

Critiques of Tathāgatagarbha Thought in Buddhist Philosophy

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In 1989, two books on Buddhism were published in Japanese. One is *Critiques of Original Enlightenment Thought* (Hongaku shisō hihan) by Hakamaya Noriaki, a professor in Komazawa University, and the other is *Dependent-arising and Emptiness—Critiques of Tathāgatagarbha Thought* (Engi to kū—Nyoraizō shisō hihan) by myself. Then in the next year, Hakamaya published one more book, i. e. *Critical Buddhism* (Hihan bukkyō). Afterwards, maybe owing to the title of the last book, our views on Buddhism and our critical opinions of social implication began to be called “Critical Buddhism.”

As stated above, the word “Critical Buddhism” itself was originally employed by Hakamaya. I, for myself, have no feeling that I have proposed or advocated “Critical Buddhism,” because, on many points, I think, I am not in complete agreement with Hakamaya. So I feel a little embarrassed to know that I am sometimes called “[one of] Critical Buddhists” in some articles by English writers.

Of course, it cannot be denied that we have been influenced by each other and have much in common with respect to understanding Buddhism. To state, from my view-point, the most important common thesis of ours, it is critique of Tathāgathagarbha thought. So in this respect I would like to reconsider the problems of the so-called Critical Buddhism in this paper.

After the publications of the three books mentioned above, in 1992, Itō Takatoshi, a professor in our university, published a book, i. e. *A Critical Study of Chinese Buddhism* (Chūgoku bukkyō no hihanteki kenkyū)¹⁾. Itō, having approved of my hypothesis concerning Tathā-

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gatatagarbha thought and of the significance of Hakamaya's critiques of Original Enlightenment thought, argued that Taoist "Philosophy of Dao-Li (道・理)," neologism by himself, united with Indian Tathāgatagarbha thought, formed the foundation of Chinese Buddhism.

It might be true that our critical opinions have had a little impact on some Japanese scholars in Buddhist studies. Our critiques were introduced into the academic world of English-reading scholars by the excellent article entitled "Zen is not Buddhism—A Recent Japanese Critiques of Buddha-nature" (*Numen* 40, 1993) by Paul Swanson. And further, perhaps thanks to the influence by this article and his efforts, a panel on "Critical Buddhism" was held at the Annual Meeting of American Academy of Religion (AAR) in November 1993. At this panel, various views and critiques on "Critical Buddhism" were presented.

Furthermore, an English book on "Critical Buddhism"²⁾ is now being edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul Swanson and will be published next year. The book, entitled *Pruning the Bodhi Tree*, contains the articles of fifteen authors, including the papers which were presented at the panel above mentioned and were revised afterwards.

This is the very short history of "Critical Buddhism." Then, when did the "Critical Buddhism" begin? I consider that it began with the publication of Hakamaya's article "Thoughts of the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination" (Sabetsu jishō o umidashita shisō-teki haikei ni kansuru shiken)³⁾ in 1986, because, from my view point, it was the first article which critically connected the so-called Buddhist thought with social problems.

The main theme of the article was critique of Original Enlightenment thought from Buddhist standpoint. But it is important that this critique was incited by the problems of discrimination in the Sōtō sect (曹洞宗), to which we belonged. It cannot be denied that there have been discriminatory practices in the sect, one of the biggest traditional Buddhist sects in Japan. Or more strictly, it is now evident that a variety of discriminatory events have been until now produced

by Sōtō priests, as is clear by the evidences such as discriminatory posthumous Buddhist names contrived by them. Of course, this is not the problem peculiar to the Sōtō sect alone. However, this problem have had especially heavy weight in our sect, because of the so-called Machida affair.

At the Third World Conference on Religion and Peace in 1979, Machida Muneo, then the secretary general of the Sōtō sect as well as the president of the Buddhist Federation of Japan, denied the existence of discrimination against identifiable outcaste groups in the present-day Japan. This denial provoked strong protests by the Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaihō Dōmei 部落解放同盟). The Sōtō leadership soon admitted Machida's mistake and issued public apologies. But simple apologies were of no use. Machida and other Sōtō leaders were interrogated and denounced by the Buraku Liberation League at five assemblies, and finally, at the last assembly in 1983, which occurred at the Administrative Headquarters of the Sōtō Sect, Machida read a statement in which he admitted his personal prejudices and pledged to eliminate all forms of social discrimination in the Sōtō sect.⁴⁾

Anyway, I think, the Sōtō leadership was then demanded to perform two tasks. One is to investigate thoroughly the real state of the discriminatory events in the sect, and the other is to seek for the ideological background of social discrimination in the so-called Buddhist doctrines. It seems for this second purpose that we were summoned to the Administrative Headquarters of the Sōtō Sect in December 1984. Then we, Hakamaya, myself and other six professors of the Faculty of Buddhism in Komazawa University, were appointed to be the members of the Second Special Subcommittee for the Committee of the Doctrinal Issues of the Sōtō Sect (曹洞宗教学審議会第二専門部会), of which the chairman was Okabe Kazuo.

As far as I can remember, our subject then assigned was to investigate the relation between social discrimination and the Buddhist

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doctrine of “karman” explained in the *Shushōgi* (修証義), the most popular sacred text in our sect. But our discussions in the subcommittee went far beyond the subject.

I think it is not improper to state that we, Hakamaya and myself, were once again made aware of being Buddhists as well as the members of the Sōtō sect, when we were summoned to the Headquarters. As far as I am concerned, I had almost forgotten until then to be a Buddhist and a member of the Sōtō sect, being absorbed in my own speciality, i. e. Mādhyamika philosophy in India and Tibet. Hakamaya also was a noted specialist in Yogācāra philosophy. Under such circumstances, I felt no urgent need to reflect on what Buddhism is.

What is Buddhism? To put such a question or to pose such a problem seemed useless to me, because I thought that such a problem could never be solved from the standpoint of objective scholarship. But my view has changed, confronted with the problem of discrimination in Buddhism. To be a Buddhist, I thought, is to be responsible for the evil deeds done by Buddhists. And, to be a Buddhist cannot be compatible with being a scholar of objective viewpoint. Having thus considered, I forsook objective scholarship, and took a subjective standpoint.

Anyway, it seems certain that the Subcommittee above mentioned had been orientated by Hakamaya’s theory, i. e, critique of Original Enlightenment thought. His theory was first disclosed at the first meeting of our subcommittee, in January 1985, and afterwards came to fruition in his article above mentioned, i. e. “Thoughts on the Ideological Back ground of Social Discrimination”, which was first read at the Center for Buraku Liberation (Buraku Kaihō Sentā 部落解放センター) in October 1985, and then published with a preface added in *Journal of the Faculty of Buddhism* of our university in March 1986.

According to my understanding, Hakamaya argued in the article as follows :

1. Original Enlightenment (hongaku 本覚) thought is the ideological background of social discrimination.
2. Original Enlightenment thought is not Buddhistic.
3. Dogen, the founder of the Sōtō sect, criticized Original Enlightenment thought in his *Bendōwa* (弁道話), one of the earliest works of Dogen.
4. In spite of Dogen's critique of Original Enlightenment thought, the followers of Dogen, i. e. the Sōtō priests have been rather in the position advocating Original Enlightenment thought.
5. Thus discriminatory practices and events have been caused by the Sōtō priests in the Sōtō sect.

These arguments by Hakamaya, although they saved Dogen from being discriminatory, provoked vehement controversies among the scholars specializing in the Sōtō orthodoxy, because Hakamaya argued that the intent of Dogen's teachings, i. e. critique of Original Enlightenment thought, was misunderstood by his followers and that the object of Dogen's critique was, in reverse, advocated by them. Thus, according to Hakamaya, it is appropriate to consider that the object of Dogen's critique, i. e. Original Enlightenment thought, is now being advocated and preached as Dogen's teaching by the Sōtō priests. If Hakamaya is right, this is an extremely serious problem. So he became the central figure of the severe controversies⁵⁾, which have been hardly experienced in the history of the Sōtō sect.

It is also noteworthy that Hakamaya afterwards added two more points⁶⁾ to his arguments above mentioned, as follows :

6. Dogen's critique of Original Enlightenment thought was brought into perfection in his *Twelve Fascicle Shōbōgenzō* (十二卷本『正法眼藏』) written in his later days.
7. Dogen's main position in the *Twelve Fascicle Shōbōgenzō* is the "deep faith in cause and effect" (jinshin inga 深信因果).

These arguments by Hakamaya have also stimulated the studies of Dogen's thought. Thus it seems evident that we are now incapable

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of discussing Dogen's thought without referring to Hakamaya's arguments.

Now, we will focus on the central conception of his article in question. What is "Original Enlightenment thought"? What did he mean by the word. He explained it as follows :

Original Enlightenment (hongaku) is the original enlightenment, which is beyond the phenomenal world. Although that enlightenment is eternal in that it is, by nature, universally possessed by all human beings, they partake of change, birth and destruction, so long as they are not awakened to that [enlightenment].⁷⁾

This explanation, I think, is rather vague in a logical sense. Hakamaya himself did not seem to be satisfied with this explanation. So he referred to the two articles which, he considered, had clarified the character of Original Enlightenment thought.⁸⁾ One is "Tibetology and Buddhism" (Chibettogaku to Bukkyō)⁹⁾ by Yamaguchi Zuihō and the other is "On the One-vehicle Thought in the Śrīmālāsūtra" (Shōmangyō no Ichijōshisō ni tsuite)¹⁰⁾ by myself.

According to Hakamaya's view, Yamaguchi there made clear the difference between Tibetan Buddhism, the orthodox position of which was the thought of "emptiness" (śūnyatā), and Chinese Buddhism, founded on Original Enlightenment thought, and further argued that Dogen's position was rather nearer to Tibetan Buddhism. It seems now almost doubtless that Yamaguchi's arguments in the article had a great influence on Hakamaya. Especially, it seems possible to understand that the original model of his theory that Original Enlightenment thought was criticized by Dogen can be found already in Yamaguchi's article, because there he made a severe distinction between the thought of "emptiness" and Original Enlightenment thought, and ranked Dogen as an advocater of the former thought.

As will be stated below, I cannot, at present, admit Hakamaya's thesis that Original Enlightenment thought was criticized by Dogen, nor do I consider Dogen to be an advocater of the thought of "empti-

ness". But Yamaguchi's critical view on Original Enlightenment thought was very important.

Yamaguchi, one of the greatest authority on Tibetology, is our mentor, who introduced us into the study of Tibetan Buddhism. It seems quite unique among Japanese scholars that he has been, from the very early days, in possession of critical views on Original Enlightenment thought or Tathāgatagarbha thought. As early as 1973, he stated quite explicitly that the significance of the so-called Sam ye (bSam yas) debate, generally considered to be held in Tibet at around the end of the eighth century A. D., lied in the critique of Tathāgatagarbha thought in Chinese Buddhism.¹¹⁾ It might be possible to consider that Yamaguchi's critical view towards Tathāgatagarbha thought was succeeded by Hakamaya and me.

As to my article referred to in Hakamaya's article he considered my hypothesis of "dhātu-vāda" (locus-theory) explained there to be identical with his idea of "Original Enlightenment thought". In fact, I presented the hypothesis for the first time in the article.

The hypothesis was a result of my study of the One-vehicle (ekayāna) theories in the *Śrīmālāsūtra* and the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*,¹²⁾ the typical works of Tathāgatagarbha thought and Yogācāra thought respectively. As a result, considering that there might have been a common theoretical structure in the two theories, I framed the hypothesis of "dhātu-vāda". According to the hypothesis, "dhātu-vāda" is the theory that the single existent locus (dhātu) or basis is the cause of producing the manifold world or super-locus (dharma)." Further, I argued that the reality of the history of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism was that there had been two mutually contradictory theories, i. e. "dhātu-vāda" of Tathāgatagarbha thought as well as Yogācāra thought, and "śūnyatā-vāda" (emptiness theory) of Mādhyamika thought.¹³⁾ Thus the distinction between Tathāgatagarbha thought and Yogācāra thought was nullified, and the distinction between Mādhyamika thought and Tathāgatagarbha thought was set

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up.¹⁴⁾ It is obvious that the idea has had an influence on Hakamaya.

In 1986, I wrote an article, titled “Tathāgatagarbha Thought is not Buddhism” (Nyoraizō shisō wa bukkō ni arazu).¹⁵⁾ I would like to explain the motive for writing it and its outlines.


As stated above, I was made aware of being a Buddhist, and was obliged to think about what Buddhism is, confronted with the problem of discrimination. So my article has the following three parts :

- (I) Explanation of what I understand to be Buddhism
- (II) Explanation of what I understand to be Tathāgatagarbha thought
- (III) Explanation that they are not identical but contradictory to each other

In the first section, having forsaken the viewpoint of objective scholarship, I stated that I considered Buddhism to be the theory of “dependent arising” (pratītyasamutpāda). But to consider Buddhism to be the theory is rather a general understanding. My point was that I interpreted the theory not as meaning the spatial simultaneous interdependence of all things, which was advocated by the Huayan (華嚴) philosophers in Chinese Buddhism, but as signifying the temporal causal sequence of properties (dharma, superlocus) without any basis (dhātu, locus) supporting the properties, as explained by the theory of “twelve-membered dependent arising” stated at the beginning of the *Vinaya, mahāvagga*.

My interpretation of the theory of “dependent arising” was explained in detail in my next article, i. e. “On Dependent Arising” (Engi ni

「縁起説」の図



tsuite),¹⁶⁾ published in the same year. There I presented the following diagram in order to explain my interpretation of “dependent arising”.

In this article, I further presented my interpretation that what was meant by “dependent arising” was “religious time” (shūkyō teki jikan).¹⁷⁾

Also in the first section of the article “Tathāgatagarbha Thought is not Buddhism”, I stated as follows :


I would like to believe that Śākyamuni had attained Enlightenment having considered the “twelve-membered dependent arising” in regular and reverse orders, as stated in the *Vinaya, mahāvagga*.¹⁸⁾

But this statement seems to have been misunderstood by scholars. I do not consider that *mahāvagga*’s account of the Buddha’s Enlightenment to be a historical fact, as is shown by the following passage in my article “On Dependent arising”:

I, too, admit that the theory of “twelve-membered dependent arising” was established later. Nevertheless, I assert that Śākyamuni had awakened to “twelve-membered dependent arising”, because of two motives. The first is to oppose to the standpoint of objective scholarship or to the idea that scholarship must be objective, and to oppose to the idea of “suspension of final judgements”.¹⁹⁾

So my word “to believe” in the first statement represents that my interpretation was finally based on my subjective viewpoint.

In the second section of the article in question, I explained the “dhātu-vāda” hypothesis using a following chart :



Here “dhātu”, meaning “the place or locus on which something is

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placed, is the “locus” (L), and “dharma”, meaning “what is supported by something”, is the “super-locus” (S). Further, I counted the following six points concerning the structure of “dhātu-vāda”:

- (1) L is the basis of S.
- (2) Therefore, L produces S. [L is the cause (hetu) of S]
- (3) L is one, S are many.
- (4) L is real (existent), and S are not real (non-existent).
- (5) L is the essence (ātman) of S.
- (6) Although S are not ultimately real, they have reality to some extent or have reality as their ground, because they are produced from L and have L as their essence.

As to Point(5) mentioned above, I pointed out that the “locus” (L) was called “ātman” in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*²⁰⁾ and the *Śrīmālāsūtra*.²¹⁾

Point(6) concerns with the problem of social discrimination. I argued as follows :

Point (6) serves as a theoretical foundation for supporting discrimination by stabilizing the actual difference. Here we can find the logical ground for such discriminatory systems as the theory of “goshō kakubetsu” (五姓各別) or “fixed difference between the five lineages (gotra) of sentient beings” [which denies “enlightenment by all beings”] and the caste system in India, because we can place, on the level of “S”, the five lineages including “agotra” (beings without lineage) or “icchantika” who can never attain Buddhahood as well as various social classes from kingship to slavery.

Thus, the seemingly contradictory theses that “all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature (buddha-dhātu) [L]” and that “the icchantika can never attain Buddhahood” can be harmonized, without being contradicted, within the structure of “dhātu-vāda”.

In “dhātu-vāda” the plurality of “S” cannot be dissolved, because the plurality is the indispensable element for the structure. In

other words, the singular nature or equality of “L” does not serve to eradicate the plurality or difference of “S”, but rather acts as the basic support to maintain the plurality. This is clearly the thought of discrimination.²²⁾

Thus, I branded Tathāgatagarbha thought as a principle of discrimination. The following passage from a Chinese translation of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* is one of the evidences which I quoted in order to prove my thesis.

Although the icchantikas possess Buddha-nature, -----they cannot produce the excellent cause of enlightenment (bodhihetu). [Taisho, 12, 419b]

In the final section of the article, I contended that Buddha’s theory of “dependent arising” can be meaningful only in case of being understood as the anti-thesis to “dhātu-vāda”. Thus I concluded as follows: Tathāgatagarbha thought is not Buddhism.

The aboves are what I consider to be the beginnings of the so-called “Critical Buddhism”. Afterwards, Hakamaya, while acting and writing as the central figure of the controversies on the Sōtō orthodoxy, extended the scope of his critique out of the world of Buddhist studies. For example, the theories or the opinions of the following thinkers or scholars in Japan were criticized by him :

Umehara Takeshi,²³⁾ Nishitani Keiji,²⁴⁾ Watsuji Tetsurō,²⁵⁾ Kobayashi Hideo,²⁶⁾ Yanagida Seizan,²⁷⁾ Nakazawa Shinichi,²⁸⁾ Yamaori Tetsuo,²⁹⁾ Sono Ayako,³⁰⁾ Kurita Isamu,³¹⁾ Nishida Kitarō³²⁾

Especially, his statement “critique alone is Buddhism”³³⁾ in his book *Critical Buddhism* made his position quite clear. It is also noteworthy that there he placed special emphasis on the role of “intellect” or “critique”, having made a distinction between “Critical philosophy” and “Topical philosophy”, based on the ideas of Descartes and Vico respectively.³⁴⁾ Further, he criticized the philosophy of the so-called Kyoto school, because he considered it to be a mixture of the German Idealism and Original Enlightenment thought.³⁵⁾

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Moreover, it is likewise important that Hakamaya made clear his critical view on Zen, already in his first book. There he stated as follows :

I feel for certain that there might have been, in the future of the *Twelve Fascicle Shōbōgenzō*, the direction [in which Dogen would state that] Zen is not Buddhism.³⁶⁾

As is seen from this statement, Hakamaya's critique of Zen was strongly motivated by Dogen's critical comments on Chinese Ch'an in his *Twelve Fascicle Shōbōgenzō*.

As for me, my works seems to have been rather restricted to the field of Buddhist studies. In my book *Dependent Arising and Emptiness*, I argued that the theory of "nirvāṇa" or "vimukti" (liberation) was based on the non-Buddhistic theory of "ātman" (ātmavāda).³⁷⁾ In my next book, i. e. *Critical Studies of Zen Thought* (Zen shisō no hihanteki kenkyū), I contended that the essence of Zen (dhyāna, ch'an) thought lied in its idea of "cessation of thinking".³⁸⁾ Further, in my recent article, 'Critical Considerations of Buddhism' (Bukkyō no hihanteki kōsatsu), I criticized in detail Nakamura Hajime's method of studying Original Buddhism, and argued that what he interpreted as Original Buddhism was nothing other than Jainism.³⁹⁾

As for my critiques of social implications, I, as well as Hakamaya,⁴⁰⁾ criticized the theory of "wa" (和) or "harmony" in the *Kokutai no Hongi* (国体の本義) published by the Japanese Ministry of Education in 1937,⁴¹⁾ and Umehara's Japanology,⁴²⁾ because I thought that I could find in them the same forms of thought, i. e. Tathāgatagarbha thought. The totalitarian theory of "wa" in the *Kokutai no hongī*, I argued, had its origin in Chinese Huayan philosophy, which itself was a developed form of Tathāgatagarbha thought.⁴³⁾

Moreover, I cannot but recognize the same Huayan philosophy in Nishida's famous paper in May 1943, i. e. "The Principle of the New World Order" (Sekai shinchitsujo no genri),⁴⁴⁾ which is often considered to be a blueprint of the Proclamation of the Greater East Asia Co-

Prosperity Sphere, issued by the Tōjō government in November 1943.⁴⁵⁾ Nishida stated there as follows :

Just as in an organism, that the whole (全体) becomes One (一) is that each member (各自) becomes each member itself, and that each member becomes each member itself is that the whole becomes One.⁴⁶⁾

What is explained here is the typical preaching of “harmony” between the whole and the individual, repeated by the Huayan philosophers.⁴⁷⁾ And the same preaching was made again half a year later at the beginning of the Proclamation above mentioned, as follows :

The fundamental principle for establishing world peace is to enjoy together the happiness of co-prosperity of all the countries, each country having acquired its own place and having depended on and assisted by one another.

The interdependence of all the countries here stated is but a reflected expression of the Huayan theory of “non-obstruction between a thing and a thing” (事事無礙).⁴⁸⁾ Simply Speaking, it seems evident that Tathāgatagarbha thought has been functioned there as a principle of discrimination and as a theory of totalitarianism.

My critical opinions towards totalitarianism, nationalism, experiential anti-rationalism (e. g. mysticism of Zen or Tantrism), naturalism and polytheism or pantheism are summarized in my paper “An Aspect of the Lotus-sutra and Japanese Culture” given at the Vancouver Conference in 1990.⁴⁹⁾ On the last point above mentioned, I think, Buddhists must love the absolute other (絶対他者).⁵⁰⁾

By the way, in due course of time, I began to have doubts about Hakamaya’s understanding of Dogen. So I criticized his interpretation in my article “On Deep Belief in Cause and Effect” (Jinshin inga ni tsuite) published in 1991.⁵¹⁾ The main points of my critique are well summarized by the following passages in my paper “My View on Critical Buddhism ”given at the Panel on Critical Buddhism above mentioned :

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For example, I think, at present, it cannot be stated that Dogen criticised original enlightenment thought or tathāgatagarbha thought in his *Bendōwa*, because his own position there, which is well expressed by the word “shinjin ichinyo” (identity of body and soul), is to be regarded as one type, the extreme type, of tathāgatagarbha thought. Moreover, even in the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*, I think, Dogen was not entirely free from the way of thinking based on tathāgatagarbha thought.⁵²⁾

To state my opinion in other words, Dogen was not entirely free from the discriminatory way of thinking even in his last days.

Finally, is there any future of the “Critical Buddhism”? In 1993, Hakamaya suddenly left the Sōtō sect. The reason was not clearly explained.⁵³⁾ But he continues to write energetically many critical papers, especially on the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism.⁵⁴⁾ As for me, I feel, I am not fully answered by the scholars who have optimistic views about Tathāgatagarbha thought. Especially, I think, the answer by Takasaki Jikidō,⁵⁵⁾ the greatest authority on Tathāgatagarbha thought in Japan, is not sufficient.⁵⁶⁾ So I must continue to study the thought

In “My View on Critical Buddhism” above mentioned, I wrote that Critical Buddhism must be critical towards Critical Buddhism itself.⁵⁷⁾ Buddhism, or critique of Thāgatagarbha thought, is none other than critique of “self” or “identity”. So, I think, we can reach quite a commonplace conclusion :

We must be very careful or critical when we try to understand Buddhism and to be Buddhists.

Abbreviation

CO : *Critiques of Original Enlightenment Thought*, Daizō Shuppan, 1989

CB : *Critical Buddhism*, Daizō Shuppan, 1990

DE : *Dependent-arising and Emptiness*, Daizō Shuppan, 1989

CZ : *Critical Studies of Zen Thought*, Daizō Shuppan, 1993

KBK : *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyogakubu Kenkyu Kiyo*

KBR : *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyogakubu Ronshu*

notes

- (1) Published by Daizō Shuppan.
- (2) *Pruning the Bodhi Tree—Storm over Critical Buddhism*, Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, eds., University of Hawaii Press, 1997.
- (3) KBK, No. 44, 1986, pp. 128-216 ; CO, pp. 134-158.
- (4) In writing this paragraph, I rely on the article by William Bodiford. Cf. William Bodiford, “Zen and the Art of Religious Prejudice, Efforts to Reform a Tradition of Social Discrimination”. *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, 23/1-2, 1996, pp. 14.
- (5) As for Hakamaya’s works on Dogen, cf. the articles contained in CO, Part II, and his book *Dogen and Buddhism—Dogen in the Twelve Fascicle Shōbōgenzō* (Dogen to bukkyō—Jūnikanbon shōbōgenzō no Dōgen), Daizō Shuppan 1992.,
- (6) Cf. CO, pp. 342-344, pp. 290-291.
- (7) CO, p. 142.
- (8) Cf. CO, pp. 150-151.
- (9) KBR, No. 15, 1984, pp. 30-53.
- (10) KBK, No. 41, 1983, pp. (37)-(64); DE, pp. 299-334.
- (11) Yamaguchi Zuihō, “Tibetan Buddhism and Kim hva shang of Silla” (Chibetto bukkyō to shiragi no kin oshō), *Studies of Buddhism in Silla* (Shiragi bukkyō kenkyū), Sankibō Busshorin, 1973, p. 36, n. 113.
- (12) Cf. Matsumoto, “On the One-vehecle Thought of the Vijñānavādins” (Yuishikiha no ichijōshisō ni tsuite), KBR, No. 13, 1982, pp. (1)-(23)
- (13) Cf. DE, p. 313.
- (14) This distinction was not clear even in the dGe lugs pa sect of Tibetan Buddhism. On this problem, cf. Hakamaya, “The Traces of Maitreya’s Five Treatises in Tibet” (Chibetto ni okeru maitoreya no gohō no kiseki), *Buddhism and Society in Tibet* (Chibetto no bukkyō to shakai), Yamaguchi Zuihō ed., Shunjūsha, 1986, pp. 235-268.
- (15) IBK (Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū), 35-1, 1986, pp. (127) (132); DE, pp. 1-9.
- (16) KBR, No. 17, 1986, pp. 437-494; DE, pp. 11-97.
- (17) DE, pp. 14-18.

- (16) Critiques of Tathagatagarbha Thought (Matsumoto)
- (18) DE, p. 1.
- (19) DE, p. 22.
- (20) Cf. the passage “彼仏者是我義” (Taisho, 12, 862a). On this passage, see my article, “The Nirvāṇa-sūtras and ātman” (Nehangyō to ātoman), *Ātmajñāna* (‘Ga’ no shisō), Shunjūsha, 1991, pp. 149–150.
- (21) Tibetan translation (Peking ed., *Hi*, 280a7; 280b1).
- (22) DE, p. 6.
- (23) Cf. CO, pp. 135–136; pp. 211–218.
- (24) Cf. CB, pp. 36–38; pp. 240–243.
- (25) Cf. CB, pp. 323–352.
- (26) Cf. CB, pp. 155–220.
- (27) Cf. “Critiques of Zen Sect” (Zenshū hihan), *Annual Report of the Zen Institute*, No. 1, 1990, pp. 65–77; “(Book review) Mirai kara no Zen by Yanagida Seizan” (Yanagida seizan cho Mirai kara no zen), KBR, No. 21, 1990, pp. 413–431.
- (28) Cf. CB, pp. 313–315; “Against the New Publication of the Quarterly Bukkyō (Buddhism)” (Kikan bukkyō no hakkan ni yosete), KBR, No. 19, 1988, p. 428; “Critique of Nakazawa Shinichi—The Contemporary Mo he yan” (Nakazawa shinichi hihan—Gendai no makaen), *Seiron*, 1989 (October), pp. 174–187; “Buddhism as a Self-criticism” (Jiko hihan to shite no bukkyō), *Komazawa Tanki Daigaku Bukkyō Ronshū*, No. 1, 1995, p. 108, p. 122, n. 37.
- (29) Cf. “Against the New Publication of the Quarterly Bukkyō”. pp. 430–431.
- (30) Cf. “Buddhism as a Self-Criticism”, pp. 115–117.
- (31) Cf. CB, pp. 103–109.
- (32) Cf. CO, pp. 276–279.
- (33) CB, pp. 3–4.
- (34) Cf. CB, pp. 3–46.
- (35) Cf. CB, pp. 47–92.
- (36) CO, p. 368.
- (37) Cf. DE (chapter 4), pp. 191–224.
- (38) Cf. CZ (chapter 1), pp. 1–85.
- (39) Cf. “Critical Considerations of Buddhism”, *Formation of Images of the World* (Sekaizō no keisei), Series Asian Perspectives (Ajia kara kangaueru), No. 7, Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1994, pp. 132–155.

- (40) Cf. CB, p. 111.
- (41) Cf. DE, pp. 114–116, n.11 ; p. 116, n. 14.
- (42) Cf. DE, pp. 100–102.
- (43) Cf. DE, p. 115, n. 11 ; “Critical Considerations of Buddhism” pp. 174–176.
- (44) *Collected Works of Nishida Kitarō* (Nishida kitarō zenshū) [NKZ], Iwanami Shoten, Vol. 12, 1966, p. 426–434.
- (45) Cf. Hiromatsu Wataru, *On ‘Overcoming Modernity’* (‘Kindai no chōkoku’ ron), Kōdansha Gakujutsu Bunko, No. 900, 1989, p. 207 ; Yusa Michiko, “Nishida and Totalitarianism : A Philosopher’s Resistance, *Rude Awakenings—Zen, the Kyoto School, & the Question of Nationalism*, University of Hawaii Press, 1995, p. 123. I do not agree with Yusa, because I cannot recognize “a philosopher’s resistance” in Nishida’s works.
- (46) NKZ, Vol. 12, p. 430.
- (47) Nishida’s affinity to the Huayan philosophers is well shown at the beginning of his diary of July 1943, where the titles of the famous Huayan writings such as the *Wu jiao zhang* 五教章 (Taisho, No. 1866), the *Fa jie xuan jing* 法界玄鏡 (Taisho, No. 1883) and the *Zhu Fa jie guan men* 註法界觀門 (Taisho, No. 1884) were written. See NKZ, Vol. 17, 1966, p. 667.
- (48) Cf. the *Fa jie xuan jing*, Taisho, Vol. 45, 672c–673a.
- (49) Cf. Paul Swanson, “Zen is not Buddhism”, p. 126.
- (50) Cf. DE, p. 111 ; “Which is earlier, Dharma or Buddha” (Hō ga saki ka hotoke ga saki ka), *From Buddha to Dogen* (Budda kara dogen e), Tōkyō Shoseki, 1992, p. 119 ; “Critical Considerations of Buddhism”. p. 169, p. 177.
- (51) “On Deep Belief in Cause and Effect”, *The Problems in the Twelve Fascicle Shōbōgenzō* (Jūnikanbon shōbōgenzō no shomondai), Daizō Shuppan, 1991, pp. 199–247 ; CZ, pp. 579–630.
- (52) “My Report of the Panel on ‘Critical Buddhism’”, KBK, No. 52, 1994, pp. (3)–(4).
- (53) Cf. Hakamaya, “Buddhism as a Criticism of Tapas” (Kugyō hihan to shite no bukkyō), KBR, No. 24, 1993, p. 345. Note that Yamaguchi, our mentor, left the Sōtō sect earlier than Hakamaya. On the problem of being within a Buddhist sect, see my paper “Reflections on Japanese Buddhism” (Nihon bukkyō eno hansei), *Buddhism in Japan* (Nihon no bukkyō), 1992, pp. 362–371.
- (54) Cf. Hakamaya, “The Sutras concerned with Rites for Extinguishing

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Evil” (Akugō Husshoku no gishiki kanren kyōten zakkō), (I), KBK, No. 50, 1992, pp. (1)–(28); (II), KBR, No. 23, 1992, pp. (15)–(34); (III), KBK, No. 51, 1993, pp. (1)–(40); (IV), KBR, No. 24, 1993, pp. (37)–(58); (V), *Komazawa Tanki Daigaku Kenkyū Kiyō*, No. 23, 1995, pp. 95–127; (VI), *Komazawa Tanki Daigaku Kenkyū Kiyō*, No. 24, 1996, pp. 67–91.

(55) Cf. Takasaki, *Tathāgathagarbha Thought* (Nyoraizō shisō), Vol. 2, Hōzōkan, 1989, pp. 372–373; *Reading the Awakening of Faith* (Daijōkishinron o yomu), Iwanami Seminar Books 35, Iwanami Shoten, 1991, pp. 205–208; “Buddhist Studies in the Last Ten Years” (Saikin jūnen no bukkyō-gaku), *Bukkyō-Gaku*, Vol. 36, pp. 2–6.

(56) For example, I criticized Takasaki’s interpretation of the passage “except icchantikas” (除一闍提) in the *Māhāparinirvāṇasūtra* (Taisho, 12, 404c; Peking ed., Tu, 99a7). Cf. DE, p. 4. There I argued that the exception here stated must be interpreted not as the exception from being possessed of Buddha-nature, but as that of becoming Buddhas. So, according to my interpretation, it is made clear by the passage that being possessed of Buddha-nature is not necessarily identical with becoming a Buddha, at least in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*. But, on this very important point, I have so far no answer by Takasaki.

(57) “My Report of the Panel on ‘Critical Buddhism”, p. (3).

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At the meeting above mentioned, Prof. Thomas Dean questioned me about my “subjective standpoint.” This question gave me an incentive to doubt the standpoint. After reading the works of Adorno, especially his critiques on Kierkegaard. I am now much attracted by Adorno’s objectivism or materialism.

At the same meeting, Prof. Yoko Arisaka presented me an off-print of her article, “The Nishida Enigma — The Principle of the New World Order —” (*Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol.51, No.1,1996). This is a detailed study of Nishida’s article in question with its English translation.