a king at Athens till the latest days of the Athenian democracy. It seems probable that, as some historical analogies might suggest, the Medontids allowed the shadow of royalty to remain in the possession of the old royal house, so that for some time there would have been life-kings existing by the side of the life-regents; it is not likely that from the very first the kingship was degraded to be a yearly office, filled by election. This, however was what it ultimately became. Cf. Bury, J.B., \textit{A History of Greece}, London, 1906, p. 169.
military reform that subtly compromised kinship. The original Greek military organization of society divided into *phylos* and *phratra*, i.e. armies were organized according to kinship structure. Greek armies were organized as consecutive circles of family, clan, tribe, as such organization improved enthusiasm and solidarity in battle. In the transition period from basileus, to *tyrannos* and *demokratia*, the ambiguous use of phyla and phrata obscured the clan structure and loyalty on which military discipline depended. *Phylos* had originally meant tribe, but was used subsequently to mean a military group, which phylos in its original meaning had also connoted. The emendation did not induce social disruption, because geographic and economic selection of the soldiers placed them in the same social and military locations as the kinship principle would have. The ambiguous use of these terms did however obscure power relations in later periods of Greek history; by the time of the Peloponnesian Wars, squadrons of triremes were divided according to tribes, but *tribe* had long become a civic rather than a consanguineous division. The military rearrangement highlighted a subtle shift from kinship to civil society, as had the demotion of the basileus. The *phylae* and *phratra* were original kinship structures, organized by blood, but the same terms semantically changed from consanguineal to territorial denotation.\(^{394}\) Since the same (genetic) phylae and phratra were consolidated in the same geographic locations, the alteration was inobtrusive.\(^{395}\)

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394 How were these tribes and brotherhoods spread over the country? Although membership went by blood and not by geographical situation, still fellow tribesmen and brothers would mostly be found in the same districts. The difference between the tribal and territorial division would come to this: that a parish map of Attica would be divided up into 48 constituencies with fixed lines, whereas the tribal map, which would alter of course, however slightly, from year to year, which show a number of points marked in 12 different colors for the different brotherhoods, where the greater number of brothers and clansmen were to be found. Cf. Francotte, H.; *L’Industrie dans la Grèce ancienne*, Brussels, 1900-01, p.29.

395 This was the position when, at some day before the time of Solon, these two symmetrical systems were fused. It was not very difficult to fuse them, for the four tribes were so large that they could practically claim to be considered as territorial divisions. Except on the border-land, men did not easily, in those early agricultural days, move their dwellings into another tribal area. One may regard the four tribes as territorial and they are easily reconciled with the 48 parishes. All that is needed is an intermediate link, corresponding, on the territorial side, with the three brotherhoods in each tribe. This was supplied by dividing each tribe up into three districts or thirds. These cannot have been the same as the brotherhoods, since a third consisted of land and the brotherhood of persons; but they were so nearly the same in practice that later writers could say they were. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; *The Greek Commonwealth*; The Modern Library, New York, p.148.
The growth of the Athenian polis, for example, made the kinship structure of the army impracticable. Only when summer campaigning was undertaken and the army remained located at the polis was kinship structure compatible with martial needs; when however maintenance of a remote military station continued for years at a time, military kinship malfunctioned. Leadership by tribal elders had been suited for temporary and local defense, consonant with clan solidarity, whereas imperial control required armies to operate not specifically for the benefit of their own clan.\textsuperscript{396} Tribal elders were generals on the ground of clan leadership, not of military ability. Foreign encampment under divided clanship command produced incompetent leadership. Military kinship organization became obsolete before emergence of the Athenian empire; a kinship leader generated obedience only in his locality, from clan members. Following Athenian reform, generals were elected to counteract the liability that generalship from kinship priority, though reinforcing kinship, would produce less competent leaders. Selection by lot of civic leaders had been preferred for its democratic tenor, precluding vested interest. However, the ten strategoi, the generals, were not democratically selected, because haphazard selection created risk.

Removal of kinship priority for the strategoi was a sign of the trend to supplant genetic with civic organization. Marx posited that a group is not a class until it has attained self-consciousness of itself as a group. The thetes had until the time of the Athenian navy been virtual outcasts; it was their indispensability as rowers of the tririmes that finally conferred on them citizenship. Marx exemplified this with factory congregation, but in classical Greece it ensued from the army and navy; as generals were elected on the standard of ability rather than

\textsuperscript{396} When they had an Empire to administer this tribal arrangement was no longer practicable, for their generals were no longer at home, needed not only for summer campaigning or for posting sentries around the walls, but were required on foreign service, sometimes continuously for 12 months, with fleets or garrisons in different parts of the Greek world. “No enemy has ever met us in full strength,” boasts Pericles, for half of us are on land, and the other half at sea, and “our soldiers are sent on service to many scattered possessions.” So the leadership of the tribal regiments passed necessarily out of their hands, and was left to inferior officers whom they appointed. For the generals, alone among higher Athenian officials, the tribal order was broken down. They were allowed to be elected out of the whole body of the people. For war of such importance, involving questions of life and death for the whole people, the primary consideration was to secure the best man. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; The Greek Commonwealth; The Modern Library, New York, p.172.
kinship position, soldiers had been organized from economic rather than kinship categories. Kinship had included the thetes within membership; economic category had excluded them, and then reincorporated them. Although the military group lost its consanguineous composition and organized artificially, it retained the name with its kinship connotations. Similarly *phratra* literally meant brotherhood, but was converted to mean a non-consanguineous group of confederates. The semantic shift seems to have moved from the literal kinship meaning to a connotative meaning of any group bound together by locality, profession, etc. The shift of meaning seems to suggest deliberate effort to dissolve kinship loyalty to produce a civic sense of loyalty, without arousing notice of the conversion. It was a characteristic of Greek culture that the individual transferred his attachment away from family and clan and wholly to the polis; groups of this sort were eventually constituted by locality disguised as kinship.\(^{397}\)

The aristocratic groups eventually co-opted the kinship categories to signify political factions, which had not the least overtone of clan rivalry but benefited the aristocracy in its status as group separate from the demos. Aristocracy in turn failed; the nobles had appropriated functions that had been peculiar to the basileus, but unremitting mutual belligerency within the aristocracy impeded stable government. Its unforeseen outcome was to have made aristocracy vulnerable to the agricultural smallholders. Internecine war developed an effective infantry: the phalanx, which was composed of infantry soldiers called *hoplites*. The phalanx in its strict meaning was the invention of Philip of Macedon, although the term can be used loosely to mean the previous Greek regiments. The hoplites were small farmers; their participation was essential to victory. Their threat to the aristocracy was not the liability of insurrection, but that only the hoplites could overcome external hostility. Similarly the thetes were not an insurrectionary threat, but commanded concessions because Athens would not prevail in naval

\(^{397}\) The antithesis between territory and kin was masked by the use of kin language for units that actually combined territorial and kin attributes. Thus the “tribes” (phylai) seem to have been originally a military band, a voluntary association of warriors. Later in Athens (as in Rome) tribes were recreated on the basis of locality. Similarly, “brotherhood” (phratra), as in most Indo-European languages, did not mean a blood relationship but a social group of confederates. In later Athenian history they became political factions, led by aristocratic clans and occasionally confined to them. Cf. Mann, Michael, *The Sources of Social Power*, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.197.
battle without them. The *hippeis*, the aristocratic cavalry, were ineffective in war between poleis. The hoplite necessitated admission of the small holder to political decision, which eventually conveyed a transition from aristocracy to tyranny and hence to democracy.

Throughout Greece, hoplite warfare promoted democratic structures. In the 7th and 6th centuries B.C. the smallholders, i.e. the hoplites, extricated themselves from aristocratic domination. The egalitarianism in archaic kinship did not promote democracy, although kinship and democracy were both more egalitarian than aristocracy. It was the aristocracy that carried the traditions of kinship; when the demos prevailed over the legitimating claims of aristocracy, it was discrediting the kinship system in furthering access to democracy. 

Kinship connoted aristocratic government and collective economy; monarchy passed indirectly through tyranny to democracy. Usually a king is the moving force behind territorial expansion; the demotion of the basileus discouraged military expansion, but developed democratic practices. The mediating link between archaic kinship and democracy had been that the tyrants, though favoring the demos against the aristocracy, were themselves aristocrats. When tyranny, which was not characterized by territorial expansion, broke down, the population devised a governmental form that reflected their attachment to small landholding:

398 From Sparta, where it was brought to a perfection which in the days of Tyrtaeus it had not yet attained, the institution of the heavy foot-lancers spread throughout Greece, and its natural tendency everywhere was to promote the progress to democracy. Cf. Bury, J.B., *A History of Greece*, London, 1906, p. 129.

399 The new aristocratic clans took the place of the Kings in most Greek areas, appropriating various legal rights for themselves. They governed the still agricultural states contending with each other in constant clan rivalry. They embarked in their own ships and on their own responsibility to seek adventure, conquest, piracy, to found colonies or occasionally to trade. Their semi-collective organizations took over in varying degree the political and economic functions of the Kings. But the supremacy of the nobles was only a transitory stage in the history of Greek social and constitutional development. The noble clans were much too particularistic to be able to maintain a permanent rule. From the eighth century B.C. onwards the free Hellenic small landowners, the next class after the nobles, began, under these circumstances, their steady climb upwards in many of the various states of Greece. Political concessions were first made to this class because their fighting strength had become an essential for the beginning Greek phalanx warfare, the phalanx being a unique type of heavily armed infantry formation of perhaps Assyrian or Urartaic origin, the Greek and Macedonian versions of which finally conquered the world under the leadership of Alexander the Great. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; *An Ancient Economic History*, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p.279.
ARCHAIC GREECE

democracy. The effort of the demos to liberate themselves from the collective economy of kinship resulted in an unpremeditated individualistic economy, which introduced a new dialectic within the mature democratic structure of polis organization.

ARCHAIC COLONIZATION

There had been no colonization during the monarchical period of government, because colonization was a product of political competition that could not have preexisted the mature polis. During the era of the basileus, the polis was coalescing from the conglomeration of villages, and inhabitants were first being distinguished as members or non-members of a polis; membership was not a strong connotation in communities prior to the polis. Identities deriving from location developed as the basileus consolidated authority in the polis. The polis-identity motivated colonization as a product of the aristocratic strife that led to republican government. Colonial ventures were public actions undertaken by the polis government in its effort to palliate stasis between the tribes vying for paramountcy.

Two types of foundation characterized archaic colonies. Some colonies were founded during the time that the metropolis was not a polis at all, but an inchoate polis in formation;

400 There was a steady crystallization of Greek feeling around the City State; the process was twofold—both centrifugal and centripetal. Of the former, the gradual break-up of the old nations into smaller units, we have already spoken. What we have now to emerge is the gradual snapping of the lesser loyalties which formed the intermediate links between the State and the individual, till the citizen stands, free and independent, face to face with the city. Cf. Zimmern, Alfred Eckard; The Greek Commonwealth; The Modern Library, New York, p. 74

401 A newly and generally individual economy gained power for the first time since the end of the Hunter and Food gatherer period. The economic balance, which was established during the first half of the first millennium B.C., was to remain fairly steady during the next three millennia, with very few exceptions. What remained of collective economy and collective institutions was modified, and in certain periods freed themselves almost entirely from these remains of the past. As early as during the seventh and early sixth centuries B.C. the small landowners in Greece began to acquire their later independence, most markedly and not by chance in the Isthmus cities of the Greek motherland, our evidence for this development being especially instructive in the cases of Megara and Athens. This change-over was to have a tremendous effect politically and economically on class distinction, a question to be discussed in the next section, and was responsible for bringing the class of free small landowners to their civic prominence as polis citizens in the Democratic states of the Classical Age. Cf. Heichelheim, Fritz; An Ancient Economic History, Volume 1, A.W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., Leiden 1958, p. 272
this sort of colony might be considered civic, in that its foundation proceeded from decisions of a civic government. The other type of foundation proceeded from ethne, that is, from tribal groups united in kinship but which had not yet coalesced into polis and civic organization. Archaic colonies lacked the expansionist connotation of colony because colonization commenced before a self-conscious identity with a political community had formed; rather, colonization might have proceeded from the pressure of population growth. Anatolia and the Aegean islands were settled not by authentic colonization, but by the migratory push exerted by the invasion of Ionic Greeks into Attica. Some of these migrants were of the previous Mycenaean civilization, and might have settled the islands in order to avoid subjugation.403

"Internal colonization" had been the gradual condensation of members into one community on the way to development into a polis; colonization may have been a collateral and imitative effect of synoekismos. Similarly to behavior on the Greek mainland, the colonizing/migrant Greeks developed a pattern of cohabitation rather than of conquest. The Anatolian culture antecedent to Greek migration had been oriental; the culture organized the common people in a form of serfdom. Maintenance of a sanctuary in an Anatolian or Aegean settlement was performed by a aristocratic priest class, again exhibiting the divergence of Greek and Oriental cultures. Peasants in the hinterland of the Anatolian temple were conceived as slaves of the god, just as in the earlier oriental societies.404 Instead of subjugating the natives, Greeks eclectically preserved and worshipped at the shrines of the Great-Mother

402 But the new movement of expansion is distinguished, as we shall see, by certain peculiarities in its outward forms, - features which were chiefly due to the fact that city-life had been introduced before the colonization began. The beginning of colonization belonged to the age of transition from monarchy to republic; it was systematically promoted by the aristocracy, and it took a systematic shape. The creation of political machinery carried on the work of consolidation which the kings had begun when they gathered together into cities the loose elements of their states. Cf. Bury, J.B., A History of Greece, London, 1906, p. 75.

403 It is one of the most notable features of the migratory epoch in Greece, that the redistribution of population at the end of the second millennium B.C. and beginning of the first drove out a number of clans, and parts of clans, first to the islands and then to Asia Minor. There is no doubt that the emigrants were exceptionally active, enterprising, and ambitious. Some of them, belonging to the old population of Greece, had been unable to defend their kingdoms against the new-comers, and preferred to emigrate rather than come to terms and submit to new masters. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Michael; A History of the Ancient World, Volume I, p. 189.
Goddess, the chief deity of Hittite Anatolia, but named her Artemis. The Anatolian head priest was also king. The Greeks kept their basileus distinct from the head priest. Instead of displacing the native ruling class, the Greeks merged with them in an aristocracy that dominated the underclasses. Possibly polytheism mitigated sensitivity to racial purity or alien domination. The Anatolian Greek poleis were subjects of Cyrus etc. Lydian and Persian kingdoms maintained a strict policy not to interfere with the religion or other institutions internal to cities, so that the Greek life under Persian suzerainty was not strained. The Persian language was a cognate of Greek, and the cult of the Great Mother was common to Greece and Persia. Developmental conflict in Anatolian Greek poleis evinced both cultural
influences; oligarchy and democracy struggled over control of government, in which oligarchy would have promoted compatibility with Persia, and democracy would have edged towards rebellion.\textsuperscript{407} Subjugation of the Greek poleis under Persia would have secured the Greek aristocracy in its dominance; thus there was internal dissent in mainland Greece regarding Persian hegemony, and appeals to Persia from one polis against another were frequent. The aristocracy had formed during the period of conquest, when the Greeks were ruled by basileis; democracy was a tendency inherent in the Greek tribe, and was strengthened by subsequent Greek immigrations.

Evidence from Plato suggests that not commerce, but Lebensraum, or \textit{stenochoria}, i.e. "narrow space" was the primary motive of early colonization, i.e. colonization following the migration of the Ionians in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{408} The living standards of a subsistence economy do not function as a buffer between discrepant production and reproduction rates; if production decreases, the population immediately decreases. The \textit{absorption rate}, the capacity of an economic system to support an increase of population, came to 0.1\% per annum; it was impossible for the Athenian population to grow. A subsistence economy quickly generates insuperable saturation; no improvement is possible because every last penny that might be invested for innovation must instead be spent on alimentation.

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\textsuperscript{406} They were all obliged to submit to Cyrus and his successors. Their internal life went on unchanged; for, as we have seen, the Persians did not interfere with the institutions of the cities. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Michael; \textit{A History of the Ancient World}, Volume I, p. 194.
\textsuperscript{407} It is probable that the conquest of the Anatolian coast was effected under the rule of kings; but our historical tradition, at least, refers almost exclusively to a contest between different forms of popular government- aristocracy, or government by a few rich and noble families, and democracy, or government by the whole people. The aristocracy probably consisted of those descended from the original conquerors, who had shared among themselves the conquered land and the serfs connected with it. The lower classes would probably include later settlers, who lived chiefly by industry and trade; some of these would be rich and influential citizens, while others would be plain artisans, small traders, and laborers. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Michael; \textit{A History of the Ancient World}, Volume I, p. 194.
\textsuperscript{408} The "narrow space" at home is here perceived more in a political sense rather than overpopulation or lack of resources. This could apply also to powerful individuals. Finding his political space too narrow because of Peisistratos’ tyranny, Miltiades the Athenian took Athenians with him to the Thracian Chersonese to become ruler of the Dolonkoi (Hdt. 6.35.3-36.1), and Doreius the Spartan, having failed in his bid to become king, led colonists to Sicily. Cf. Malkin, Irad; “Foundations,” in \textit{A Companion to Archaic Greece}, Eds. Raafflub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 379.
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Saturation is a minimal equilibrium from which a society cannot escape. If the fertility rate increases, mortality increases at the same rate. Colonization enabled the metropolis to remain exactly at the saturation point. Colonial efforts began from the agitation of malcontents deprived of land and livelihood, but, surprisingly, did not percolate into class conflict; the malcontents were not identified specifically as *thetes*. Saturation ought to rigidify the fertility rate; if there was no surplus to feed more people, motivation to procreate should decline; population could not have grown from natural increase. An unforeseeable, sudden population inflation ought not to have been possible. The sudden growth of population far beyond the carrying capacity of Attic agriculture could only have followed the archaic period, due to the influx of slaves and metics, which in turn may have necessitated the deportation of Athenian citizens to colonies.

Plato reports that in ancient times, citizens were amicably sent out to found a colony when there were too many people in the polis: “there still remains that ancient device which we have often mentioned, namely, the sending forth, in a friendly manner from a friendly nation, of colonies consisting of such people as are deemed suitable”.

In effect, colonization maintained the Greek population at its saturation point; if the land produced more population than it could support, colonization substituted for increased mortality rates, thus keeping population exactly at its replacement level. The Greek word for colony, *apoikia*, originally meant a swarm of bees; thus a human colony was likened to the pattern by which superfluous bees break off from the overpopulated bee-hive to found a new hive elsewhere; a colony is “like a swarm of bees; a single genos goes out from a single country and settles, like a friend

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409 To the extent that the production of people is a function of the production of goods, these underlying growth rates also provide a rough index of economic development. In the long term, and especially in subsistence economies which cannot accommodate substantial declines in conventional living standards, population cannot grow faster than total output. The ability of the system of production to support a given increase in population over any given period of time in a constant real wage is known as the absorption rate. Judging by the above estimates, the minimal long-term absorption rate of ancient-or indeed any pre-modern agrarian-economies appears to have been close to 0.1% per annum. This rough estimate is in line with the mean absorption rate calculated for the medieval and early modern England. [Lee 1980: 525].

410 Plato: *Laws* 740c.
coming from among friends, being either squeezed out by lack of room or forced by some other pressing need. The violence of civil strife (stasis) might compel a whole section of a state to emigrate; and on one occasion an entire state went into exile because of external attacks”. Plato suggests that colonization purposed to assuage civil strife arising from overpopulation, and places in the same category the exodus of the Athenians from Athens at the time of the invasion of Xerxes.

Colonization protected aristocratic ascendancy. The mounting discord of the demos might have subverted the aristocratic supremacy, had it not been that colonization relieved immediate pressure. Plato recommended banishment of political or social agitators to the colonies, just as the discordant inhabitants of the colonies had, as it were, been honorably banished chiefly to relieve social stress. The combination of overpopulation with factionalism and stasis associated colonization with suppression of political insurrection as intimately as with food shortage and overpopulation. Some colonizations were political, insofar as malcontents constituted the group of colonists, but in other cases colonization seems to have been non-political. Some of the poleis had indiscriminately required every family to provide its second son for the colonization. The motive of stenochoria is exemplified in the instance of Thera; each citizen household was required to provide one son for emigration to Cyrene. The distribution did not select a particular political party or economic bracket: every family

411 Plato: Laws 708b.
412 The same inducement drew nobles who did not belong to the inner oligarchic circle. In fact, political discontent was an immediate cause of Greek colonization; and conversely it may be said that colonization was a palladium of aristocracy. If this outlet had not existed, or if it had not suited the Hellenic temper, the aristocracies might not have lasted so long and they wisely discerned that it was their own interest to encourage colonization. Cf. Bury, J.B., A History of Greece, London, 1906, p. 87.
413 In the foundation decree of Cyrene, colonists retained a collective right of return after a minimum stay of five years, and Therans, as individuals, were guaranteed the right of future immigration to Cyrene. The decision made by the entire Theban community, as in the Homeric army, forced each household with more than one son to send another as a settler on the pain of death. Other Therans may join, now or later. However, if the “Therans are unable to help them and they suffer inescapable troubles up to five years, let them return from that land without fear to Thera, to their possessions and to be citizens.” The decision, ritualized by a communal oath, applies to “Therans,” an appellation that applies both to those who stay and those who leave. Cf. Malian, Irad; “Foundations,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 381.
had to provide one son for the emigration. Non-citizens were exempted from the conscription. This is quizzical; the eviction of exclusively citizen residents to the new colony would suggest a fear that the new colony might in some manner rebel against the metropolis, if it were populated mostly of non-citizens; on the other hand, the polis never exerted much effort to retain its colony as its property.

A metropolis that colonized for trade would keep its colony in close possession, whereas it would not be possessive of a colony established merely for relief of overpopulation. The first theory of 8th-century colonization is land shortage; emigration to colonies existed to provide the emigrants with land ownership equivalent to entitlements in the metropolis. This presupposes that the kinship law of equal, or even unequal land allotment was strong enough to force such a consideration. The fact that colonies were always founded on the seacoast, and never expanded inland, lends skepticism to this theory. Colonists relieved the metropolis of excess citizen population by providing them with adequate land ownership, just as if they were citizens of the original community. Being clan members, the landless were relatives of some families, but not others, of the polis; if the landless had been resolutely deprived, it would have been an expression of contempt towards established families in the polis of whom the landless were relatives. Constituting an indirect slight of some family or clan, the reaction would not have been elimination of the landless, but civil war between the affected clans. The metropolis and colony remained connected by religious, not political or commercial obligations. Any Theran who wished was free to emigrate. Those who emigrated remained citizens, and if the emigré fared poorly, he was allowed to return to his family and property in Thebes after five years in Cyrene. Hypothesizing that they had been capable of conceiving political unity, such

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414 We are interested here in the origins of the eighth-century colonies, not their later development, and we will begin by examining two tidy theories of the cause of the colonizing “movement.” The first argued that the Greeks on the mainland ran short of land and turned to emigration as a solution. Land-poor individuals and families were forced to the west to seek new lives. Each participant received by lot a holding, or kleros, without encumbrances in the new settlement and was thus self-sufficient and an active member in a new social organization. This theory, in its various articulations, emphasizes that the choice of site was based on the quality and quantity of the new land and not on the quality of the harbor there or the quantity of mineral or other nonagricultural resources. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 75.
a tie would have been established ab ovo, just as the overseas cleruchies were established with obligations to the metropolis during the mid-classical period. It appears that the motive of colonization was to sustain the rights of the clan members, not to advance the interests of the polis; colonization was accomplished all at one time, not gradually, and after foundation the metropolis left the colony alone. It remains to ponder: why five years? The motive behind the right to repatriation is quite clear; colonization was to be pacifistic, with no implicit derogation of those who emigrated. But what purpose did the interval of five years serve? It was not for care of the parents, for the elder son was left in the metropolis. Possibly the development and aggregation of people in a period of five years was thought to dissuade the colonist from returning.

If population was in a condition of saturation, one might wonder why slaves flooded in, and Greek citizens emigrated, under conditions of population pressure; why did the poleis not ban importation of foreign slaves, when the carrying capacity of the land was overstrained? Population pressure lowered normative living standards. It was possible to elude the lower living standards by importing slaves. Slavery could produce labor for longer hours at less remuneration than voluntary acceptance could have. Slavery displaced free labor, and in doing so raised the living standards of the citizens; in effect, a person who was a slave was made to accept a shorter lifespan than a citizen, forming enough of a buffer to preserve the citizen from the deleterious effects of labor and population growth. Since free laborers were displaced, an excess population for emigration formed.

Plato recommended neither murder of the potential demagogue, nor his integration in the conventional political process. Banishment fails to suggest that aggrandizement of the polis for external defense was the motive of colonization. Rather, Athens relied on two premises: 1. Colonies would mature into poleis of equivalent size. It was supposed that a colony that grew too big would not threaten Athens, as in the strife between Corinth and Corcyra, because excessive size would doom it to self-destruction. 2. Athens did not anticipate that another polis might attempt to unite colonies into a political structure much larger than a polis. If there had been such an apprehension, all of the Greek poleis would have maintained stronger control over their colonies. Plato's recommendation rather reflects the young tradition of ostracism, in
which a likely demagogue would be neutralized by expulsion from political activity. Exporting small populations or banishing demagogues apparently maintained the ideal size of the polis.  

Colonization was also a precondition of external trade; was colonization, or external trade, the catalyst of the other? It is plausible that initial colonization was undertaken to solidify trade routes; colonies may have facilitated trade by reducing the incidence of piracy. This appears unlikely because the archaic Greek mentality had not evolved to a conception of exchange of equal values, abstracted from social relations; this conceptual deficit was part of the reason that archaic Greeks gave higher moral value to piracy than to trade. Colonization might have initiated this direction if aristocracy had prevailed. Since commerce and artisanship were reserved for metics, citizens without land had no means of earning a living or of maintaining the dignity due to them as citizens. The only restitution that would satisfy the dignity of citizen would be small-holding agriculture. Since dependence had been stigmatized as degrading, superfluous georgoi could not crowd into a domestic manufacturing sector. This was perhaps deeply unfortunate. A surplus of farmers is perhaps a typical phenomenon in one stage of social evolution, and the perhaps healthiest adjustment is absorption of excess rural population into an emergent manufacturing class. If Athenian society had been able to take this direction, the institutions of metics and slavery might have been avoided. The Greek poleis had not thought of any honorable remunerative occupation for a native citizen other than agriculture, nor had the poleis resorted to territorial expansion: hence colonization. In later periods perhaps still prior to the classical age colonization expanded for external commerce, but progression materialized only after the introduction of coinage enabled exchange that had been cumbersome or impossible by means of barter. Prior to colonization oriental commerce had

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415 Plato remarked that the wise legislator always got rid of troublesome agitators by sending them to the colonies, a policy which has proved useful in later times. *Laws*, 736. Cf. Michell, H.; *The Economics of Ancient Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 1940, p.224.  
416 Rather must we find the causes of Greek colonization in growth of population and an unsound land system which drove “landless men” away from their mother country to find liberty and scope for their energies in new settlements overseas.. Cf. Michell, H.; *The Economics of Ancient Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 1940, p.224.  
417 Herodotus, IV, 147-51.
placed Athens in deficit. Colonization was a necessary precondition for transformation from a kinship to a commercial society with polis organization.

This contrasts with the early development of the Oriental city-state, which by territorial expansion changed into a nation. Canals had dictated the inverse development of the oriental societies; an area needed irrigation to establish a settlement, and the social organization for building canals radiated exclusively from the city.\(^{418}\) The original social organization of Greece had been rural, and the polis matured when commerce entered society. Population growth alone would never have gestated the polis. Although population growth can elevate consumption and production, it can just as easily destroy society, depending on the land's carrying capacity relative to technological ability.\(^{419}\)

The poleis generated two reactions to overpopulation, prior and posterior to the invasions from Persia. Prior to the Persian Wars, war did not intend territorial expansion in the manner of Rome; wars between Greek poleis had been more like raids to acquire plunder or honor. Excepting the Spartan conquest of Messenia, there had been no systematic strategy to annex the land of neighboring poleis. But skirmishes did not suffice to correct the disequilibrium of overpopulation; given land shortage, the constant acquisition of slaves pursuant to war aggravated food scarcity more than it amplified food production. Since the excess slave-population could not be assigned to war, slavery imposed a strong limitation on the use of war to acquire land. Since slavery displaced citizens from labor, it severely reduced the number

\(^{418}\) Colonization was connected with a transition from a negative to a positive balance of trade, with the development of Greek-owned shipping, and with the search for foreign markets by Greek sailors. It was part of the great transformation from which emerged the characteristic features of Greek civilization. The decisive turning point in Greek social history is the development of the military urban particulars which led to the *polis*, in contrast to developments in the Near East where city monarchy existed at first but then developed into bureaucratic territorial monarchy and finally “world monarchy”. The crucial factor which made Near Eastern development so different was the need for irrigation systems, as a result of which the cities were closely connected with building canals and constant regulation of waters and rivers, all of which demanded the existence of a unified bureaucracy. Cf. Weber, Max; *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, Verso, London, 1988, p. 157

of citizens within the carrying-capacity of the polity; when Sparta finally did collapse, it was
due to the paucity of citizen soldiers. In any war, Sparta was more worried about a potential
internal slave revolt than she was about the external enemy.

The other relief to overpopulation had been deportation of the excess of relatively young
citizens to found a colony; this was sensible under the premise that the only honorable status
for a citizen was that of a land-holder. In consonance with the style of war as raiding parties,
however, there was no concerted belligerence for territorial expansion. The Greek apoikia
(colony) was deeply different from the Roman colonia (colony). The archaic colonies were
not dependencies or protagonists of the metropolis; they were almost wholly independent
after the initial act of colonization. Colonies were not, as in the modern connotation of colony,
possessions of the metropolis. 420 A colony might maintain some obeisance to the metropolis,
but there was no concerted attempt to bind colonies and polis into an empire.

Greek colonies were typically independent of their metropoleis, and efforts were not
made to curtail independence. 421 Archaic Greece had not surpassed the indigenous prejudice
against trade and external dependence. If archaic colonies had been established principally for
commerce, the metropolis would have maintained proprietary control over its colonies, but
in fact colonies dealt with mainland poleis indiscriminately. The Aegean colonies, or better
the Aegean poleis, were unambiguously settled for the sake of residence, although this area
was the most important trade nexus. The colonies to the West, which were settled later, were
probably complicated with commercial interests, because Greece had become alert to the
possibilities of commerce. Nevertheless, except for the grain trade with Euboea and Sparta, the
western area became more of a seller's rather than a buyer's market for Athens. 422

420 Indeed, despite much ink spilled to demonstrate the contrary, colonies are not very tightly bound
to their mother cities by religion, military alliance, or other ties. Cf. Antonaccio, M.; “Colonization:
Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 211.
421 It is indisputable that Greek and Roman colonies were different in character, despite the application
of the same English term to both. All Greek colonies were politically independent of their mother
cities (metropoleis) from the start, even if various contradictory claims could be made – and were. Cf.
Although not designed for empire, the colonies, from southern Russia to Spain, exhibit one common trait; the colonies are similar in climate and economy to the metropolis. Subordination to the metropolis was not maintained, but colonies propagated the production and living conditions of the metropolis. Nationalistic expansion not being the motive, colonization neither provoked war nor subjugated indigenes. Cohabitation was pursued, perhaps a legacy from the mainland practice of synoekismos. Colonists practiced xenia with the indigenes, through which Greeks absorbed them into patterns of mutual hospitality, as originally practiced between Greek aristocrats. In the 7th and 6th centuries poleis neither collected tribute from their colonies, nor forced their culture on the indigenes. The Delian League of Athens is not a cogent counterexample, not because it was in the 5th century but because it was in origin a voluntary alliance for a common purpose amongst exclusively Greek poleis.

It seems more plausible to reduce archaic colonization to Lebensraum. Divisible inheritance quickly morsellized small holdings to insufficient carrying capacity, while archaic Greeks supposed that entitlement to land ownership was an irrevocable right of kinship. Colonization on coastal locations, without inland territorial expansion, on the contrary, implies 423 The Greek word that we translate as colony, however, was apoikia, “home away from home.” This captures well the fact that Greek colonies were founded not in totally alien territories, but in lands bordering the Mediterranean, Adriatic, and Black, and even the very Aegean, seas. The landscapes and environments, and thus the agricultural economies and trade and transportation networks, were in many cases remarkably similar to those of colonies’ metropoleis (mother cities”). Moreover, interactions with the inhabitants of colonized territories may have run the gamut from violent aggression to alliance, but in the Archaic period at least there is some reason to believe that the severely polarized categories of Greek and Barbarian, so familiar in the Classical period, were not operative. Greeks and indigenes may have operated more at the level of partners, whether in hostilities or in the reciprocal obligations of friendship called xenia (both highly ritualized, in Greek society at any rate). Cf. Antonaccio, M.; “Colonization: Greece on the Move, 900-480,” in The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, Ed. Shapiro, H.A., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 204.

422 The second theory argues that all western colonies were founded with an eye toward either trading with the local populations and participating in the newly created Euboean trade network or establishing markets for their goods. This theory, then, would define the colonists who received and then worked their kleroi as essentially entrepreneurial. Something between these two positions is probably the case. Cf. Tandy, David W.; Warriors into Traders, the Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 76.
concentration on piracy and external trade. \textsuperscript{425} Greek colonization spread over the Aegean and Asia Minor ca. 800 B.C. The tribe was Ionic; Attica had been previously settled. \textsuperscript{426} However, the location of Aegean settlements as close as possible to Attica resembles a pattern of territorial more than one of commercial expansion; nevertheless, commerce originated in the Aegean. Attica at the earliest moment of colonization was characterized by material surplus, overpopulation, light famine and aristocratic government.

"Surplus," "light famine," and "overpopulation" seem inconsistent; as soon as there was overpopulation, it became possible to sequester wealth to the aristocracy by means of a

\textsuperscript{424} Greek colonization in the Archaic period was limited to the coastal regions of the Mediterranean, Aegean, Propontic, and Black Seas. These limits were, in part, determined by the limited aims of colonizing movement. No Greek metropolis set out to conquer a new empire, to bring religion to the natives, or to secure tribute from subject foreign peoples for the metropolis. It was not until the Athenian hegemony of the fifth century that a de facto empire of tributary, mostly Greek, communities was created. This included Athenian colonies established in the north Aegean and Bosphorus and klerouchies. Cf. Antonaccio, M.; “Colonization: Greece on the Move, 900-480,” in The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, Ed. Shapiro, H.A., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 222.

\textsuperscript{425} None of these claims, however, militates against political independence. Although the original community might be directly and collectively- "officially" –responsible for a colony’s founding, as in the case of Cyrene, this was not necessarily a rule. The earliest were established before the communities that founded them might even have been considered poleis, or at least before they were urbanized communities (not necessarily the same thing). Others were founded by ethne, an alternative form of political organization somewhat akin to a federation of communities centered on a common assembly, and a shared sense of regional identity, articulated by common cults. Because colonies were independent communities themselves founded by relatively small and independent polities (even they, which could have rather large populations, can be thus characterized), the Greek experience of colonization cannot be said to have participated in the kind of imperialism that operated in other times and places. Greek colonies were not put into place to claim territory for a distant ruler or state, or to secure resources for the same, or with any of the other justifications of imperial expansion in history. Indeed, the early Greek colonies are, to some extent, a natural outgrowth of two processes operating in the iron Age. Population growth is the first, a development that also led to what has been called the “internal colonization” of the territories surrounding the Iron Age communities, or the “infilling of the landscape” by settlers from existing groups from nearby settlements. The second is Greek trading activities, some of which used old Bronze Age routes to south Italy, Sicily, and the East that broke the paths to settlement. Cf. Antonaccio, M.; “Colonization: Greece on the Move, 900-480,” in The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, Ed. Shapiro, H.A., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 205.

\textsuperscript{426} At a very early age, in the last stages of the Homeric or “heroic” period, the inhabitants of Greece had begun to spread over the islands of the Aegean and the coasts of Asia Minor. Cf. Michell, H.; The Economics of Ancient Greece, Cambridge University Press, 1940, p.217.
credit and debit process which left *aristoi* with most of the land and sufficient labor, together with a large population of those who lost their landed property by virtue of debt. It might seem strange that unequal gift-exchange, and thereafter unequal trade, long preceded ideas of equal exchange, and accordingly delayed the development of Greek commerce. There had been no national framework in archaic Greece that might have fostered equal exchange. When a basileus or warlord visited a neighbor, he would provide elaborate gift-exchanges; the exchange was intended to produce good will and from that point cooperation, nonaggression, and good exchange in the future. Such gift exchange could not be equal; the lesser magnate gave more, the greater magnate returned less. The disproportion was calibrated to the difference in greatness between the two magnates. It could therefore be gravely insulting if the lesser magnate's gift was smaller than it should be, in that it would signify that the lesser magnate failed to appreciate the other's greatness. The profit in this unequal exchange for the lesser magnate was the achievement of some degree of trust for the sake of events or transactions in the future. The exchange was not economically rational, but its complication in reciprocal customs compensated against the initial economic loss. Gift exchange thus stabilized the hierarchies and relations between neighboring communities. The same concept of the justice of this unequal exchange pervaded all levels of society. Although it achieved more harmony than otherwise, it did not provoke enthusiasm for gift exchange or for trade, since the surplus of such exchange always went up, not down. It took a very long time to achieve the idea that just exchange was an equal exchange of goods, regardless of the relative social positions of the traders. Eventually equal exchange became normative, but it sacrificed the social security that had been achieved in the regime of unequal exchange.\textsuperscript{427}

Not even barter was the earliest form of exchange between polities. Barter was not rational in that the products exchanged were not equivalent; one exchange value may exceed the other because of noneconomic considerations such as prestige, kinship, obeisance, etc. Nevertheless barter was essentially rational. Exchange between basileis could not suffer being perceived as barter, which, implying inferiority and superiority, would inconvenience establishment of alliances between kings. Barter would impugn the implicit friendship conducted by the exchange; the exchange between kings was purely gift-exchange, purportedly
maintaining dignified disinterest in the balance of profit ensuing from the exchange. The gift-exchange was to establish trust between basileis; trust once achieved would economize on transaction costs between the two polities. Barter and reciprocity impeded commerce by pushing exchange in the direction opposite of commercial rationality. Similarly to barter, gift-exchange, being highly inaccurate, could not have spawned the idea of commerce; one could not adjust supply to demand, exchange was unequal, and the return gift was unpredictable. The mores and customs of reciprocity and piety in which exchange was entwined nevertheless made the environment more habitable than if one's neighbor were an overt enemy.

The cardinal issue of Athenian stenochoria was citizenship; but for the original land-qualification that constituted citizenship, alimentary shortage could not have demonstrated the necessity of colonization. An invading tribe would need to distinguish its members from non-members, for otherwise it would not achieve sovereignty. This distinction was achieved, after miscegenation with Mycenaean remnants, by making each tribal member a land owner,

427 The third mechanism, most prominent in the poems, was ritualized gift exchange. When one basileus visited another, he received gifts; feasting and gift giving established frameworks within which more substantial transfers could take place. Mistaking a basileus for a trader was a major breach of etiquette. Gift-exchange cemented alliances and defined hierarchy, but we should not exoticize and romanticize it into non-profit-seeking reciprocity. In a world where trust between members of different communities was an expensive commodity, gift exchange lowered transaction costs, creating at least some sanctions for unscrupulous behavior. Cf. Morris, Ian; “Early Iron Age Greece,” It hardly made sense for the members of the upper classes to invest part of their wealth in large-scale enterprises for commercial production: the chances of obtaining high returns from craft-based production were clearly lower than in agriculture or in money lending. Cf. Morris, Ian; Early Iron Age Greece, Ch.8, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.235.

428 The third mechanism, most prominent in the poems, was ritualized gift exchange. When one basileus visited another, they received gifts; feasting and gift-giving established frameworks within which more substantial transfers could take place. Mistaking a basileus for a trader (prekter) was a major breach of etiquette. Gift-exchange cemented alliances and defined hierarchy, but we should not exoticize and romanticize it into non-profit-seeking reciprocity. In a world where trust between members of different communities was an expensive commodity, gift exchange lowered transaction costs, creating at least some sanctions for unscrupulous behavior. Cf. Morris, Ian; Early Iron Age Greece, in The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, & Saller, Richard, editors; Cambridge University Press, p.235.

and correlatively a participant in government and military. Exclusion of non-members of the tribe from land ownership and legislative activities would prevent dissolution of the identity and culture by which the invasive tribe maintained sovereignty. Hence, the non-member was not allowed to own land that it collectively owned prior to invasion, and an individual who did not own land could not be a citizen. The tribal member of the tribe had to own land, because that was the criterion used to discriminate tribal sovereignty.

Since commerce and artisanship were reserved for metics, citizens without land had no means of earning a living or of maintaining dignity due to them as citizens. The only restitution that would satisfy the dignity of citizen would be small-holding agriculture. As any other labor had been regarded as degrading, superfluous georgoi could not crowd into an urban manufacturing sector. The Greek poleis had not thought of any honorable remunerative occupation other than agriculture for a native citizen, nor had the poleis resorted to territorial expansion: hence colonization.

430 When trust and knowledge were scarce, it also made sense even for those rich enough to take risks to embed exchange in other social relationships. Gift-giving made it difficult to respond to changes in supply and demand or to exploit advantages and knowledge. But information and transaction costs were so high that the potential of guests-friendship to control exploitation counted for more than its rigidities. Few of the conditions that development economists identify as favorable to growth were present. To. Cf. Morris, Ian; “Early Iron Age Greece,” It hardly made sense for the members of the upper classes to invest part of their wealth in large-scale enterprises for commercial production: the chances of obtaining high returns from craft-based production were clearly lower than in agriculture or in money lending. Cf. Morris, Ian; Early Iron Age Greece, Ch.8, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.235.

431 The Spartans’ refusal to share the kleroi of Messenia with a group large enough to occupy, in principle, “a fifth of Messenia,” is another example of what Plato’s stenochoria could mean: those excluded from the allocation of land were also excluded from full civic rights and from the consolidation of the political community of Sparta, newly emerging after a war of conquest. Instead of getting a state-allocated kleros at home, the colonists won an equivalent (or larger) allotment abroad in a new settlement: thus the two processes, consolidation at home and foundation abroad, were perceived as inextricably linked. Cf. Malkin, Irad; “Foundations,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raaflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 381.

432 Rather must we find the causes of Greek colonization in growth of population and an unsound land system which drove “landless men” away from their mother country to find liberty and scope for their energies in new settlements overseas. Cf. Michell, H.; The Economics of Ancient Greece, Cambridge University Press, 1940, p.224.
This eventually incurred a new complication. Land-possession secured the dominance of the conquering tribe over the conquered territory and guaranteed the priority of the tribal members, but partible inheritance removed land available for the property that qualified a tribal member as a citizen. The very criterion that had been devised to guarantee the collective sovereignty of the tribal members would, against purpose, disqualify tribal members from citizenship. Discrimination between members and non-members could not be sustained if the tribal members were deprived of citizenship. By colonizing the tribal members, but not non-members, the criterion of landed property could continue to assert the domination of the tribe and segregate tribal members from the conquered people. This consideration could define "overpopulation" to mark the moment at which the polis would have to spawn a colony in order to quell popular calls for land redistribution; only citizens, i.e. tribal members, and never aboriginal inhabitants, were sent in colonization and awarded landed property. Colonization preserved the compatibility of citizenship and kinship, but at a cost: it diminished the number of authentic tribal members in the metropolis, and promoted disproportionate population growth of the non-citizens.

It appears that territorial extension, i.e. aggression, ought to have been a more probable subsequent of intensive development than colonization. It is intriguing that the poleis did not follow an established course from internal war to eventual amalgamation into one nation. Territorial expansion would have condensed the full strength of the core citizen class, whereas colonization constantly dissipated this potential. Thales recommended ca. 546 BC a union of all Ionian poleis into one nation, realizing that otherwise the poleis could not resist absorption into the Persian Empire.\textsuperscript{434} The Delian League under Athens was essentially a realization of this idea. In the 7th century the dispossessed demos of Sparta had demanded land redistribution from the aristocracy; Sparta eluded civil war, i.e, class strife, by conquering Messenia and distributing the land acquisition.\textsuperscript{435} Athens had managed to consolidate all of Attica into one polity, and in the 6th century had conquered adjacent lands to resolve conflicts over land redistribution. Land annexation such as that of Sparta and Athens had been entirely

\textsuperscript{433} Herodotus, IV, 147-51.
successful. Nevertheless, by the sixth century the poleis had renounced conquest of contiguous land for enlargement of alimentary production, instead deporting excess population to external colonies, where such colonists were allotted land, but which did not in the least increase the power or property of the polity. Why did the Greeks waste their excess population on colonization instead of using it for land seizure? Why hadn’t the Greek poleis sustained a continuum of contiguous land acquisition, as would have culminated in formation of a nation-state?

The Spartans resolved this problem differently from Athens, by what might be considered internal colonization. Instead of sending young Spartans abroad to a colony, and omitting to send non-spartan inhabitants as well, the Messenians, those conquered by the Spartans, were already there. The underlying principle remained the same: to maintain the domination of the Spartans by preventing the infiltration of Messenians into civic life. Sparta did not produce colonies, because the chief motivation of colonization was to elude *stasis*. Since the Spartans

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434 The most powerful of all the states, Miletus had gone her own path and stood quite apart. One of her citizens, Thales, the astronomer and philosopher, whom we have met before, is said to have ventured himself into the speculations of political, as well as celestial, science. He saw the weakness of Ionia in its disunion, and the futility of the loose league of the Panionion; and he made the remarkable proposal that Ionia should form itself into an united nation, with one Hall of Council as well as one place of Assembly, each city surrendering her sovereignty and becoming merely a town or deme of the state; and he suggested Teos as the fitting place of the capital. The idea, whether it was put forward by Thales or not, was assuredly suggested by the political development of Attica, the mother country of the Ionians. Cf. Bury, J.B., *A History of Greece*, London, 1906, p. 231 ca.546.

435 Perhaps the most important way of relieving the internal tensions created by economic competition was to acquire new land and other resources by force at the expense of outsiders. Alongside widespread private raiding by sea and land, we also find public campaigns of plunder, conquest and overseas settlement. Sparta’s conquest of Messenia is the most dramatic example. Even if this was a much more piecemeal process than tradition suggests, it was by the late seventh century at least regarded as a public enterprise and served in part to silence popular agitation for an internal redistribution of land. Whether Athens’ conquests and settlements abroad from ca. 600 BC onwards were public ventures from the start is open to debate, but by the end of the sixth century these territories were under public control. Similarly, although many of the countless new towns settled by Greeks across the Mediterranean throughout the archaic age were probably the creation of private groups of settlers, the preserved oath of the original settlers of Cyrene shows that by the late seventh century publicly enforced emigration was also conceivable as a solution to desperate economic problems— in this case prolonged drought. Cf. Van Wees, Hans; “The Economy,” in *A Companion to Archaic Greece*, Eds. Raaffaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 463.
had instituted helots, the kind of overpopulation that fostered stasis could not occur.

The Spartans sent their secret-police ephebes out to murder helots, in order to intimidate the helots; but there might have operated a more subtle purpose. The murder of helots strongly resembles a coming-of-age ceremony for youths in primitive society; the young man would be proud of himself for having murdered a helot, because it would signify his passage from boyhood into manhood; the individual chosen for this service was always an ephebos, a young man. The preservation of the Spartan culture depended on internal purity; the helots and perioeci were a much larger proportion of the population than the citizens. If a young Spartan murdered innocent helots, he would feel guilt that would instill in him an irremediable hatred of helots, in order to justify to himself his murders. It is in general extremely easy for a dominant person to fraternize with a slave, due to constant contact, and fraternization could induce sympathy and friendship. In order to maintain dominance over its inordinately large slave population, it was necessary 1) to keep its citizens out of constant contact with their slaves, and 2) to secure that the hatred of the citizen for the helot would be indomitable. Regarding #1, sistitia secured physical isolation. In other poleis, the owner did farm work together with his slave; in Sparta, the citizen never did farm work, which was performed exclusively by slaves. Regarding #2, the hatred of the citizen for the helot was secured by means of the guilt induced in making the young citizen murder helots.

In this the Spartans had one advantage over the Athenians: the kleros. The Spartan also received landed property which distinguished him as a citizen, but the allotted land was cultivated by Messenians, rather than by the presumptive land-owner. The institution of the helot, i.e. the Messenian, deeply altered the notion of the citizen's landed property. The Spartiate owned the helot and land contingently. The Spartiate had life-or-death authority over the helot. However, the Spartiate could neither sell nor otherwise alienate the helot, and he could forfeit possession of him. The land allotted to the Spartan was not hereditary. Sparta used land-holding more vigorously to regiment her citizens. Ultimate control by the polis over the Spartiate's contingent possession of the helot drove into the Spartiate's soul constant awareness that he would lose his property, if for instance he befriended a helot. Land ownership was ultimately vested in Sparta. The contingency of land ownership was
made possible by the institution of the helot; the helot remained inexorably on the kleros, but the Spartiate land-holder existed there only conditionally. The Spartan kleros and Athenian colonization were kindred structures; both were devoted to the segregation of the conquering tribe from the defeated.

The archaic colonizations were not liberal, pace Thera; the colonists received land at the new colony and in some sense retained their citizenship in the mother colony, but colonization could be compulsory, and refusal could be punishable by death. Food shortage compelled emigration to Cyrene; the colonization was to the purpose of secure sustenance for the population remaining in Thera. Emigration, although ostensibly good for the emigrants, was oriented to the good of the polis. Conditions in which colonization was coercive were characteristic of aristocratic government; later colonization, which was voluntary, was associated with democracy. Coercive colonization may have been a continuance of coercion implicit in the consolidation of a polis under aristocratic or tyrannical government.

Archaic colonies characteristically adopted tyranny, the precursor of democracy. The metropolis was probably governed by a basileus, but since only landless, young citizens

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436 How fragile and potentially contentious this process was is suggested first of all by the massive movement of population associated with radically expanded trade of the new surplus and “colonization” – a mostly informal process which led ultimately in about a century and a half to the establishment of some fifteen hundred new Greek poleis scattered all around the Mediterranean and Black seas like “frogs in a pond” as Plato was to describe it (Phaedo 109b2). The process of consolidating poleis in Greece itself seems dialectically linked with the exclusion of many thousands of persons from these new communities of “citizens.” In some cases this exclusion was presumably managed directly by the new aristocracy as in the case of the settlement of Cyrene from Thera about 630. The fourth-century inscription speaks of a decision by the assembly, but it would be unrealistic at this period to envision an open democratic decision by the entire adult male community. The death penalty for refusal to comply suggests the coercive character of the process. In other cases individuals or groups of individuals hoped to seek their fortunes elsewhere than in the new poleis. Cf. Rose, Peter W.; “Class,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raafflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 473.

437 At Thera the reason for the “forced” colonization is dearth, a topos of foundation stories; but the fact that it is a topos does not mean that it is necessarily false, since actual dearth is common, especially in the Aegean islands, which have known long periods of abandonment. In short, both the cause and procedure of colonization are portrayed in terms of the well-being of the mother–city, with hardly a word about the colony as such. Colonization is again seen primarily from an internal perspective. Cf. Malkin, Irad; “Foundations,” in A Companion to Archaic Greece, Eds. Raafflaub, Kurt A., and van Wees, Hans, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 2009, p. 381.
moved to a colony, gentilian order did not persist for the organization of government; *tyranny* connoted popular selection. Oligarchy, rule by an aristocratic group of large land owners, could commence only after a couple generations during which the initially equal colonists had enough time to separate into large and small landholding classes. The earlier phase of tyranny was coincident with trade, inasmuch as, first, tyranny was hospitable to trade, and second, the Aegean colonies neighbored the oriental societies. The eastern colonies of the Ionian and Aegean adopted tyrannies from the start, whereas the western colonies adopted tyranny much later, because external commerce developed in the western seas only much later, when commerce became a deliberate objective.  

Aegean colonies characteristically evolved into democracies, whereas the remote colonies remained tyrannical.

**ARCHAIC COMMERCE**

The hereditary basileus, and with him aristocracy, had been inexpugnable until the expansion of commerce. The circumstance that four times more people died before the age of 60 as after inhibited economic growth, because it generated excessive dependents in women and children. Since commerce entails long-term planning far more than does subsistence economy, brevity of life discouraged commercial agriculture. Landowners constituted the earliest wealthy class; their strength inexorably increased in inverse proportion to the number of landowners. They were unchallengeable because 1) food production was

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438 Tyranny constitutes a notable feature of Archaic colonialism, but one that came late to the western colonies. It was the fifth century, not the seventh or sixth, that witnessed the ascent of the Emmenid tyrants of Akragas and the Deinomenids of Gela and Syracuse. Indeed, most of the colonies were ruled by landowning oligarchies, and the western tyrannies may be considered against this background. Cf. Antonaccio, M.; “Colonization: Greece on the Move, 900-480,” in The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, Ed. Shapiro, H.A., Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 220.

439 Whereas production is high on intensive power, mobilizing intense local social cooperation to exploit nature, exchange may occur extremely extensively. At its fringes, exchange may encounter influences and opportunities that are far removed from the production relations that originally generated selling activities. Economic power is generally diffuse, not controllable from a center. This means that class structure may not be unitary, a single hierarchy of economic power. Production and exchange relations may, if attenuated, fragment class structure. Cf. Mann, Michael, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume I*, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.25.
the first condition of survival, 2) land was scarce and fully distributed, 3) eventually the smallholder was financially compelled to alienate his smallholding to the magnate and 4) land value appreciated in a context of land scarcity and burgeoning population. Short life span and bad health had promoted aristocracy.

The life span in ancient Greece amounted to 25 years; life was not quite so bleak, inasmuch as infant mortality is calculated within that figure. However, health disability would on average incapacitate at least four of those years, and, contrary to the impression of Greek statuary, arthritis was endemic. Fertility rates do, but mortality rates do not, vary directly and immediately with food scarcity: why? Direct correlation of fertility-rate and production maintained exact equilibrium of population and carrying capacity. The elasticity of the mortality rate vis-à-vis food scarcity implies that population on occasion exceeded supply of minimally necessary food; then "minimally" is incoherent. If alimentation was minimal, mortality should have varied immediately with starvation; if the senile did not die more frequently from shortage, then another group would have to die. The mortality rate did not vary directly with food shortage, but it did vary indirectly, by virtue of factors in direct relation to disease, migration, and war, which were direct effects of famine. An old person, who was already alive, was more likely to survive adverse conditions than a person who was newly alive. Positive law affected the fertility rate more efficiently than the mortality rate. The Greeks had condoned a concept of infanticide, but not of euthanasia, though the same ground should

440 Up to three or four times as many people have died before as after age 60. Death was as much a phenomenon of childhood and maturity as of old age. Mortality on this scale hampers economic development by discouraging investment in human capital, creating large numbers of orphans and widows, and disrupting long-term economic strategizing. Cf. Scheidel, Walter, *Demography*, Ch.3, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.41.

441 Temporary output fluctuations are more likely to activate preventive checks (via nuptiality in England or marital fertility in China) than to raise mortality. While fertility tends to be highly sensitive to grain prices, the responsiveness of mortality is inversely correlated with the level of development. Death was often a necessary but not a sufficient cause for higher death rates: the effect of harvest variation on mortality appears to have been mainly indirect, via migration and exposure to disease, and was mediated by social mechanisms that govern the distribution of the impact of scarcity. Cf. Scheidel, Walter, *Demography*, Ch3, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 56.
have been equally compelling for both. Why did the Greeks apply economy to birth but not to senility? Partible inheritance and indigence directly discouraged prolific reproduction, but this was forbearance from a nonexistent possible; exposure apparently became conventional as an enthymeme of the motivations behind reproductive abstinence.442

Sexual reproduction is highly sensitive to immediate economic conditions, because abstinence is a forbearance, whereas the mortality rate of senility is relative to an act rather than a forbearance. The direct variance of the mortality rate with grain prices obtains in a subsistence economy, as there is no buffer, whereas a surplus economy accepts the diseconomy of the old and disabled because of expectation that they will soon disappear by natural cause.443 Belief in posthumous powers of the dead would have inhibited euthanasia, although this entails an explanation of the forces which made it beneficial to believe in a continuity with one's ancestors. The reverence of elders and the dead in Greek religion reflects a belief that the dead can affect the living.

The health-adjusted life expectancy also curtailed economic prospects of the polis. Under these factors economy would remain aristocratic. Early commerce was posterior and parasitic on agriculture; since commercial wealth was ultimately reducible to agricultural production, having no source independently of agriculture, commerce ought to have been unable to challenge aristocratic wealth. Since Greece did not practice primogeniture, partible inheritances quickly morsellized, and subdivision accelerated the transfer of land to the great proprietors. Commerce, syncategorematic on agriculture, could never have overwhelmed it. Agriculture could persist without commerce, but commerce could not exist without agriculture. Since commerce could not degrade agriculture without depleting its own resources, it essentially promoted the dominance of agriculture. Domestic trade first depresses the merchant, because productive labor is intensive, but commerce is extensive. Manufacture will not develop until there is commercial demand, but commerce entails a wide clientele. The

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merchant is subject to the great landlord because mercantile materials depend on domestic agricultural production; supply vanishes at the moment that the farmer does not achieve an agricultural surplus. The factor through which a merchant class, though ultimately dependent on agriculture, can surpass the great landowners is the partial replacement of domestic with remote trade.

Production entails intensive labor. At a phase of surplus development it beneficially absorbs the superfluous labor of agriculture, but in a subsistence economy, it depletes labor necessary for agriculture, and therefore does not commence. The oikos economy is adjusted to non-commercial subsistence. Both Egypt and Greece used schemes of redistribution, but their intentions were different. Egyptian redistribution imposed fixed social classes, whereas Greek redistribution proceeded from a premise of equality. The oriental fixation of classes through redistribution was an elaborate result of very long social evolution, whereas egalitarian redistribution is a feature of primitive social development. Citizens of Athens, conceived to be common owners of the polis, asserted a distributive right to any municipal surplus.

Aristocrats conducted all piracy and occasional commerce in the archaic period, in accordance with this premise. No conceptual distinction existed between commerce and piracy, there existed no merchants, and only aristocrats had ships. The earliest commerce, conducted by aristocrats rather than merchants, was not capitalistic; the exchange of goods stemmed from the prestige of exotic goods rather than avidity. The value of exotic goods was to distinguish the aristocrat from the commoner. What exchange as existed was transacted orally, and was in natural kind. Commercial exchange necessitates plans and written records, whereas commodities involved in barter are intrinsically unpredictable. No accounting or credit was employed, although standard weights and measures became necessary when the

444 At first the privileged classes of the aristocratic republics benefited by the increase of commerce; for the nobles were themselves the chief speculators. But the wealth which they acquired by trade undermined their political position. For, in the first place, their position depended largely on their domains of land; and when industries arose to compete with agriculture, the importance of land necessarily declined. In the second place, wealth introduced a new political standard; and aristocracies resting on birth tended to transform themselves into aristocracies resting on wealth. Cf. Bury, J.B., A History of Greece, London, 1906, p. 118.

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volume of commerce increased.\(^{445}\) Barter impeded motivation to extensive manufacture.\(^{446}\)

Proto-capitalistic commerce was a later and separate event, coeval with debt bondage; it resulted directly from kinship exclusion and land deprivation, and constituted a new social class. Between 1000 and 700 BC, Greece had been impoverished by comparison with oriental societies, and the Greek Aegean islands were the poorest of the Greek settlements. By 700 BC the Aegean islands were the wealthiest of the Greek settlements. Possibly the poverty of the Aegean caused it to become the wealthiest. Coinage began in the Aegean because these islands were the neighbors of Lydia. Coinage seems to have promoted political and social evolution. The areas in which coinage took root were the first areas to elaborate governmental office and law, and were the first to formulate laws and treaties with foreign polities for the expedition of disputes between citizens of different polities.\(^{447}\) The Aegean archipelago had been least able to sustain the rents and taxes that the aristocracy extracted to finance their rivalries; consequently the peculiar alliance between smallholders and lesser aristocracy formed more frequently in this troubled area. Alliance of lesser nobility and smallholders produced governments within the optimality band, i.e. stable government with taxation that did not crush commerce. The

\(^{445}\) As trade was conducted mainly in oral terms and largely via exchange of goods, accounting was scarcely necessary; for private purposes in a society where agency and credit were limited, but stronger economic activity came to require a standard measure and medium of value. Cf. Starr, C.G.; *Economic and Social Conditions in the Greek World*, in *The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C.*, edited by Boardman, John, F.B.A., and Hammond, N.G.L., F.B.A., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.430.

\(^{446}\) Industry serves only to supply necessities and luxuries. It is not an independent form of human labor; it does not aim at the rational exploitation of the many and various raw materials which nature has to offer to man. The industries connected with food, clothing, would, hides are still purely domestic in character. Cf. Toutain, Jules; *The Economic Life of the Ancient World*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, p.23.

\(^{447}\) The earliest coinage comes from late seventh-century Lydia; in the first half of the sixth century electrum coinage seems to have been slowly adopted by a relatively small number of Greek cities in Asia Minor, but after the first silver coinage was minted around 550 a very large number of Greek cities took to maintain. A recent count produces over 40 cities maintained by 500, and those spread from Cyprus through Libya to Sicily and South Italy. Coinage was one mark of another dramatic change: Greek cities acquired formal institutions. Magistracies, laws, treaties with other cities not only about peace and war but about how to treat individual disputes arising between their citizens, all of these gave a framework for economic activity practically absent in 700. Cf. Osborne, Robin; *Archaic Greece*, Ch.10, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.278.
homogeneity of production and the mountainous transport of mainland Greece on the contrary suppressed exchange between mainland Greek poleis.

The neighboring oriental societies introduced something revolutionary to Greek Aegean commerce; it was an exchange untrammeled by religious or other ethnic connotations of exchange; it provided the first possibility for godless commerce. The situation of the Aegean islands between the Greek mainland and the Orient impelled authentic commercial exchange because the Aegean was first to evince the possibility of acquiring as yet nonexistent goods by means of secular exchange. The prosperity of purely secular trade between alien cultures altered the balance of power in polis government in the Aegean basin, by having produced a new source of wealth that was not limited to birthright and land monopoly. As trade between Greece and the Orient had no common culture, exchange was compelled to base itself upon the intrinsic values of things, without regard to supervenient obligations of social relation. Commercial wealth, especially because it was foreign trade with oriental societies, subverted aristocratic predominance.

Remote commerce reduces dependence of raw material on domestic supply, in which case the merchant can profit even during the contraction of the domestic agricultural market. Mercantile domination over agriculture matures when commercial profit can grow even during deterioration of domestic agriculture. Although famine guarantees the highest possible price within the domestic market, the merchant may nevertheless transfer produce from the domestic market, inadvertently aggravating famine, to achieve greater profits in a remote market. This possibility gives the merchant a powerful device for predominating over the agriculturalist. It strained the traditional kinship structure of the basileus.

Extremely interesting is the Greek concept of the "just price". The concept applied to

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448 Around 1000, Aegean Greece was one of the poorest regions in the North Mediterranean, but by 700 it was one of the most dynamic and expensive. It was still poor compared to Egypt, Anatolia, the Levant, or Assyria, but over the next quarter-millennium a structural revolution pushed Greece into the “optimality band,” in which the state is strong enough to provide security and guarantee property, but not strong enough to engage in destructive rent-seeking. Cf. Morris, Ian; Early Iron Age Greece, Ch.8, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.241.
domestic retail trade, not external commerce, but on the other hand emerged only on the occasion of external commerce. The just price was one acceptable to the consumer, including a marginal profit for the merchant; *marginal* signified, exactly as in Aquinas, enough to support the merchant's life, vague though that be.\textsuperscript{450} This formulation was remarkable; one might as easily posit that the merchant's cost in acquiring the good is not at all the concern of the consumer; rather, whatever the consumer is glad to pay should be the proper foundation of market price. This is a fundamental moment for the entire history of western economics. The Greeks mysteriously penetrated to the idea that the merchant's cost and means of procurement should have a moral relation to the conditions under which the consumer could buy the good. The idea of just price originated from remote, not domestic trade; the concept emerged exactly from those conditions under which the consumer could not possibly know what the good had cost the merchant. Apparently the idea of just price derives from a speculation as to what the price should be on the model of the differential of cost and price in domestic exchange. The marginal profit of *just price* was to be far less than the potential profit of effective demand.

When price-fixing came in evidence, laws were introduced to limit individual grain purchase and speculation on grain shortage, but the poleis never resorted to socializing the market to prevent excess profit.\textsuperscript{451} Greek culture, especially Athenian culture, was reluctant

\textsuperscript{449} In Attica it begins with the conflict between the new rich and the landed aristocracy. The ancient families still love the soil, and live for the greater part on their estates. Division of the patrimony through many generations has made the average holding small [Semple, 425] (the rich Alcibiades has only 70 acres), and the squire xxx in most cases labors personally on the soil, or in the management of his property. But though the aristocrat is not rich, he is proud; he adds his father’s name to his own as a title of nobility, and he remains aloof as long as he can from the mercantile bourgeoisie which is carrying the wealth of Athens’ growing trade. Cf. Durant, Will; *The Life of Greece*, MJF Books, New York, 1966, p. 281.


\textsuperscript{451} Some *poleis* seem to have bought grain from the *emporoi* at a “just price,” i.e., one acceptable to the residents and leaving a margin of profit to the merchants. Exceptionally high prices for grain were subject to attempts that price-fixing, albeit within the *polis* at resale, as there is no xxx hand that anyone ever tried to regulate the wholesale price. The aim of the “official price” was stabilization, escaping unpredictable oscillations and, most frequently, preventing speculation and unjustified profits. Cf. Möller, Astrid; *Classical Greece: Distribution*, Ch.13, in Scheidel, Walter, Morris, Ian, and Saller, Richard; *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.373.
to control individual transaction, condoning liberal transactions in several instances that might have been more efficient if socialized; this seems to be inconsistent with the Greek conception of just price. On the contrary, the concept of just price substituted for socialization or legislation. Although the concept of just price was never explicitly formulated in law, it did enable an individual to sue the merchant if the price seemed excessive; in ancient Greece an individual could be sued for things that did not violate any established law. This attitude determined the market for the rest of history.

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